The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia

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List of Abbreviations

ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPT	Communist Party of Tadzhikistan
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
DDK	Democratic Movement of Kirghizstan
DPK	Democratic Party of Kazakhstan
DPT	Democratic Party of Turkmenistan
ECO	Economic Co-operation Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRP	Islamic Renaissance Party of Tadzhikistan
NRM	National Revival Movement of Tadzhikistan
NRC	National Reconciliation Commission of Tadzhikistan
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
PDPU	People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan
SNEK	Union of People's Unity of Kazakhstan
SPK	Socialist Party of Kazakhstan
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UTO	United Tadzhik Opposition
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

Acknowledgements

Map 1. Contemporary Central Asia

Introduction

The August coup of 1991 not only marked the beginning of the end of Communist rule within the Soviet Union but also provided the final impetus for the disintegration of the Federation itself. The effects of the post-Cold-War springtime of nations in Eastern Europe had reverberated throughout the Soviet bloc and once the full implications of the post-coup political situation had been realised the process of national separation began to resemble that of a *matryoshka* doll, republics rapidly peeling off from the centre one by one. In Central Asia the possibility of breaking away from the Federation initially received a rather muted response from the leaders of these republics. Nevertheless, the events unfolding in the rest of the Union resulted in the majority of these states declaring their independence within a month of the coup and even Kazakhstan, the most reluctant state in the region, finally declared its independence in mid-December 1991. These declarations were followed by a flourishing of writings on the area addressing the question of 'whither Central Asia' – what types of states are they? What alliances are they likely to forge? What resources do they have at hand?[1] A whole array of questions were asked about the region more often than not because of the West's concern over the influence of Islam in the region.[2]

This book sets out to provide at least part of the answer to the above question, 'Whither Central Asia?' In doing so it takes Central Asia to be the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan. The reasons for taking this group of states as constituting Central Asia is more to do with self-definition than some set of objective criteria. In fact, during the Soviet period the region was referred to as 'Middle Asia' (*Srednyaya Azia* rather than *Tsentralnaya Azia*) and was said to consist of all the above states except Kazakhstan. Soon after attaining independence representatives of all five countries met in the capital of Uzbekistan, Tashkent. They collectively agreed that the Soviet term should no longer be used and that the region would from then on be referred to as 'Central Asia' (*Tsentralnaya Azia*), thereby reaffirming that Kazakhstan's historical, religious and cultural ties are inextricably linked with the rest of Central Asia.[3]

In some ways, the situation that now confronts the Central Asian states are similar to the problems that have confronted many of the ex-colonial states of the 'Third World' shortly after they attained independence. In the economic sphere there have been endeavours to move away from an over

reliance on the extraction of particular products such as oil, gas, coal, cotton etc. towards a more balanced and less dependent economy. The fact that the former Soviet Union no longer provides a guaranteed market for Central Asian goods has inevitably led to a dramatic decline in living standards and high levels of unemployment further driving the search for new customers and the restructuring of their economies.[4] Similarly, the devastation wreaked by the outbreak of ethnic conflicts in many of the ex-colonial states after independence was granted has been repeated in the Central Asian region.

Earlier indications of future ethnic antagonisms were witnessed in the Gorbachev era. The first major clashes of the Gorbachev period occurred between Kazakhs and Russians in the capital of Kazakhstan, Almaty (formerly Alma Ata), following the replacement of the republic's First Secretary Dinmukhammed Kunaev, a Kazakh, by the Russian Genadii Kolbin. Worse was to follow in the Summer of 1989 when violence broke out in Uzbekistan between the Meskhetian Turks and Uzbeks which left over a hundred people dead; and a year later clashes between the Kirghiz and Uzbeks in the Osh region of Kirghizstan resulted in over three hundred deaths. These riots of 1989–90 mostly occurred in the Ferghana Valley where a multitude of ethnic groups reside, unemployment is high and an acute shortage of resources such as housing is apparent.[5] Only a year after independence Tadzhikistan was embroiled in a civil war that has so far cost tens of thousands of lives and as yet no solution to this conflict has been found.

It is this latter similarity between the ex-colonial states and Central Asia, the lack of societal cohesiveness within each of these newly independent states, that this book explores. By comparing the experience of the ex-colonial states of the 'South' with the longer-established and highly industrialised states of the 'North' it becomes apparent that these ex-colonial states often suffer from what has been called an 'insecurity dilemma'.[6] Many ex-colonial states contain a polyphony of ethnic communities within their borders to the extent that they are more accurately described as state-nations rather than nation-states. State-nations must contend with the fact that multiple ethnic communities reside within their borders and that a corresponding absence of societal cohesion stems from this. The difference between the two forms of state, state-nation and nation-state, is in reality one of degree rather than kind but the terms are adopted because they emphasise that many of the ex-colonial states have suffered from ethnic conflicts within their borders during their brief experience of independence.

It can be quickly discerned from an examination of Table A.1 that a similar situation exists in Central Asia. The most obvious influence on this

condition is the number of Russians residing within these countries; according to the 1989 figures, Russians were almost equal to the number of Kazakhs within Kazakhstan and constituted a quarter of the population of Kirghizstan. This has since changed because of the large out migration of Russians from the region: only 100,000 Russians remain of the 500,000 that were in Tadzhikistan in 1989;[7] in Kirghizstan the percentage has dropped from 21 per cent to 17 per cent; and in 1993 alone 365,000 Russians left Kazakhstan.[8] It is also highly likely that a similar out migration of Russians has occurred in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; nevertheless Russians still exist in significant numbers within the region and continue to constitute a large percentage of the population in Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan. In addition to the Russian presence, Uzbeks constitute almost a quarter of Tadzhikistan's population and form large minorities in Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan.

What are not so easily discerned are the intra-ethnic divisions that exist within each of the titular nationalities of these five states. In examining the contemporary situation of the Central Asian states it can be said that the politics of the region is still influenced by traditional, sub-ethnic, forms of legitimacy. Furthermore, the regionalisation of Islam also plays an important role. The intensity of the religion varies in several of these states from region to region further magnifying the divisions within some of the national groups within the area. Three possible sources that may challenge the stability of these states can therefore be identified: ethnic, sub-ethnic and supra-ethnic identities. The possibility of these newly independent states suffering from inter-ethnic conflicts is left until Chapter 5 of this book because of the relative transparency of this source of dissonance. However the possibility that within each of the titular nationalities of these states there exist sub-ethnic and supra-ethnic identities that undermine national cohesiveness is more difficult to assess.

During the first decades of Soviet rule the Central Asian region underwent a process of national delimitation. By referring to the two maps that depict contemporary Central Asia and pre-revolutionary Central Asia (Maps 1 and 2) the reader can readily discern that this process involved a major political and social restructuring of the region. At the turn of the century Central Asia consisted of a combination of multi-ethnic Islamic states or khanates and the territorial pastures of the nomads. Although Russian intervention in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had long term repercussions for the region, at the time many of the social institutions remained intact and local customs continued unimpeded. In comparison, the first few decades of Soviet rule could not have been more different, the ramifications of which are still being felt today. The political

boundaries of the region were redrawn in an effort to incorporate the major nationalities of the region into their own republics or autonomous republics. At the same time, these institutions were instrumental in further developing a national classificatory grid within the region through their, often Soviet orchestrated, language development programs, codification of national histories, creation of national symbols etc.

This book therefore explores the extent to which the national delimitation of the region has led to a process of nation-building within each of the titular nationalities whereby the intensity of sub-ethnic and supra-ethnic identities have decreased amongst the population whilst a sense of national identity has increased. Although, at the time of the formation of their republics, these ethnic groups were at various stages of development and national consolidation they were all best described as ethnic groups rather than nations.

In other words, a sociological distinction is adopted here whereby an ethnie is described as a conglomeration of tribes whose members 'share a sense of common origins, claim a common distinctive history and destiny, possess one or more distinctive characteristics, and feel a sense of collective uniqueness and solidarity' as opposed to a nation which includes these characteristics but has become more integrated so that any clanic, tribal or regional allegiances have become virtually insignificant.[9] These two definitions obviously represent ideal-types in the Weberian sense in which the abstract characteristics are said to obtain and in reality the situation is far more complex. However, such definitions are useful for emphasising the point that these groups were best described by the term ethnie as opposed to nation. In investigating the effects of Soviet nationality policies upon the Central Asian region the book therefore examines to what degree a form of nation-building has occurred which has led to further national consolidation of these ethnic groups.

The civil war in Tadzhikistan demonstrates how critical it is to understand the degree to which the nation-building process in the surrounding states has succeeded in promoting societal cohesiveness within their titular nationalities. The fact that Soviet social engineering had failed to generate a cohesive national entity within Tadzhikistan has been a significant factor in the country dividing politically into four separate regions. The example of Tadzhikistan serves to indicate how important it is to investigate not only the inter-ethnic but also the intra-ethnic differences within the region. To understand this fully one must examine the historical evolution of each of the titular nationalities and the policies that they were subjected to throughout the Soviet period.

At first sight the proposition that under the Soviet regime a process of nation-building was implemented within the region will strike the reader

as running counter to the oft-cited Bolshevik objective of promoting the flourishing *(ratsvet)*, coming together *(sblizhenie)* and final fusion *(sliyanie)* of the nations into a new historical community of Soviet people *(Sovetskii narod)*. However, the awakening of nationalism, prior to, and during the revolution meant that the initial formation of the Soviet state would have to incorporate the desires of the various nationalities that had come to the fore during the Civil War. The 'federal compromise' between the two elements, proletarian internationalism and nationalism, resulted in the Bolsheviks supporting the creation of a federation with each state possessing the purported right to secession.[10]

At the same time, previous opposition to the Austrian socialists', Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, suggestions of an extra-territorial form of federation had led to Stalin's definition of a nation as an 'historically evolved, stable community arising on the foundation of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up, manifested in a community of culture'.[11] This principle of the 'territoriality of ethnicity', combined with nationalist demands and the Bolshevik's opposition to the Austrian solution, paved the way for an ethno-territorial form of federalism.[12] As Rogers Brubaker has pointed out, the Bolshevik form of federalism therefore institutionalised two forms of nationhood, in the sense that the titular nations were 'defined simultaneously in territorial and political terms (as national republics) and in extra-territorial, cultural terms (as nationalities)'.[13] Although nationalism was severely repressed during the Soviet period the establishment of national republics designed to subdue such political movements actually led to the representation of such nationalities within the federation at both the institutional and cultural level.

In the particular case of Central Asia, it was a mixture of this Soviet ideology alongside *realpolitik* considerations that resulted in a policy of divide and rule whereby the region was delimited into five national republics. This was favoured by the Soviet regime for two main reasons. Firstly, the anti-religious nature of Soviet ideology meant that one of the objectives of the regime was to counter any religious movements within the region. It was said that there was 'a need to combat pan-Islamism and similar trends' which 'attempt to strengthen the positions of the khans, landlords, mullahs, etc.'.[14] Thus, the principle of 'national in form, socialist in content' suited the purposes of the Soviet leadership who desired to undermine the supra-national pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic movements of the region.

On top of this, in the Marxist progressivist interpretation of history nationalism was regarded as a more progressive movement when compared to pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism which were viewed as much

more reactionary. It was thought necessary therefore to wage a 'struggle against the clergy and other influential reactionary and medieval elements'.[15] National representation was established within the region as much to diminish the influence of supranational movements which were viewed as potential threats to the incipient Soviet state as to assuage nationalist demands. Central Asia was therefore delimited into national republics despite the fact that there had been several indigenous political movements prior to the revolution (and for a short while after) that desired the establishment of a multi-ethnic Islamic republic within the region.

One author has described the policies implemented during the Soviet period as a process most aptly described as 'nation-killing'.[16] To be sure, the harshness of the Stalinist purges which led to the wholesale elimination of the national elites of the region in the late thirties and the collectivisation programmes that resulted in, at a very conservative estimate, a million Kazakh deaths, deserves an even more appropriate appellation to remind us of the carnage wrought by such policies. The misunderstanding develops if the reader regards nation-building automatically in a positive light. In fact, as will be demonstrated later, the process of nation-building has often involved the loss of idioms and customs of local ways of life and sometimes the use of wide-scale state repression, to the extent that one author has questioned whether a more appropriate term for such policies would be nation-destroying as opposed to nation-building.[17] The repressive practices employed by the Soviet regime, although morally abhorrent, does not therefore automatically exclude the possibility that a nation-building process occurred within Central Asia.

It is also important not to confuse the terms nation-building and nation-making. It is evident from this book that the Soviet period in Central Asia did involve the standardization of national languages, the creation of national symbols and regalia, and the implementation of a classificatory grid based on ethnicity. At the same time the Soviet Union is one of the best examples of the extensive use of historicity by a state to realise planned social change and to achieve its social and political objectives. This use of historicity by the Soviet Union, i.e. the 'controlled use of reflection upon history as a means of changing history', is manifestly apparent in the republics of Central Asia in the arrogation of the region's history, culture and heroic figures for the various titular nationalities of the area.[18] In this sense it can be said that such policies have, in some cases, led to a nation-building process within these states, however, it is not claimed that Soviet national policies towards the region played a formative nation-making role in the creation of these nationalities i.e. in their ethnogenesis.

What is examined are the effects that the national institutionalisation of these ethnie had upon the social groups involved. The creation of these national republics was clearly based on the pre-existing ethnic groups of the region which were 'prior to and independent of the polities whose creation they legitimated'. But what is of interest are the long term effects this 'territorial-political crystallization of nationhood' had upon the ethnic groups that these institutions were said to represent.[19] In other words, the creation of the Central Asian republics with their accompanying national symbols, the state codification of national histories, the standardisation of the languages of the region etc. may have played a consolidative role in the national development of these titular ethnic groups. By investigating the extent to which these nation-building processes have contributed to the national consolidation of these groups a better understanding of the societal dissonance within these states may be grasped.

In summary, the objective of this book is to outline one of the main problems that confront the newly independent states of Central Asia: societal cohesiveness. The example of Tadzhikistan demonstrates that these states may be similar to many of the ex-colonial states in that they suffer from an 'insecurity dilemma'. Three possible sources that may challenge the stability of these states are identified: ethnic, sub-ethnic and supra-ethnic identities. The first of these factors, the existence of inter-ethnic antagonisms is left to the last two chapters because of the relative transparency of this subject. The intra-ethnic civil war within Tadzhikistan demonstrates the importance of understanding the sub-ethnic and supra-ethnic identities of the region. In order to do this it is necessary to adopt an historical perspective that examines the possible nation-building processes that occurred during the Soviet period.

The book is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 develops a typology of state power by comparing the industrialised countries of the 'North' with the newly independent states of the 'South'. The chapter abstracts three dimensions of state power: despotic power; infrastructural power; and legitimacy. Although this is a highly abstract typology it is useful in highlighting a common problem within 'Southern States': namely, the problem of legitimacy arising from an absence of social cohesiveness. In the case of Central Asia it is possible that a source of instability emanates from a lack of cohesion within the nation itself as well as antagonisms between the titular nationalities and the minorities that reside within their states. Chapter 2 therefore outlines the nation-building processes that have been identified as promoting greater social cohesiveness within a national group. These influences are later used to examine the contention that a nation-building process has occurred in each of the titular nationalities of Central Asia.

The remaining part of the book concerns itself directly with Central Asia. In order to investigate the extent to which a nation-building process has occurred in Central Asia a comparison needs to be made of the contemporary period and the pre-revolutionary situation. Chapter 3 therefore examines the identities, political movements and state structures that existed prior to the Soviet Revolution. Chapter 4 examines the possibility that the processes that were identified in Chapter 2 on nation-building have operated within Central Asia during the Soviet period. The chapter concludes that although certain influences have acted to promote the consolidation of the titular nationalities other Soviet policies have often acted to attenuate this process so that sub-ethnic and supra-ethnic identities are still very much apparent in contemporary Central Asia. Chapter 5 addresses itself to the stability of the Central Asian states. It therefore examines the continuing existence of tribal, clanic and inter-ethnic divisions within these societies and to what extent they serve as sources of instability within each of the states. The final chapter, Chapter 6, re-examines the problems that face the leaders of the Central Asian region in light of the findings of this book and discusses the possible options available to them.

1 The South's 'Insecurity Dilemma'

This chapter develops a typology of states that are said to exist within international society. Rather than providing highly detailed accounts of certain states the chapter adopts a more abstract approach comparing the experience of ex-colonial 'Southern States' with the experience of the more industrialised 'Northern States'. Writings on this topic within the subject of International Relations have emphasised the 'insecurity dilemma' that confronts ex-colonial states arising primarily from the fact that, unlike the nation-states of the 'North' where the state is generally coterminous with nation, ex-colonial states are usually state-nations, in which multiple ethnic communities reside within a state's borders.[1] This absence of a position of so called 'unconditional legitimacy' in the ex-colonial states because of the plethora of ethnic communities that reside within their borders, is said to be one of the main differences that set them apart from the more cohesive states of the 'North'.[2]

Naturally, generating an abstract typology of states in the international system leads to fairly coarse comparisons between those states that have relatively recently experienced colonialism and those that have not. The nation-state, where state and ethnic community are coterminous, is actually the exception rather than the rule in the international state system; it has been estimated that only 12 states can in fact be described as ethnically homogeneous.[3] Many of the 'Northern States' do in fact contain high ratios of ethnic minorities whilst some of the ex-colonial states are to an extent ethnically homogeneous such as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam so that it is more accurate to describe the difference as one of degree rather than one of kind. But in comparing the two forms of state it is possible to develop a general description of state power which may then be used to determine what aspects of the state-society interrelationship are relevant for an examination of the Central Asian region.

The chapter therefore begins with an overview of how international society changed and adapted to the arrival of the newly independent ex-colonial states on the world stage. From the differences that have become apparent between these states and the so called 'Northern States' the chapter abstracts three dimensions of state power: despotic power; infrastructural power and legitimacy. It is the latter form of power that is expanded upon in the rest of the book with its focus on nation-building. The question

as to whether or not Central Asia suffers from an 'insecurity dilemma' as do many other ex-colonial states is in fact addressed much later in Chapter 5 of the book. What this chapter provides is a categorisation of the various dimensions that are said to combine to induce this condition of insecurity.

FORMS OF SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE STATE SYSTEM

Since the Paris Conference of 1919 a fundamental contradiction has prevailed within international society between the principle of national self-determination and the actuality of the international situation in which the majority of states are multi-ethnic.[4] Two competing concepts of sovereignty can be said to exist in contemporary international relations. Firstly, there is state sovereignty which is derived from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia based on the mutual recognition of states as sovereign entities in their own right. Secondly, there is national sovereignty based upon the principle that individual ethnic groupings have a right to independent statehood i.e. that the political and national unit ought to be congruent.[5] The latter is more a political belief in what ought to be whilst the former is a reflection of contemporary international norms and the current condition of international relations. In the following section it is argued that state sovereignty is, on the one hand, supported and legitimated at the level of international society and, on the other hand, often undermined by the internal challenges posed by the ethnic communities residing within a state's borders.

   The majority of newly emerging states were, as a result of colonial rule, subjected to an alien definition of their borders which were usually drawn up with very little regard to the various ethnic communities that resided within the newly defined jurisdictions. The independence of these countries led to an acceptance of them as sovereign states by the existing international community and a *de jure* recognition of the externally imposed boundaries. State sovereignty was therefore recognised at the expense of the principle of ethnic self-determination. In some cases this situation became unacceptable and civil war ensued, the various factions more often than not dividing along ethnic lines. The frequency of ethnic civil wars within the newly independent states has been such that most writers on the subject are agreed that 'the primary physical threats to the security of the overwhelming number of Third World states are internal, not external; they result from the granting of international legitimacy to states which lack domestic legitimacy'.[6] Within the academic discipline of International Relations the arrival of such states on the world stage has led to a re-evaluation of the Realist paradigm.[7]

Within International Relations one school of thought, that of Realism, has predominated over all others since the end of the Second World War.[8] For Realists, the international environment is viewed as one in which a condition of anarchy prevails. The absence of an overriding supra-national authority is said to lead to a Hobbesian condition of all against all in which each state pursues its own self-interest (or possibly its community's interest) whether or not this conflicts with another state's interests. Realists conclude therefore that the existence of a moral and political community beyond the state is impossible because of the condition of anarchy that prevails at the international level.

However, a long-standing alternative to this approach, the English School tradition, stresses that although an overriding supra-national authority is absent in the international arena an international society in the form of common rules, norms, interests and values nevertheless exists.[9] The external contemporary environment that faces states is not of a Hobbesian condition of all against all, there does exist some kind of minimal international society. In other words, contemporary states 'conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions'.[10]

The English School approach stresses that at a very minimum it can be said that international relations do constitute an international society due to the mutual recognition by states of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the legal equality of all states. This is the approach adopted by Robert Jackson in his recent work *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*. Jackson argues that the 'triad of cornerstones'[11] of international society – sovereignty, territorial integrity and the legal equality of states – has gained increasing significance since the decolonisation of the 'Third World'.[12] According to Jackson, the Realist view of an international situation, in which states act solely in terms of benefitting themselves, fails to explain satisfactorily the existence of inchoate independent states which lack domestic legitimacy but are legitimised by international recognition of their sovereign status – 'the quasi-state cannot logically collapse into a state of nature because its sovereignty is derived not internally from empirical state-hood but externally from the states-system whose members have evidently decided and are resolved that these jurisdictions shall not disappear'.[13]

Jackson argues that, since the Second World War (the 1960s to be more precise), a qualitative change has occurred within international society. Prior to the Second World War states, according to Jackson, came into

existence by virtue of being empirical realities, each was 'an inescapable reality in the surrounding international landscape which other sovereigns were obliged to recognise'; Jackson has therefore identified these states as possessing 'positive sovereignty'. The majority of these states existed in the Northern hemisphere. 'Southern States', on the other hand, acquired independence 'solely in virtue of being successors of colonial governments'; these states are said to possess only 'negative sovereignty', because they do not consist of 'self-standing structures with domestic foundations but of territorial jurisdictions supported from above by international law and material aid'. When the 'Southern States' were finally permitted independence it was given regardless of whether or not they satisfied the previously accepted standards of sovereignty. Jackson therefore argues that many exist largely because of the international norms that ensure them freedom from outside interference, these states are therefore more accurately described as 'quasi-states'.[14]

At times Jackson is a little vague as to why 'Southern States' fail the criteria of positive sovereignty, but it is possible to identify in his work three possible reasons. Firstly, they do not possess the wherewithal to provide political goods for their citizens. Secondly, they are unable fully to protect their population from external threats and cannot claim to have a monopoly of force throughout their territory. Finally, there is a lack of domestic legitimacy derived from the population within the state largely because their borders were arbitrarily drawn up by the colonial powers with little regard for the fact that their territories contained a polyphony of ethnic communities.[15] The continuing existence of these quasi-states is therefore derived externally from the principles, norms and rules of the international system. In the words of Robert Jackson, 'Southern States' 'turn Hobbes inside out: the state of nature is domestic, and civil society is international'.[16]

For Jackson these states are juridical entities rather than empirical entities. They have not come into being by applying physical coercion so that other states have been forced to recognise their sovereignty. Instead, they have been granted legal recognition as sovereign bodies by the international community, whether or not they fulfil the previously accepted criteria for this recognition. Their existence is not due to the principle of self-determination, rather it is derived from international-determination. International society's emphasis on the *state* as the ultimate and final authority is achieved at the expense of the principle of *self-determination*. Adherence to this principle has been virtually universal during the period of the Cold War; Bangladesh was the only aspirant secessionist state to achieve independence successfully during this period, an exception that proved the rule.

Other writers have emphasised that these international norms have been reinforced by regional agreements between the new élites of these states who have felt threatened by the possibility of secessionist movements within their borders. Regional agreements have been based on the principle of *uti possidetis*. That is, states have agreed to retain their 'colonial administrative boundaries as international frontiers' at the expense of the ethnic principle.[17] An obvious application of this principle is the Organisation of African Unity which, in 1964, agreed to 'respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence'.[18]

In summary, the 'Southern States' are thus supported at the international level in two ways. Firstly, the 'triad of cornerstones' of international society – sovereignty, territorial integrity and the legal equality of states – function so as to support the legitimacy of newly independent state entities. Secondly, regional agreements based on the principle of *uti possidetis* ensure that existing borders between states will not be challenged and that secessionist movements within can be successfully suppressed without fear of regional involvement. Examination of the norms of international society has the positive benefit of emphasising the support that states derive for their actions at the international level and, on occasions, the containment of ethnic disputes within a state's borders. However, the important point for this chapter is that this support at the international level has led to an increasing number of so called 'quasi-states' since the end of the Second World War. This in turn has brought about a re-evaluation of state power and the possible permutations that it can assume. In comparing the newly independent states with the more established sovereign states several dimensions of state power become apparent. It is to this subject that we now turn.

THREE DIMENSIONS OF STATE POWER

In the preceding section it was argued that there exists a fundamental difference between the states of the North and the recently independent states of the South due to the change in international norms after the Second World War which applied the principle of self-determination to what Jackson calls 'quasi-states'. 'Northern States' were said to possess positive sovereignty whilst 'Southern States' were said to possess only negative sovereignty. The emergence of states that only possess negative sovereignty has highlighted the weakness of traditional sociological explanations of the state. Taking Weber's definition as the touchstone of sociological analysis of the state, Michael Mann has argued that this concept of state power is rather one-dimensional.[19] Weber describes the

state in the following manner: '(A) "ruling organisation" will be called "political" in so far as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded within a given *territorial* area by the threat and application of physical force on the part of the administrative staff. A compulsory political organisation with continuous operations will be called a 'state' in so far as its administrative staff successfully uphold the claim to the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of physical force in the enforcement of its order'.[20] Mann has argued that in fact the power of the state is two dimensional, that state power certainly stems from its monopoly of violence (despotic power) but that it also possesses a certain amount of infrastructural power.

According to Mann, despotic power is power executed by the 'state élite *over* civil society' and control by an élite within the state depends on the ability of that state élite to impose their rule on its civilians. Infrastructural power, on the other hand, denotes 'the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm'.[21] The latter type of power is independent of the form of government and is concerned with the bureaucratic effectiveness of the state in both providing resources, such as the provision of education, state benefits etc., and acquiring resources from its citizens, such as the collection of taxes. This type of activity can only be implemented if there exist various communication networks (roads, rail telegraphy etc.), standardised forms of exchange (coinage, weights and measures), a high standard of literacy and so on.

Weber's definition of the state has also come under fire from Anthony Giddens who, by comparing 'Northern States' with the recently independent 'Southern States', argues that the definition is flawed in three ways: the monopoly of the means of violence by the state apparatus may not extend to the whole of its claimed territory; similarly, the administrative scope of the state apparatus may not encompass the whole domain; and finally, the claim to legitimacy is a highly tenuous one. With these in mind Giddens defines the state 'as a political organisation whose rule is territorially ordered and which is able to mobilize the means of violence to sustain that rule'. As Giddens explains, this definition does not 'accentuate a claimed monopoly of the means of violence or the factor of legitimacy'.[22]

Giddens' description can be said to be more accurate in that it incorporates the conditions of many 'Southern' state-nations into the overall sociological definition of the state. Moreover, Giddens' emphasis on the essential characteristics of the nation-state, whether intentionally or not, sheds important light on the absence of such characteristics within state-nations. In describing the modern nation-state, Giddens argues that its attributes can be reduced to four 'institutional clusterings': 'heightened

surveillance, capitalistic enterprise, industrial production and the consolidation of centralised control of the means of violence'.[23] In some ways, these four 'institutional clusterings' may be said to collapse into the two dimensions of power set out by Mann i.e. Mann's despotic power can be said to be equivalent to the centralised control of the means of violence; while the other three 'institutional clusterings' can be (very approximately) conflated by Mann's general definition of infrastructural power. Although this may be oversimplifying the two approaches, the convergence will suffice for this chapter. Some support for this is found in Giddens' own work when he states that 'the process of internal pacification ... is only possible because of the heightened administrative unity that distinguishes the nation-state from previous state forms. On the other hand, this very administrative unity depends upon the 'infrastructural' transformations brought into play by the development of industrial capitalism, which help finally to dissolve the segmental character of class-divided societies'.[24]

So far only two dimensions of state power have been dealt with: despotic/centralised control of the means of violence; and infrastructural/administrative scope. The rest of this section addresses the third dimension of power; that of legitimacy. Regardless of the various forms that legitimacy can take, it is set apart from the despotic dimension by the interdependence between the state, on the one hand, and the society contained within its borders on the other. This is because the legitimacy of a regime 'depends, in general, on widespread acceptance of a myth that promises valued benefits in exchange for recognition of authority and obedience to those in power. By contrast, despotic rule is based on violence or the threat of violence so that subjects obey orders from fear, not respect'.[25]

Although Giddens does not include legitimacy in the definition of the state, it features predominantly in his analysis of the nation-state i.e. of 'Northern States'. In so doing, he introduces the concept of polyarchy – 'rule by the many' – and its historical association with the nation-state. Polyarchy, in Giddens' opinion, involves three types of citizenship rights; civil, political and economic/social rights. Civil rights are said to include the freedom of expression, freedom of movement and the freedom to form and join organisations of whatever persuasion. Political rights are associated with the right to vote, some form of representative democracy in which leaders are elected by the population and, tied in with this, the right of political leaders to form political parties and compete for votes. The last set of rights are involved in preventing the deprivation of the population by ensuring a basic level of welfare; something which has only occurred in the twentieth century and, in Giddens' view, largely because of the appea

of universal franchise. The development of these rights has bestowed some form of legitimacy upon the state from the society within its borders. 'Internal pacification' of the population has not only come about by the use of force by the state but also by the granting of rights which has made the population feel that the state now reflects to some degree their interests.[26]

In addition to citizenship, and related to it, is the growth of nationalism and its emphasis on community representation via the state. Nationalism can be used by the state as a form of ideology so that order is maintained as much through consensus as coercion.[27] By stressing the cultural unity of the community, policies are presented as representing the national or general interest regardless of whether there is any truth in such a claim. In industrialised societies class divisions arising over economic inequalities are ameliorated by the dominant class by presenting economic policies as beneficial to the nation as a whole. Whilst in less industrialised traditional societies where segmental divisions are of more importance than those of class, the appeal to national unity often hides inequitable policies executed by a clanic/regional/ethnic élite benefitting their group at the expense of others.

It is the latter type of legitimation that is of interest to this study. The idea of the nation is often invoked to provide a justification for the policies of state leaders. However, as was previously mentioned, the vast majority of states in the world are in fact state-nations, which are not socially cohesive because they incorporate a variety of ethnic communities each possessing their own common culture and sense of solidarity and significance. State-nations therefore lack this dimension of state power, in fact internal threats to the state are often of overriding importance. Ethnic, clanic and regional differences emerge over various policy implementations to the degree that the security of the state is called into question. It is of course possible that the other forms of 'legitimacy building' such as provision of civil, political and economic rights will serve to attenuate these differences, but it is precisely the fact that state policies cannot depend on a degree of cohesion within society that is significant.

This dichotomy between the state and legitimacy is reflected in the two forms of sovereignty that have been discussed. Within international society it is the state as a political entity that is recognised at the expense of the principle of ethnic self-determination. In community terms sovereignty can be defined as 'the political authority within a community which has the undisputed right to determine the framework of rules, regulations and policies within a given territory and to govern accordingly'.[28] In these terms, sovereignty is more to do with the representation of a community. This is in contradistinction to state sovereignty which has more to do with the state's right to control a particular territory and the population within.

If we now refer back to Jackson's analysis of 'Southern States' or, as he refers to them, 'quasi-states', Jackson implies that they failed the criteria of positive sovereignty in three ways: they do not possess the wherewithal to provide political goods for their citizens; they cannot claim to have a monopoly of force throughout their territory or provide full protection of the population from external threats; and there is a lack of domestic legitimacy from within the state. These three criteria can actually be explained in terms of the three dimensions of state power determining the type of states found in the international system; despotic power, infrastructural co-ordination and, most important for this analysis, domestic legitimacy.

However, the problem with Jackson's study is that it implies, whether intentionally or not, that all three dimensions apply to all 'Southern States'. As Jackson has pointed out in an earlier article, some sub-Saharan states may in fact be weak on all three counts, but this should not lead to a generalisation about all 'Southern States'.[29] This tendency to confuse the various dimensions is fairly common in academic writings on the subject. As Caroline Thomas has pointed out, it is just as misleading to label many of these 'Third World' states as weak, as Barry Buzan does, when in fact many of these states are strong states, in despotic terms, but possess weak societies due to their lack of infrastructural development and envelopment of diverse ethnic communities.[30] To be sure, all three factors are to some degree dependent upon one another. Infrastructural power entails, *inter alia*, the creation of a standardised language, increase in literacy, an improvement in communications etc. which also form part of the process of nation-building. Equally, due to the constant fear of secessionist movements from within, state élites may acquire a large inwardly pointing military apparatus to control the population. Yet the separation of the two forms of state power and the additional factor of societal consensus is of fundamental importance. Many other 'Third World' states are in fact despotically powerful or, more rarely, both despotically and infrastructurally powerful and yet still suffer from the lack of an overriding societal consensus. It would therefore be highly misleading to represent all 'Third World' states as weak in terms of all three dimensions of state power.

In summary, any sociological analysis of the state has to include the new state-nations of the South. By comparing these new entities with the nation-states of the North three dimensions of state power become apparent. These three factors not only help explain the differences between the North and the South but also the differences within these two categories so that, for example, we can say that Russia as a despotic and infrastructurally strong state is nevertheless societally weak due to its polyphony of ethnic communities. Generalising these three dimensions to the 'Third World' it can

be said that these states are marked by both a dissonance between the state and the ethnic communities within and by a general lack of infrastructural development, but only in some cases can it be said that the state is weak in all three dimensions.

UNRESOLVABLE UNCERTAINTY FROM WITHIN

This chapter began with a reference to Robert Jackson's book on the existence of 'quasi-states' within international society. It was argued that this work has been useful because it investigates the problems that face many Third World states i.e. that in contradistinction to 'Northern States', 'Southern States' are often afflicted by internal threats to their continuing existence. The approach is of value because it emphasises the fact that these states actually derive much of their legitimacy from the norms of international society which recognise the state as the ultimate and final authority in terms of internal political policies. The principle of self-determination is compromised in order to preserve the international norm of sovereignty.

However, in terms of analyzing the types of states that exist in the 'South', much of the literature on this phenomenon, including Jackson's, serves to confuse the various elements of state power and, therefore, the reasons for the existence and persistence of the so called 'quasi-states'. This chapter has identified three forms of state power: coercive power; infrastructural power; and power derived from the legitimacy of the state in the minds of its population. One of the primary reasons for a lack of legitimacy within 'quasi-states' is said to be an overriding absence of domestic consensus largely due to the dissonance between the state and the ethnic communities contained within its borders.

In comparing the conditions that 'Southern States' find themselves in as opposed to those of 'Northern States' it was suggested that the latter are more preoccupied by the 'security dilemma' that is said to pertain at the international level, whilst the former were said to be most concerned with the 'insecurity dilemma' emanating from within the state. The 'security dilemma' at the international level is said to exist because of the anarchial nature of the international system itself. Although cooperation between states is mutually beneficial, it is said that this cooperation, at its best, can only be very limited because each state is 'desperately unsure about the intentions of the other party'.[31] Each state is thus said to guard its own territory jealously, constantly vigilant against possible attack. The dilemma arises from the fact that the security of all states would be enhanced through cooperative action but because there is an 'unresolvable uncertainty' as

to the intentions of other states each must ultimately be self-reliant in security terms, despite the fact that this will lead to the persistence of an action/reaction cycle whereby each state in enhancing its security militarily will cause other states to do likewise.[32]

On the other hand the 'insecurity dilemma' refers to 'internal *threats to and from* the regime in power, rather than externally motivated threats to the existence' of the state.[33] The internal environment within these states is therefore said to be not that dissimilar to the external environment that all states face. Essentially, these states are unable to provide either protection for the population from violence or basic welfare needs, at the same time if only particular ethnic groups are in control of the state apparatus then the result may be the implementation of policies in a partisan manner. Insecurity therefore stems from a lack of one or more of the three forms of state power: a deficiency of coercive means; a lack of infrastructural power; or a lack of legitimacy. The ethnic groups within the state are said to respond to this insecurity in a similar fashion to the way states are said to react to their external environment. In other words this 'internal predicament in which individuals and groups acting against perceived threats to assure their own security' tends to engender 'an environment of increased threat and reduced security for most, if not all, others within the borders of the state'.[34]

At the same time these three aspects of state power are interlinked with one another. If a state is unable to provide for the basic human needs of its population then it is likely that to some extent it will also suffer from a lack of legitimacy. Similarly, if there is an absence of domestic consensus arising from social divisions along, say, class or ethnic lines then state leaders may react by strengthening the coercive power of the state. The 'insecurity dilemma' that state élites are presented with can therefore promote, in some cases, a tendency to rely on strong state control of the population as opposed to some form of popular representation. In some ways this mirrors Giddens' point that these states have not yet pacified their populations and are marked by their inward-pointing, rather than outward-pointing militarism.[35]

But, as was mentioned earlier, the 'insecurity dilemma' is not only associated with the social relationships between the various ethnic groups residing within the state, it is also connected with internal threats to the regime in power. The 'insecurity dilemma' is therefore said to emanate also from the society or societies within the state. The inability of these states to provide certain basic forms of protection combined with a real or perceived bias of state policies favouring the ethnic group(s) in control of the state results in a chronic lack of legitimacy often ending in violent

clashes between the government and opposition. In such circumstances regimes of such states face a dilemma over which policies to pursue to overcome their condition of insecurity. In particular, élites of those states that are ethnically heterogeneous are confronted with the choice of increasing the state's coercive means they have at hand or of ensuring both equitable distribution of resources and greater political representation of the various ethnic groups' interests. The dilemma that faces such élites is that there is an 'unresolvable uncertainty' as to whether, in the short term, democracy and more equitable policies will bring greater or less stability.

There are two main reasons for this uncertainty. Firstly, there is the possibility that giving greater political representation to the various ethnic groups will encourage such groups to 'turn inward and focus on their "difference"' at the expense of a more general form of citizenship.[36] Recent work on transitions to democracy has indicated that such a period is bedevilled by instabilities. Given the diversity of interests that exist within multi-ethnic societies, it is difficult for the state to attend to all of the demands of all the groups all of the time. It has been suggested that under such conditions there is a tendency for élites to get their issues on the agenda by drumming up nationalist sentiment for their causes. Given such support the state may acquiesce to such demands, but this practice runs the risk of engendering hypertrophied forms of nationalism and further instability.[37] Secondly, by promoting greater representation of other ethnic groups and pursuing more equitable distribution of resources the leaders of such states may find that they have alienated their own support base, possibly to the extent that new contenders surface to challenge them.

Yet if the demands for reform are left unaddressed such regimes run the risk of being violently overthrown or of further exacerbating ethnic tensions to the point of civil war. Therein lies the dilemma. On the one hand, the reform process is wrought with political uncertainties and possible social instabilities, and on the other hand ignoring demands for change only serves to store up trouble that is likely to boil over in an unpredictable and uncontrollable manner.

CONCLUSION

If many of the problems facing the states of the 'Third World' are in fact to do with their status as state-nations, as compared to the nation-states of the North, then we need to investigate how these 'Northern States' emerged. Earlier it was pointed out that in the case of the nation-state a sense of national identity preceded, or was concomitant with, the crystallisation

of the structures of political authority. If in fact a sense of national identity evolved concomitant with the development of modern state structures,[38] then what needs to be explained is how exactly the development of the modern state elicits a belief in the nation – an 'imagined community' in which 'the members ... will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their community'.[39]

In examining the persistence of the 'insecurity dilemma' the chapter has focused on the three dimensions of state power that may contribute to a diminution of this condition that many 'Southern States' suffer. It is the third dimension of state power that this book wishes to focus on and, in particular, the national solidarity that is said to obtain in 'Northern States' and the lack of this societal cohesion within 'Southern States'. Referring back to the objective of this book, it was said that the main aim was to answer the question 'whither Central Asia?'. It will be argued in this book that one of the most important elements in assessing the problems facing Central Asia is that of the third dimension legitimacy, in particular the problems stemming from the lack of societal cohesiveness within these states.

To evaluate the contemporary cohesiveness of Central Asian society its experience under Soviet rule and the possibility that a process of nation-building occurred within the region is examined. However this should not be understood as positively asserting that nation-building did actually occur under Soviet patronage, rather the book examines the institutionalisation of these nations during the Soviet period and whether this has led to the further national consolidation of these ethnic groups. In other words, the next few chapters will evaluate whether or not nation-building has occurred within the region, and if so, to what degree. By analyzing the historical experience of the Central Asian states it ought to then be possible to establish what types of society reside within each state and the degree to which it can be said that these states are cohesive.

It has been recommended by some writers that a process of nation-building by 'Southern States' will lead to a possible diminution of challenges from the ethnic communities within a state's borders.[40] If Central Asia has in fact already undergone this process or at least partially undergone this process, then they have begun their independence with a comparative advantage. To obtain an insight into the possibility of this it is obviously helpful to examine the European experience of state and nation building. However, there exist a variety of theories on the nation building experience of the 'North' and it is to these that we must turn if we are to understand to what degree it can be said that Central Asia suffers from the above 'insecurity dilemma'.

2 Ethnicity, Nationalism and Nation-Building

> Nationality does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the state. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind. (Lord Acton, 1862)

> Nations are nothing eternal. They had a beginning, they will have an end. ... At present, the existence of nations is good and even necessary. Their existence is a guarantee of liberty which would be lost if the world had only one law and one master. (Ernest Renan, 1887)[1]

Nationalism's death knell has been sounding for approximately 150 years. Almost before the baby had been 'licked clean' it was announced by Marx and Engels that it was suffering from an acute case of *Anno Domini* and would soon exit from the political stage as quickly as it entered. Ironically this prognosis was pronounced most emphatically in the 1848 Communist Manifesto, the same year that witnessed a host of nationalist uprisings in Europe. As one writer has stated, it would have been far more accurate for these authors to have posited that 'A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of nationalism' rather than its well known alternative.[2] However, their belief in the demise of nationalism has been shared across the political spectrum: Ernest Renan, quoted above, predicted as early as 1887 that some form of European Confederation would eventually replace nationalism; at the close of the Second World War E. H. Carr, whilst recognising that nationalism was at its peak, felt that the world was moving on to new forms of organisation; similarly, Karl Deutsch, whose work represented a watershed in writings on nationalism, predicted that the processes that had produced nationalism may 'soon come to turn against it'.[3] As late as 1990 Eric Hobsbawm was confidently predicting that the Owl of Minerva was finally 'circling round nations and nationalism' signalling its eventual decline.[4] Yet only one year later nationalism was to play a dominant part in the break-up of the Soviet Union. Challenges to other federations immediately followed in Eastern Europe with the division of Czechoslovakia into two independent states and the bloody splintering of the Yugoslav Republic. Other events elsewhere in the world shatter the illusion that this

is confined solely to the old Communist bloc; Canada, Eritrea and the genocidal atrocities in Rwanda and Burundi, to name but a few, serve as reminders that dusk has not yet arrived for nationalism.

This is not to say that many of the independence movements that have been witnessed in the last decade are not directly related to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Clearly, the unprecedented ideological conflict of the 'Cold War' and its corollary, the division of much of the world into two opposing camps, functioned in such a way as to constrain many national movements. But what is more noticeable is that nationalism continued to play a major role in international politics despite the imperative for stability in the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nationalism in fact cut across these ideologies in such a way that few would disagree with Anthony Smith's view that 'of all the visions and faiths that compete for men's loyalties in the modern world, the most widespread and persistent is the national ideal'.[5]

This national ideal is now an accepted ideology throughout the world, however, this very same ideal cuts right across the political spectrum adhering to no particular political organisation. This degree of political diversity is encapsulated in the two quotes at the beginning of the chapter. They were both written in roughly the same period yet in the first instance nationalism is said to lead to 'moral ruin' whilst the second account of nationalism views it as the custodian of liberty. This janus face that nationalism displays is the key to its universality, it 'tends to assert itself without at the same time demanding loyalty to any particular political, social, economic or cultural values or organisation'.[6] It is precisely this protean character of nationalism that makes the subject so difficult to study, and yet nationalism does operate within a largely assumed set of common beliefs and principles. It is the task of this chapter to discover the principles and assumptions that nationalism operates under and to outline the possible reasons for the increase in nationalism in the last two centuries. Some of these approaches are then identified as possible explanations for the nation-building processes that are said to have occurred in Western Europe. These will then be used in later chapters of this book in examining the effect Soviet policies had on the identities of the Central Asian region.

THE ORIGINS OF NATIONALISM

There is general agreement that nationalism, at least as an ideology and movement, is a relatively recent phenomenon and essentially a product of eighteenth-century Western Europe.[7] Of course this is not to say that

nations did not exist before this period, or that political uprisings involving particular individual nations have not occurred throughout history. What is suggested is that the principle that the 'political and the national unit should be congruent' is a relatively modern phenomenon as is its political adjunct, the nationalist movements which seek to secure this state of affairs.[8] These European roots of nationalism are said to have stemmed from two main sources: its political source classified as 'citizenship nationalism'; and its cultural/historical source which can be classified as 'ethnic national-ism', both of which are outlined below.

Nationalism as a political idea was initially expressed in the years lead-ing up to the French Revolution as an alternative to monarchial absolutism and the belief in divine rule. The French Revolution sought to enact this alternative by placing sovereignty with the peoples of that state, that is, the nation. Hence the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 proclaimed that 'sovereignty resides essentially in the nation; no body of men, no individual, can exercise authority that does not emanate expressly from it'.[9] As Walker Conner put it 'L'etat c'est moi became l'etat c'est le peuple'.[10] The French Revolution thus gave birth to the powerful political idea of the people's state in which the state's authority was said to be derived from the people and as such represented the communitarian will of the nation. It is largely from the French Revolution that the political part of nationalism originates, and as such, it represents the 'citizenship national-ism' of the phenomenon.

As Anthony Smith points out, the nationalism of the French Revolution derived its roots more from civic and political principles whereas the more organic 'ethnic nationalism' with its emphasis on the cultural source of nationalism is associated with the German movement epitomised by the writings of Herder and Fichte.[11] Cultural nationalism was given its theo-retical underpinnings by Johann Gottfried Herder's (1744–1803) concep-tion of the term *Volk* (folk). According to Herder's schema the world was naturally divided into several cultural groups each possessing their own tradition, custom, literature and language. For Herder, nationalism was less political and very much sentimental with each cultural group having a soul or group spirit (*Volkgeist*) derived from 'the long chain of national tra-dition from hoary primitive times on'.[12] However, Herder was well aware of the intermingling of ethnic groups throughout European history and the common cultural influences affecting many of the languages of the region. The emphasis on the necessity for each nation to have its own state is asso-ciated more with Johann Fichte than with Herder, despite Fichte's debt to Herder's writings. Similarly, the notorious concept of the superiority of the German nation (*Herrenvolk*) which found its outlet in the ideology

of the Third Reich is to be found in Fichte's work whilst Herder stressed the equality and flourishing of nations, each of which was a 'manifestation of the Divine'.[13]

This belief that humanity is naturally divided into God-given individual and clearly identifiable cultural groups has had huge political ramifications precisely because 'ethnic nationalism' endows the phenomenon of nationalism with a natural and absolute status. If the world is indeed naturally divided into different cultural groups or *Volk*, then, for nationalists, it follows that the only socio-political form that can rightfully exist must be that of the nation-state. It is precisely this form of argument, that the nation is a natural socio-political formation, that nationalists use to justify themselves, usually referring back to some (more often than not mythical) golden age when their particular ethnic group was clearly identifiable as a *Volk* and when their unique culture was dominant and untainted by outside influence.

As a result of the emergence of these two historical tendencies the phenomenon of nationalism has generally been analyzed in both political and cultural terms. The relatively new idea that final political authority rests with the community of people has also led to the question, what constitutes a political community? The belief that the world is divided into natural definable cultural/ethnic groupings has provided the answer in the form of national communities. Each naturally existing cultural/ethnic grouping has the right to form an autonomous political community, the socio-political community that is called the nation.

THE FUSION OF CIVIC AND ETHNIC NATIONALISM

This relatively new political principle that ties cultural groupings with the right to autonomy was succinctly set out by John Stuart Mill in 1861 – 'where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed. One hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves'.[14] Although Mill does not endow nations with the same status as the Germanic tradition the integration of the two tendencies, the civic and the ethnic are clearly at work here. It is the belief that political authority of a state is derived from the people and that groups of people are naturally divided into cultural/ethnic

groups, that has made nationalism such a powerful political idea. This merger of 'ethnic nationalism' and 'citizenship nationalism' has led to one of the most powerful political doctrines of the present era, so powerful in fact that the idea has now spread to every continent of the globe.

The main elements of the nationalist doctrine have been identified by Anthony Smith as seven propositions which are listed below:

1. Humanity is naturally divided into nations.
2. Each nation has its peculiar character.
3. The source of all political power is the nation, the whole collectivity.
4. For freedom and self-realisation, men must identify with a nation.
5. Nations can only be fulfilled in their own states.
6. Loyalty to the nation-state overrides other loyalties.
7. The primary condition of global freedom and harmony is the strengthening of the nation-state.[15]

From this list of propositions it can be readily ascertained that nationalist doctrine has its roots firmly embedded in the two core principles of 'ethnic nationalism' and 'citizenship nationalism'. It is apparent that propositions 1, 2 and 4 confirm the ideas of 'ethnic nationalism', namely, that the world is indeed naturally divided into nations and that the existence of these nations is a given absolute i.e. an objective fact. Propositions 3, 5, 6 and 7 follow the tenets of 'citizenship nationalism', that the nation is the natural object for peoples' political loyalties, in other words, a state's political authority is derived from the people's belief that it embodies the nation and in so doing the state represents a nation's 'general will'. The seventh claim of nationalist doctrine can also be viewed as a corollary of the two forms of nationalism; if nations naturally exist and each state's authority is derived from its representation of the nation as a whole, then it follows that global freedom and harmony can only be achieved through the principle of self-determination for every nation.

However, there are staunch critics from the opposite end of the political spectrum who have challenged such propositions. Pre-eminent amongst them is Elie Kedourie who has argued that despite the fact that nationalism has been transmitted throughout the world it is a European doctrine whose main premise is in fact false – 'nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organisation of a society of states. Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that

the only legitimate type of government is national self-government'.[16] Kedourie questions the whole doctrine of nationalism by attacking its fundamental proposition, asserting that it does not pertain to reality 'for humanity is not naturally divided into "nations"; the characteristics of any particular "nation" are neither easily ascertainable nor exclusively inherent in it'.[17]

Kedourie cannot understand why on earth a European doctrine which is, at its heart, false should be taken up as a cause by the rest of the world. For Kedourie, it is ironic that the rest of the world should have taken up the banner of nationalism for it 'is neither something indigenous to these areas nor an irresistible tendency of the human spirit everywhere, but rather an importation from Europe clearly branded with the mark of its origin'.[18] From his standpoint the fact that the nationalist ideology has gained importance above all other political principles has generally had disastrous results, creating 'new conflicts, exacerbated tensions, and [has] brought catastrophe to numberless people innocent of all politics'.[19]

Kedourie's analysis highlights the problems involved in the ethnicist's argument, however the problem with his own position is that he stresses the 'ethnic nationalist's' case whilst ignoring the underlying political reasons for nationalism. This brings us right back to the weaknesses in describing nationalism solely in terms of 'ethnic nationalism' and neglecting nationalism as essentially a political movement. His view of nationalism is one that over emphasises the romantic side of nationalism which stresses the belief in the *Volk*. For Kedourie, nationalism is not about liberty. For him nationalism as an ideology, instead of increasing political stability and political liberty, has generally had pernicious results. One would be inclined to agree with one author's view that, for Kedourie nationalism 'is not a child of reason or of liberty, but of their opposite: of fervent romanticism, of political messianism whose inevitable consequence is the annihilation of freedom'.[20] This has indeed been the case in certain forms of nationalism, German Nazism and Italian Fascism being two of the most obvious examples, but this does not imply that all nationalist movements are inherently pernicious.

Kedourie may be correct when he points out the weaknesses in the 'ethnic nationalist's' case, however he does so at the expense of the political elements within nationalism. Nationalism is above all a political movement which utilises the power and cohesiveness created by the belief in a common ancestry and common destiny. In this sense, the nation is an 'imagined community' but as such it forms a powerful belief which unites people into a political community. Anti-colonialism is but one obvious example of a political community being formed to overturn a form of unjust government and, as Ali Mazrui has pointed out, the actual content

of these movements was filled with the language of 'individual freedom' and 'democracy'.[21] In answer to the last page of Kedourie's book 'Nationalism' where he states that 'the only criterion capable of public defense is whether the new rulers are less corrupt and grasping, or more just and merciful',[22] it is precisely the hope for a more just and merciful governance that is often the driving force of nationalism as a political movement, whether the eventual outcome lives up to the participants' expectations is another matter altogether.

Kedourie is correct to point out a common error of nationalist thought, i.e. the general belief in the purity of races/nations. However, Walker Connor has countered this by stressing that it is the belief in common descent that is important regardless of whether or not it is erroneous. He agrees with Weber's definition that ethnic groups are 'those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent ... it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed identity'.[23] For Connor a nation is a 'self-aware ethnic group' in which the belief in blood ties acts as the essential social bond within a given society so that it is essentially inaccurate to label multicultural states as nations – 'whatever the American people are (and they may be *sui generis*), they are not a nation in the pristine sense of the word. However, the unfortunate habit of calling them a nation, and thus verbally equating American with German, Chinese, English, and the like, has seduced scholars into erroneous analogies ... the *absence of a common origin* may well make it more difficult, and conceivably impossible, for the American to appreciate instinctively the idea of the nation in the same dimension and with the poignant clarity as do the Japanese, the Bengali, or the Kikuyu'.[24]

In the above quote Connor, immediately after agreeing that common descent is a myth, reasserts the fallacy by neglecting to state that it is the absence of a belief in common origin that distinguishes the American people. But it is not only a belief in common descent that unites various groups; cultural markers also act as daily reminders of a group's uniqueness and difference from other groups. These cultural characteristics are usually either diacritical features such as phenotypical characteristics, dress, language, mores and customs etc.[25] These distinguishing characteristics of various ethnic or national groups provide the impetus for national movements, they act to promote the idea of common descent which underpins the doctrine of nationalism.

Connor's analysis throws open the question as to what constitutes a nation. As we have seen, for Connor a nation is congruent with ethnic grouping, his is an 'ethnicist's' view in which the nation is defined as a

'large, politicised ethnic group, defined by common culture and alleged descent'.[26] Following on from this argument Connor takes issue with the common practice of eliding the terms state and nation.[27] But these definitions originate from his emphasis on the immutable characteristics of ethnic groups which is undermined by the analyses in the next section of this chapter. The definition of these terms therefore depends on which approach you adopt when analysing the phenomenon of nationalism, some of which are outlined below. This section has emphasised the ethnic and political aspects of nationalism and how they have often combined to provide a highly emotive social force since the advent of the nationalist doctrine that the national and political unit should be congruent. These two approaches to the explanation of nationalism have formed the extreme poles of a wide ranging spectrum on the subject. The next section sets out some of the main explanations that lie between these two poles.

THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

In the previous section it was pointed out that in the case of the nation-state a sense of national identity preceded, or was concomitant with, the crystallisation of the structures of political authority. If in fact a sense of national identity evolved concomitant with the development of modern state structures, then what needs to be explained is how exactly the development of the modern state elicits a belief in the nation – an 'imagined community' in which 'the members ... will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their community'.[28] Four possible explanations of the creation of national identity present themselves: the primordialist argument; the communication/modernisation theories; the statist approach; and, finally the 'Marxist' approach.[29]

The Primordialist Approach

The primordialist or ethnicist argument originally stemmed from social anthropology and the findings of fieldwork conducted on a variety of ethnic groups in Africa and South East Asia. Such writings suggested that within any particular ethnic group there exists a common feeling of significance and solidarity towards that community and this is in itself derived from the existence of a common culture and a belief in a shared history and ancestry. It is these antecedent commonalities passed on from generation to generation within each particular ethnic group that act as the fundamental

constitutive building blocks of the social group. Edward Shils' seminal work on this approach examined the loyalties of soldiers of the German Army during the Second World War and concluded that their motivation could be traced to the fact that 'a certain ineffable significance is attributed to the tie of blood' and that 'Man is much more concerned with what is near at hand ... than with what is remote and abstract'.[30] In other words the human species appears to be less motivated by abstract principles and ideologies and more by a belief in common descent. Shils is therefore asserting that there is something in the human psyche that renders the individual overwhelmingly susceptible to the ties of the social community.

This view was taken up and expanded upon by Clifford Geertz who criticised what he saw as the main underlying assumption of the enlightenment, that the 'great vast variety of differences among men, in beliefs and values, in customs and institutions, is essentially without significance in defining his nature. It consists of mere accretions, distortions even, overlaying and obscuring what is truly human the constant, the general, the universal – in man'.[31] From his anthropological analysis Geertz argued that this supposition was a highly erroneous one, in fact the opposite was true 'man is precisely the animal most desperately dependent upon such extragenetic, outside-the skin control mechanisms, such cultural programs [customs usages, traditions, habit clusters], for ordering his behaviour'.[32]

For the primordialists, individuals are overwhelmingly affected by the fact that they are immersed within the culture of their particular community. Other allegiances pale into insignificance when compared to the attachment of local, personal societal ties which stem 'from the "givens" – or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed "givens" – of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the giveness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbour, one's fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself'.[33]

This school of thought has been given recent support by certain psychological and socio-biological approaches. James Kellas, for example, has recently argued that the human species has a predisposition towards inclusive/exclusive behaviour such that group formation within a community is

promoted whilst open hostility is displayed to other social groups – 'the balance of evidence seems to support the view that human nature includes instincts which are related to ethnocentrism and nationalist behaviour'.[34] In a similar vein Pierre van den Berghe has argued that the human species possesses nepotistic tendencies such that kin selection is said to operate whereby kin are favoured over non-kin. This nepotistic behaviour is said to have evolved in all social organisms because 'altruistic investment in unrelated organisms is biologically wasted'.[35] But these contemporary sociobiological approaches are still in their infancy and, as Kellas has admitted, they are therefore still 'relatively new, and controversial'.[36] In addition, the social biologists also differ greatly from the original primordialist account which emphasised the overwhelming influence of culture, rather than basing their account specifically on particular versions of human nature.

The assumptions and empirical foundations of the primordialists have been challenged by an opposing anthropological school of thought, the instrumentalists. The primordialists have not only presented the human species as overwhelmingly determined by their initial social surroundings i.e. their cultural community, but have also assumed that ethnic identity has a certain immutable and inert quality about it. If this is the case, then it is difficult to explain the integration of various ethnic groups and the cultural melding that has occurred throughout history. If an ineffable significance is given to kinship ties through cultural conditioning, then it is difficult to explain, argue the instrumentalists, the circumstances that pertain today in which, for example: the Greek nation is actually constituted not only from Hellenic peoples but also from Avars, Slavs and Albanians as a result of huge influxes of these people from the eighth century onwards; or the fusion of Anglo-Saxon, Danish and Norman elements that not only resulted in the creation of Chaucerian English but has created an English identity with a concomitant belief in common descent.[37]

The instrumentalists have therefore questioned the primordialist's view of culture, and instead have emphasised the variable and context dependent nature of ethnic identity. They argue that not only does culture change over long periods but also different elements of a culture are stressed or completely ignored in different situations – 'some cultural features are used by the actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some relationships radical differences are played down and denied ... . In other words, ethnic categories provide an organisational vessel that may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different socio-cultural systems'.[38] Ethnic identity may therefore be far more variable than the primordialists' version of events.

In fact anthropological fieldwork that has studied the dynamism and permeability of ethnic boundaries has highlighted the link between ethnic identity and the particular social and economic circumstances individuals find themselves in. For example, Fredrik Barth has researched how the change in ethnic identity of certain North African groups could be explained by the limited resources of their own sedentary life-style and the improved opportunities associated with the nomadic life-style of the ethnic group whose identity they assumed.[39] The instrumentalist approach in anthropology thus opened up the possibility that ethnic identity is, to some extent at least, malleable with individuals adopting new identities to benefit themselves. This therefore challenges the primordialists by throwing into doubt the unchanging nature of culture that they present and also the proposition that culture has an overwhelming effect on the human species to the extent that 'primordial ties' will always transcend other forms of attachment.

Modernisation Approaches

The primordialist approach therefore tends to ignore the dynamic and instrumental aspects of culture. At the same time it does not adequately explain the uniformity of culture and the existence of historical myths that exist throughout the population of a contemporary nation-state. National identity differs from clanic and tribal identities in which close contact is maintained between the members of the group because this personal contact is not a prerequisite – 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their community'. The nation is therefore 'an imagined political community & imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign'.[40] This section outlines one explanation for the creation of such 'imagined communities', the growth of communication and concomitant homogenisation of a state's population associated with modernisation.

Sociological studies of pre-nineteenth century Europe have highlighted the regional differences that have previously existed within a particular state's territory, for example, the extreme diversity of dialect, the separate local histories and myths and, most importantly, the resistance by certain regions to the centralising tendencies of the modern state.[41] Identity has not always been primarily associated with the nation. The more common structures were clanic and tribal where unity was based on a real or mythical common kinship.[42] Modernisation theory has endeavoured to account for the increasing sense of national identity by focusing on the process of modernisation and industrialisation experienced by the nation-states,

thereby explaining the eradication of regional idioms and their substitution by a uniform monoculture within the nation-state. Modernisation theorists stress the metamorphosis of society into a new form – the industrial society, with its concomitant processes of political and economic centralisation, standardisation of education, and the effects of mass literacy and the mass media. In other words, these theorists highlight the shift from an agrarian mode of production to an industrial mode of production and the corresponding change in society that is associated with this shift.

Karl Deutsch's seminal work on nationalism and social communications is one of the more widely acknowledged pieces on modernisation. Deutsch points out that one of the key aspects of modernisation is the 'social updraft' of the population, the mass migration of individuals from their rural surroundings into the industrial heartlands – the cities. Individuals are therefore uprooted from their local environment and local community in which bonds of affection, kinship and a sense of belonging prevailed. The deracinated individual is then assimilated into the dominant culture of the state. This mobilisation of people uprooted from their familiar surroundings and thrown into new environments brings with it new patterns of intensive social intercourse and, it follows, new social communities. For Deutsch modern society is therefore defined as a 'group of individuals united by the division of labor: persons who have learned to work together',[43] and Deutsch is essentially interested in what the limits are for these newly formed communities. If society is now based on a functional concept i.e. the division of labour, rather than a segmental concept i.e. group loyalty then, theoretically, the size of society should be unlimited. Deutsch sets out to explain why societies have developed into national societies as opposed to purely functional societies based on the division of labour.

For Deutsch the limits of a community are set by culture, where culture is 'based on the community of communication, consisting of socially stereo-typed patterns of behaviour, including habits of language and thought, and carried on through various forms of social learning, particularly through methods of child rearing standardised in this culture'.[44] What is essential in the modern era is the distinction between society and culture, societies are said to 'produce, select, and channel goods and services' whereas cultures 'produce, select, and channel information'.[45]

The limit to a social community is thus set by communication, those who are able to understand the socially stereo-typed patterns of behaviour peculiar to a certain social group and can communicate through this medium are included by default. As Deutsch has explained, 'What is proposed here, in short, is a functional definition of nationality. Membership in a people essentially consists in wide complementarity of social

communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group rather than with outsiders'.[46]

In other words, for Deutsch, modernisation has created a vast mobilisation of the human race but this has not led to an automatic assimilation of the earth's population. Instead social upheaval has resulted in the formation of nationalities which are based on cultural communities that are bounded by the cultural barriers to communication. Within each of these communities political cleavage becomes 'functional rather than segmental', the social bond within minority groupings will become weaker while the position of an individual within society as a whole will become more important. Two influences are said to be at work in modern societies: firstly, because of the division of labour within modern society, a person's political loyalty to a social class will increase at the expense of political loyalty to a minority grouping within a particular society; and secondly the increase of communications between the regions within a state, concomitant with the 'social updraft' of a population, eventually results in a sense of belonging to a greater community.[47] For Deutsch these two tendencies of modernisation will therefore tend to forge a nation via these assimilative processes.

However, this approach does not fully explain why an increase in modernisation/communication should foster a feeling of nationhood. It could be equally argued that the process of modernisation actually destroys any feeling of belonging to a community, *à la* Ferdinand Tönnies' famous division of social organisation into *gemeinschaft*, organisation based on the community, and *gesellschaft*, organisation as a functional society.[48] Tönnies describes the process of individuation and deracination within a society that has become, or is in the throes of becoming, industrialised. Individuals, uprooted from their local community in which bonds of kinship and affection existed, are said to lose their sense of belonging which they had previously possessed. Organisation based on the community is replaced by a contract theory of society in which the state becomes the final arbiter between de-personalised individuals pursuing their own self-interest.

Deutsch's analysis of modernisation fails to explain fully why the personal ties of kinship are in fact replaced by new social bonds instead of disappearing altogether as predicted by Tönnies. In addition to this, other authors have questioned why a growth in communications should help dissolve cultural distinctions rather than create disharmony between various ethnic groups. Under Deutsch's version of modernisation it is quite possible that rather than promoting assimilation the opposite may happen, whereby the increased contact within the various ethnic groups incorporating the state leads to an increased awareness of their own separate identities, their 'otherness'.[49]

The Statist Approach

What appears to be lacking in the above approach is the intervention of the state; industrialisation and modernisation may actually foster a belief in the nation, but other authors suggest that it is state control of these activities that centrally coordinates this process. It is along these lines that we should regard Weber's statement that it is 'primarily the political community, no matter how artificially organised, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity'.[50] These writers, then, emphasise the state's central control of coordination and its role as authoritative legitimator of a nation's past as a fundamental influence in shifting a population's allegiance away from the local level towards a larger collectivity, the nation.

Some writers have pointed to the European experience of state and nation building and have highlighted certain aspects: the length of time involved; the initial unpopularity of the state; and the implementation of brutal force in creating a situation of 'internal pacification'.[51] Such suppressions of the population and the existence of the state over a long period may explain the earlier assimilation of otherwise heterogeneous groups – 'where the framework of the state was strong enough and persistent enough, it even created a common nationalism out of very different linguistic and cultural groups. Languedoc was very like Catalonia and very unlike north France, yet it finally became thoroughly French'.[52]

This state imposition of a uniform language, standardised education, national symbols etc., what Gellner labels 'high culture', is said to lead to the eradication of local idioms. In other words, the 'previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves' is replaced by a nationalism which finds its source in 'that generalised diffusion of a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication'.[53]

Gellner takes many of the concepts of modernisation on board in his essays on nationalism but in a far more comprehensive way than has been described thus far. For Gellner industrialisation and modernisation is essential for the formation of nationalism. Industrialism and modernisation are viewed as working simultaneously – 'the two are to be distinguished only as the narrower and wider aspects of the same phenomenon. Industrialisation proper may be preceded – in certain odd cases followed – by the trappings, terminology, expectations, slogans of industrial society. A complex of such anticipatory borrowings may have almost as much impact on a society as the thing itself'.[54] The significance of this simultaneous industrialisation and modernisation is the effect it has on the changing roles of structure and culture.

Gellner argues that in so called 'primitive' societies there is generally a highly developed 'structure', i.e. 'individuals are ascribed roles which determine and circumscribe their activities and relationships to others', these societies also have a highly developed 'culture' i.e. 'the social position and relationships will tend to be richly symbolised in manner, conduct, ritual, dress, and so forth'. Within a highly structured society, where roles are ascribed and relationships set, culture is of less importance for organising that society so that culture and even language are not a precondition for communication. However, within modern societies structure is said to lose much of its significance for although the position and role of a person is set by bureaucratic organisations in the sense that 'bureaucracy is the kinship of modern man', a person still has a relatively free choice to move between organisations and/or change roles.

Culture thus becomes all-important – culture being, in this context, 'essentially, the manner in which one communicates, in the broadest sense. In simple societies culture is important, but its importance resides in the fact that it reinforces structure – the style of being and expression symbolises, underlines the substance, the effective role, activities, relationships. In modern societies culture does not so much underline structure: rather, it replaces it'.[55] It is this model of the inverse relationship between structure and culture that is missing from much of the other analyses above; for example, Deutsch's communication theory does not fully explain why communication has become so important in modern society and it is Gellner's model that is the missing key; communication in the widest sense has become of the upmost importance because of the lack of structure in modern society. People are no longer ascribed roles which give them identity, and this is why, as Gellner puts it, 'culture becomes' a person's 'identity'.[56]

In a modern industrialised society a 'full citizen' is required to be literate in the language of that society and is expected to possess a certain level of technological competence as well. Village-size social units reproduce individuals by incorporating the infants into communal life and by locally 'training' them, this turns the infants into adults which are a reasonable reproduction of the last generation. However, this is not satisfactory for the 'full citizens' necessary for modern society, what is needed is a far more centralised method of reproduction where the local method is significantly complemented by a centralised educational or training agency. What is required in an industrial society is cultural homogeneity within the political unit.

To achieve cultural homogeneity, a 'high culture' i.e. a standardised literacy and education-based system of communication must be superimposed over the local 'low cultures'. However, this 'high culture' does not

consist of a totally new and modern culture, instead it 'uses some of the pre-existent cultures, generally transforming them in the process, but it cannot possibly use them all'.[57] The 'high culture' is in itself Janus-faced, whilst spreading the bible of modernisation throughout the area it simultaneously spreads a uniform culture which has inherited as its base much of the culture and history of the preceding 'low cultures'. It is the formation of this 'high culture' which is, for Gellner, the cornerstone of nationalism. Nationalism is therefore said to be 'essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, whose previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the population. It means that generalised diffusion of a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication. It is the atomised individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves'.[58]

Gellner's account is fairly similar to Deutsch's in places but it emphasises the role of the state in imposing a uniform culture throughout its territory to a far greater extent. To be fair to Deutsch, he does mention that the channelling of communication by a government can add 'a name, perhaps a flag, usually a selective history and a set of related symbols to the existing relative complementarity and distinctiveness of a people'.[59] But generally Deutsch emphasises the inner source of political power that issues from antecedent communal ties so that from his point of view it can be said that 'on the whole, it is the communities that make governments',[60] the influence of the state is therefore relegated to some ordinal position.

Other authors have, in a similar vein to Gellner, emphasised the influence of the state and the effects that modernisation has had on the creation of the nation-state. Benedict Anderson argues that the political community of the nation has superseded the preceding 'cultural systems' of religious community and dynastic realm that preceded it. In the process certain factors were highly relevant in implementing this change, primarily capitalism, mass media, and the existing variation in languages – 'what, in a positive sense, made the new communities imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity'.[61]

For Anderson, historically, three types of nationalism became available: the 'creole nationalisms' of the Americas; the 'linguistic nationalisms' of Europe; and 'official nationalism'. It is the latter type that is of interest to this discussion. The typical example of 'official nationalism' that Anderson

gives is of Tsarist Russia which involved the imposition of cultural homogeneity from the top through state action by dynastic and aristocratic groups.[62] However, this imposition of 'official nationalism' by the colonial state not only imposed cultural homogeneity but it also spread modern-style education throughout the colonies and with it the idea of nationalism. In addition to this, 'official nationalism' gave the colonies a tangible identity through the imposition of the census, map, and museum – 'interlinked with one another, then the census, the map and the museum illuminate the late colonial state's style of thinking about its domain. The 'warp' of this thinking was a totalising classificatory grid .... The effect of the grid was always to be able to say of anything that it was this, not that; it belonged here, not there'.[63]

This highly original account has the merit of emphasising that national identity has not only been promoted by deliberate state policies but also through the scientific classificatory nature of modern society. Non-state influences on the process of nation-building have also flowed from the revival and invention of traditions by indigenous cultural societies and other less purposive activities. The creation of the Scottish kilt by an English Quaker from Lancashire is a powerful example of such a mixture of purposive and non-purposive activity. The Lancashire Quaker, Thomas Rawlinson, actually created the kilt as we now know it in the 1720s to enable the Scottish workers that he employed in the Highlands to fell timber more effectively. The design of the kilt was influenced solely by the functional requirements of the type of work involved; sartorial considerations played little part. However, the style of dress became increasingly popular and the combination of commercial interests and the influence of the Highland Society of London resulted a century later in each clan being identified by a particular tartan kilt pattern. The tradition that each clan has its own tartan pattern and the association of the kilt with Scottish identity is therefore a fairly recent invention. History is replete with other such examples of state and non-state activity which have promoted national identity but the example of Scotland is highly significant because of the original ethnic divisions between the Highlanders who were the 'overflow of Ireland' and the Lowlanders who were Picts, Saxons and Normans.[64]

As was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter there is also the citizenship approach to explaining the formation of the nation-state. It is argued that the introduction of common citizenship and the concept of 'polyarchy' i.e. 'rule by the many' and concomitant rights in the civil, political and economic spheres has aided the development of a national identity within the state. This popular sovereignty may have promoted the formation of a cohesive community by the guarantee of equal treatment to

every citizen.[65] This presents the opposite picture of the state as a despotic power suppressing any popular unrest. It suggests that it is equally possible that heavy handed state policies actually incite groups to fight for national separation. However, it may be that in certain cases both these influences are at work in a carrot and stick fashion such that ethnic groups that acquiesce to state control are rewarded with certain benefits whilst those that persist in their claims to independence are suppressed.[66]

State policies may therefore produce a unifying form of nationalism or its exact opposite, 'divisive' nationalism in which particular groups endeavour to break away and set up their own political units. It should be taken into account that the longer established nation-states in Western Europe crystallised in an historical epoch in which nationalism as an ideology had not yet taken root. It may therefore be that the coercive policies utilised by these states to assimilate divergent groups may act in completely the opposite manner under contemporary conditions by further provoking separatist demands rather than leading towards a situation of 'internal pacification'.[67] Another possible explanation of 'divisive' nationalism is associated with the economic rights mentioned earlier and the situation whereby inequitable economic policies favour one cultural group at the expense of others. The next section describes the 'divisive' nationalisms associated with such uneven development.

Marxist Approaches

It is fairly commonplace in the literature on nationalism to encounter the opinion that Marx and Engels had little to offer in the way of an explanation of the phenomenon of nationalism. Even writers on Marxism have claimed that nationalism represents 'Marxism's great historical failure' and that the leitmotif of modernity ought to have been that 'A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of nationalism' rather than the Communist Manifesto's well known emphasis on the spreading influence of Communism throughout the industrialising countries of Europe.[68] Yet there is much in the writings of Marx and Engels that has been put to use in the study of nationalism and it would be more accurate to say that their weakness was in failing to 'develop a systematic theory of nationalism' rather than lacking an understanding of nationalism as such.[69] Indeed, although Tom Nairn argues that nationalism is Marxism's great historical failure he immediately qualifies this by suggesting that historical materialism can 'perfectly well escape from the prolonged and destructive impasse in which it has been locked on the issue'.[70]

This section investigates two possible approaches associated with Marxist writings; the instrumentalism of class and the uneven development

accounts of the subject. The class-instrumentalist approach emphasises the employment of nationalism in the mobilisation of the masses for particular ends; ends which ultimately serve a particular élite or particular social class. The class-instrumentalist approach follows this form of explanation but stresses the historical part it played in the rise to, and preservation of, political power of the bourgeoisie. To take the reins of political power away from the formerly dominant land owning class the bourgeoisie needed to mobilise the mass of the population to their side, they had to, so to speak, 'invite the masses into history; and the invitation card had to be written in a language they understood'.[71]

Marx's own writings give full support to the idea that nationalism is used by certain classes as a means to an end. Although it is apparent in many of his writings it is given its fullest description in 'The German Ideology', one which echoes the later writings of Gramsci on the hegemonic rule of classes: – 'the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e. the class, which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force .... For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, put in an ideal form; it will give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones'. Such, according to Marx, was the case of the bourgeois revolution and the apparent separation of the public and private sphere represented, on the one hand, by the state portrayed as the political embodiment of the community exercising the general will of the people and, on the other hand, by a civil society consisting of 'unpolitical' individuals whose activities are governed only by their own private interests. For Marx this is merely illusory, the state 'is nothing more than the form of organization which the bourgeois necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests'.[72]

By the fact that the capitalist class is forced to organise itself nationally to enable it to take over the reins of state power and that they must gain mass support for their actions, they depict themselves as representing the national interest. Moreover in the process of taking power they must rally the masses to their cause by cashing in on the wealth of national history available to them. In a passage resembling Anthony Smith's emphasis on the importance of tradition and history for national movements Marx outlines the tendency of revolutionaries to 'anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow names, battle cries and costumes from

them in order to act out the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language'.[73] The national card is played in order to mobilise the masses to support a particular sectional interest within society, and it is not only written in a language readily understood but it is bolstered by the promise that the national interest i.e. the people's general interest will be guaranteed in the creation of a state that stands above the narrow sectional interests existing within society.

The class/instrumentalist approach may be accused of being a class reductionist one i.e. that 'social classes are considered the only possible historical subjects'. But the above analysis does not preclude nationalism as a phenomenon independent of class: it only implies that nationalist movements, despite appearing to forward the certain general interests, are usually instigated and controlled by certain élites representing definite sectional interests; particularist interests that may be to the detriment of the general interest.[74] As is illustrated below the general idea of disgruntled élites has been combined with the concept of exploitative economic relations between ethnic groups to explain the phenomenon of 'divisive' nationalism.

The 'uneven development' school of thought places emphasis on the existence of economic inequality as a primary source of 'divisive' nationalism. As was mentioned earlier there are two different concepts which are covered by the appellation 'uneven development'. The first is a spatio-temporal description of industrialisation and the wave of uneven development that has been associated with its establishment. Nationalist separation movements are explained as reactions to the different levels of affluence this creates between ethnic groups. The second method incorporates all of the above but adds the dimension of exploitative relations between a developed core and an underdeveloped periphery in which surplus value is transferred from the periphery to the core.

The first approach is a non-Marxist interpretation of uneven development and is best exemplified in Gellner's attempt to explain the multitude of secessionist movements that have evolved this century. The model of 'divisive' nationalism goes something like this. As the wave of industrialisation and modernisation reaches out across the globe its influence is not simultaneous, rather it hits the various areas successively so that 'nationalism is a phenomenon connected not so much with industrialisation or modernisation as such, but with its uneven diffusion'.[75] If, say, two territories A and B are united under one sovereignty but the wave of modernisation and industrialisation hits A prior to B, territory A will also approach affluence prior to B. The result is that 'B, politically united with A, is a slum area of the total society comprising both A and B'. What is important here is that if the people of B can be easily differentiated from the people of territory

A by phenotypical characteristics or culture, then the discontent will be channelled into a national expression. This movement, if it is to be effective, will include both the proletariat and the intelligentsia of territory B. However, after a successful secession, the intelligentsia will greatly benefit as they have created a 'magnificent monopoly for themselves', whereas for the proletariat the hardships are not removed and, in the short term, probably worsen.

Gellner's model of uneven development has much in common with recent work on the core-periphery model of nationalism which focuses on regional deprivation/relative regional deprivation. Much of this work takes its inspiration from the work of 'World Systems/Dependency theorists' such as Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein. A core-periphery relationship is said to exist between the industrialised and less industrialised countries such that 'the core concentrates and 'centralises' the accumulation of capital, including that which is derived from its exploitative structural relation with the periphery, and their hinterland'.[76] The peripheral countries are viewed as structurally dependent on the needs of the metropolitan western economies and this structural relationship between the core and periphery is essentially an exploitative one. The exploitation of the periphery by the core metropoles has led to growth in the latter and stagnation in the former.

Tom Nairn uses the core-periphery model to explain Scottish nationalism, focusing on the industrial revolution and the pre-eminence of fully developed capitalist countries over countries which were still predominantly agriculturally based. For Nairn, the origins of nationalism are not to be found in the belief in the *Volk*, in the myths of blood and *Geist*, but in the machinery of the world political economy, in the 'uneven development of history since the eighteenth century'.[77] This uneven development creates a dominance of the more developed countries over the lesser developed countries which, in turn, provokes resistance and protest within the lesser developed countries – 'real, uneven development has invariably generated an imperialism of the centre over the periphery; one after another, these peripheric areas have been forced into a profoundly ambivalent reaction against this dominance'.[78]

In Nairn's schema, the élite are the essential element in this reaction against the core. Only a few of the élite are included into the core's technocracy leaving a large pool of disenchanted and disgruntled native élites within the periphery. These peripheric élites had to mobilise the people of their native region so as to divest the core of its power within the periphery. The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism 'had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation had to be written in a language they

understood'.[79] That language was one which incorporated the unique attributes of the people of that region, the local culture, folklore, 'ethnicity'. In other words, the mobilisation of the masses was spoken in the language of nationalism.

The second approach explaining divisive nationalism is very similar to Gellner's in its conception of uneven development, however its emphasis is not only on the temporal wave of industrialisation but also on the exploitative relations which are said to pertain between the various regions due to this uneven level of development that has occurred globally. On the other hand, both approaches use the class-instrumentalist model to emphasise the role of the disgruntled native élite in promoting the rise of nationalism in the periphery.

CONSOLIDATING THE NATION

The explanations of nationalism outlined above throw into doubt many of the assumptions of the primordialist account of both ethnicity and nationalism. Primordialism, with its emphasis on the ineffable significance of cultural ties, fails to explain: the migration of individuals to other cultures; the dynamism of culture; the instrumental use of culture; or the existence of a national identity despite the fact that members of a nation rarely meet more than a few of their fellow members. The other approaches adumbrated above illustrate: the malleability of cultures and identity; examples in history of the merging of various ethnic groups; the adoption of a dominant culture by minority groups; and the ready acceptance of traditions that have either been invented or manipulated by various elements of the community. How susceptible culture and identity are to change is highly debatable with the primordialist and instrumentalist approaches representing the extreme poles of a wide spectrum of interpretations, some of which also furnish explanations for the cohesiveness and uniformity of the nation which can be used to identify possible processes involved in nation-building.

What is important for this study is that from the above accounts of nationalism it is possible to identify certain influences promoting national unity and other conditions that may act, in an opposite manner, to foster divisiveness. The uprooting of individuals from their local environment into industrial heartlands and the concomitant mobility of a population in an industrial society was said to increase the contacts between previously self-contained locales giving more concrete foundations to the 'imagined community'. Similarly, the imposition of a centralised and standardised linguistic and educational system is said to eradicate local idioms or 'low

cultures' spreading a standardised 'high culture' at a national level. In addition to this, there is the impact of 'official nationalism' or the 'myth-symbol' complex in which national identity is promoted through: the imposition of a classificatory grid; the symbolic representation of the nation in state regalia; and the invention or reconstruction of a nation's history, traditions and myths.[80] Equally, the literature on instrumentalism and Marxism emphasised the importance for the state of pursuing equitable policies and the co-optation of ethnic leaders if it wished to unify its population. In the case of Central Asia, Soviet efforts at controlling the various clanic and tribal leaders, whilst to a certain degree ensuring equity between these groups, may have provided an important environment in which national consolidation could further develop.

Within the literature on nation-building it is sometimes not entirely clear whether these authors are claiming a constitutive role for the processes of nation-building as opposed to a consolidative role. That is, whether the processes of modernisation and state-building are said merely to eradicate local idioms within a pre-existing ethnic group and assimilate other minorities or whether these processes are said to create entirely new forms of 'imagined community' from a number of diverse ethnic groups. In other words, have modern nations been 'reconstructed out of pre-existing social networks and cultural elements', or have they been completely invented?[81]

This book concerns itself with the consolidative effect that the formation of national institutions has had on the pre-existing ethnic groups of Central Asian. The creation of these national republics was clearly based on the pre-existing ethnic groups of the region which were 'prior to and independent of the polities whose creation they legitimated'. What is of interest are the long term effects this 'territorial-political crystallization of nationhood' has had upon the ethnic groups that these institutions were said to represent.[82] The following chapters therefore investigate the possibility that a nation-building process has occurred within Central Asia whilst emphasising that the building blocks of each nation concerned consisted of a 'central fund of culture, symbolism and mythology' associated with each of these ethnic groups involved.[83] Some of the approaches in the above chapter are therefore employed to examine the possible transformation of the Central Asian ethnic groups into nations in which tribal and regional identities have been attenuated.

Map 2. Pre-Revolutionary Central Asia: Its Incorporation into Tsarist Russia

3 Pre-Revolutionary Identities in Central Asia

The following two chapters examine the contention that a nation-building process has occurred in the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan during the Soviet period. Several specialists on the area have emphasised the national delimitation of the region and an accompanying nation-building process that is said to have occurred; one contemporary example of this interpretation states that 'one of the most successful and obvious legacies of Soviet domination of Muslim Central Asia is the territorial and political fragmentation of the area which has radically, perhaps even permanently, altered the geopolitical complexion of Turkestan [Central Asia] ... new language based 'nationalisms' were invented, bestowed, and promoted through competition for access to strategic resources among nationalities at all levels of social articulation'.[1] However, to what extent this process of nation-building has succeeded is contested between these scholars, some have argued that the Central Asian republics in which 'national consciousness was non-existent or merely in an embryonic state have reached the stage of modern nationhood; ill-defined tribal or ethnic 'sub-national' consciousness has disappeared; supranational pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic consciousness ... may have survived in the minds of a few but it is barely discernible on the surface'.[2] Others have taken a more cautious approach, arguing that 'even at present, these objectives remain unachieved; and these processes, incomplete'.[3]

At the other end of the spectrum there are authors who have described Soviet policies towards the region as 'a tragic experiment' and the general implementation of the Bolshevik solution to the national question as a process of 'nation killing'.[4] As was mentioned earlier the harshness of the Stalinist purges which led to the wholesale elimination of the national élites of the region and the collectivisation programmes that resulted in, at the very least, a million Kazakh deaths, deserves an even more appropriate appellation to remind us of the carnage wrought by such policies. However, as was explained in the last chapter, the nation-building process has often occurred under the tutelage of despotic states, therefore the harshness of the Soviet regime during certain periods of its existence, although morally abhorrent, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a process of nation-building has not occurred.

An examination of the ethnic composition of the Central Asian republics just prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union (Table A.1) presents us with certain key aspects of the region. To begin with, there was a strikingly large Russian population within the region especially in Kazakhstan and Kirghizia where they constituted two fifths and one quarter of the population respectively, even in the other three republics Russians made up at least one-tenth of the population. Secondly, within each republic there were significant minorities of other ethnic groups, to the extent that the aggregate within each republic constituted between 20 and 30 per cent of the total population. The significance of these figures is underlined when one considers that Russians were the majority ethnic group within Kazakhstan, and that Uzbeks made up 23 per cent of the total population of Tadzhikistan – the Tadzhiks constituted just 59 per cent of the total, similarly, the Uzbeks constituted 12 per cent of the population of Kirghizia – approximately a quarter of the Kirghiz population. These types of example are repeated throughout the rest of Central Asia, as can be readily discerned from Table A.1 (see Appendix).

Several issues arising from this data need to be addressed. It is clear from Table A.1 that there has been a large migration of Russians and other Slavic ethnic groups to the region and, given the overwhelming predominance of these groups in the Soviet Union as a whole, this raises the question of how much the region underwent a process of Russification. Many of the differences that arise over the subject of nation-building stem from the varying emphasis placed on the assimilatory aims and policies of the Soviet Union. The policy of 'national in form, socialist in content' has been interpreted on the one hand as a mere cloak for assimilatory policies which the Soviets believed would lead to the creation of a unified, non-national, Soviet people (*Sovietskii Narod*). On the other hand, the authors mentioned at the beginning of the chapter have countered that the introduction of Soviet policies in a national form have led to a type of nation-building within the Central Asian region, the policy of 'national in form, socialist in content' appeared to 'recognise the existence of nationalism and to stimulate its growth artificially while keeping it under close control'.[5] This does not mean that these authors deny that the promotion of assimilation has not occurred; in fact they simultaneously point to the Russification of the region, the 'many-sided influence of Russian culture [which] is manifest in every walk of life'.[6]

Many of the differences of opinion that arise over this issue seem to originate from the assumption that assimilation and nation-building are mutually exclusive processes. This may usually be the case but as the introduction indicated the Marxist-Leninist *Weltanschauung* adopted by

the Soviet state did not exclude the simultaneous implementation of both these policies. Rather, the introduction of nation-building to the Central Asian region was regarded as part of a progressive dialectical process which would eventually result in the dissolution of nationalities and the advent of a new historical epoch heralding the establishment of a new community of Soviet people.

Another point that needs to be addressed is the inclusion of large numbers of ethnic minorities of the other titular nationalities of the region within each other's borders. This arbitrary placement of the Central Asian republics' boundaries has meant that borders actually cut across and divide ethnic communities, to the extent that one author has recently described the contemporary situation as 'a patchwork quilt rent by ethnic, regional, and tribal disputes over land and natural resources'.[7] This strongly suggests that the national delimitation of the region was influenced as much by *realpolitik* and the principle of *divide et impera* as it was by Marxist ideology.[8] What is more likely is that such policies reflected a fusion of both *realpolitik* and Soviet ideology. The delimitation of the region into national republics was probably designed ultimately to undermine the supra-national Islamic and pan-Turkic movements which were very much apparent at the turn of the century. At the same time this was consonant with the Marxist progressivist interpretation of history which regarded nationalism as a lesser evil when compared to the Pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic movements which were then evident within Central Asia. The retention of significant numbers of minorities from the other titular nationalities of Central Asia within each state ensured that the Soviet authorities could rely on support against any individual state exhibiting 'excessive' nationalist tendencies. Finally, if for some reason the Soviet Union were by chance to lose control of the area, such minority issues would probably inject such a degree of instability into the region that no significant coalition would arise from there to threaten it.

It is therefore possible to posit a three fold explanation of the delimitation of Central Asia: national consolidation would provide a way of diminishing the influence of supranational movements which were viewed as potential threats to the incipient Soviet state: it was thought that the introduction of a nation-building process with a simultaneous promotion of proletarian internationalism would eventually lead to the integration of the region into the larger community of Soviet people: the drawing up of borders that cut across the various national communities would serve to stimulate antagonisms between the national republics further undermining supranational allegiances, it would also ensure that within each state a natural bulwark against a republic's 'national excesses' would exist.[9] In other

words, the existence of large numbers of other titular national groups within each of the Central Asian republics does not necessarily preclude the possibility that a nation-building process was implemented within the region.

The earlier chapter on nationalism explained that the term 'nation-building' is one which describes the transformation of an ethnic group in which identity is primarily associated at the tribal level (and/or possibly at the supra-national level) to a nation in which these identities are replaced by a national identity. This is not meant to imply that in reality within a nation other identities do not compete for a people's loyalty. Rather it suggests an ideal-type of nation in the Weberian sense in which the abstract characteristics of what constitutes a nation are said to obtain.[10]

The standard anthropological definition of a clan is usually based on kinship and common ownership of lands and livestock, however, a clan's natural growth normally leads to a shift away from common ownership leaving the clan's kinship as its defining element. Therefore, the clan is best described as a 'unilineal descent-group: that is, a body of persons claiming common descent from an ancestor (often mythical) and recruiting the children of either male or female members, but not of both'.[11] A tribe is a grouping of these clans so that the tribe is above the direct kin group but 'is still small enough to claim common descent although it is large enough to permit intermarriage'.[12] It follows from this that, if an ethnie is a conglomeration of tribes, an ethnic community can be defined as 'a social group whose members share a sense of common origins, claim a common distinctive history and destiny, possess one or more distinctive characteristics, and feel a sense of collective uniqueness and solidarity'.[13] But this definition needs to include the extant division of the ethnic group into tribes and the possible existence of supra-national identities the term 'social group' should therefore be altered to 'tribal union'. This would then emphasise the uniqueness of the nation which, if regarded as an ideal-type abstraction, would be marked by the absence of sub-national and supra-national identities and could be defined as 'a large, vertically integrated and territorially mobile group featuring common citizenship rights and collective sentiment together with one (or more) common characteristic(s) which differentiate its members from those of similar groups with whom they stand in relations of alliance or conflict'.[14]

In order to establish the transformative effects that Soviet policy had within Central Asia the condition of the region, prior to the Revolution, needs to be examined. The object of this chapter is therefore to ascertain to what extent the peoples of the region prior to the Soviet Revolution identified with the ethnic/national grouping they were said to belong to, and to

what extent other social groupings acted as alternative forms of identity. In other words, the chapter examines the various forms of sub-ethnic, ethnic and supra-ethnic identities which existed in pre-revolutionary Central Asia in order to establish to what degree Soviet policies were responsible for the national identities evident in Central Asia.

It should not automatically be assumed that because an ethnic group is clearly identifiable that its people's identity and loyalty are centred at the ethnic level. The 'objective' categorisation of ethnic groups has inherent weaknesses because of its inability to take into account the subject's own interpretation of their surroundings. This is obviously a recurrent episte-mological debate in many spheres of the Social Sciences and is repre-sented in anthropological ethnic classification under the dichotomy of 'emic' and 'etic' categorisation.[15] It may be that the pervasiveness and popularity of nationalism sometimes colours our interpretation of events; as one author put it, 'history has ... mostly been written from national perspectives about 'nation' states or at most about 'civilisations' ... National(ist) or not, historical writing or written history has been overly Eurocentric. This Euro (or Western) centrism has marked and (de)formed not only historical writing about 'the West', but also about 'the East' and 'the south' ... It blinds people to Central Asia and especially to anything important or good coming out of it'.[16] Suffice it to say that it is possible that the identity of Central Asians at the turn of the century may not neces-sarily have been at the national level; supra-ethnic solidarities such as Christianity or Islam and sub-ethnic identities such as a people's identifi-cation with a city-state or tribe may be essential in the composition of identities within a region. The following will therefore endeavour to estab-lish what identities were prevalent within Central Asia on the eve of the Soviet Revolution.

ETHNIC IDENTITIES WITHIN CENTRAL ASIA

The Altai mountains, the border crossroads of Russia, Kazakhstan, China and Mongolia, are considered to be the earliest home of both the Turks and the Mongols. In 551 AD a Turkish Empire arose in Mongolia and by 565 AD this had led to their presence during the sixth century in Kazakhstan and western Central Asia displacing the Ephthalites (White Huns) who had resided there for two centuries.[17] By the eleventh century Turkic tribes had come to dominate Central Asia to the extent that the region became known as 'Turkestan', at the same time their influence had also spread to Asia Minor, southern Russia and the Caucasus.[18] The

increasing dispersion of the Turks eventually led to the formation of a
Western and Eastern branch. The Western Branch was represented by the
Oghuz Turks who rose to prominence after the decline of the Karakanids
who had established the first officially Islamic Turkish state in Central
Asia.[19] The Oghuz Turks, which are thought to have been composed of 24
clans and initially based north of the Aral Sea, spawned the Seljuk Empire
(1038–1150) that conquered Persia, Syria and Armenia; the Ottomans of
Turkey; and the Turkmens of Turkmenistan. The Kipchak branch (Eastern)
formed the main Turkish component of the Turco-Mongol agglomeration
of tribes.[20]

Prior to the Turkish incursions Central Asia had experienced successive
Persian invasions from the sixth century BC onwards. Although Persian
control was immediately succeeded by the conquest of the region by
Alexander the Great between 330 and 327 BC, Persian rule was reasserted
in the third century AD by the Sasanian Empire which spread from Iran
through Central Asia to the Caucasus, but the Persian influence was again
supplanted by an invasion of the Huns (Epthalites) in 425 AD. The Arabs
invaded Central Asia in the middle of the seventh century (AD) and con-
quered the whole area south of the Syr Darya by the beginning of the
eighth century, bringing the Islamic religion and the Arabic script with
them. However, throughout this period the earlier Persian influence remained
and, in fact, during the Bukharan based Samanid dynasty (875–999) Persian
literature began its full development.[21]

Eventually the Turkish encroachments mentioned above led to the gen-
eral turkification of the region despite the renewed Persian influence via
the Saffavid dynasty (1502–1736 AD) and, after its fall, by Nadir Shah's
incursions into Central Asia (1740).[22] Although a considerable melding of
cultures inevitably occurred, Turkic influences have predominated to the
extent that the Tadzhiks of contemporary Bukhara, Samarkand and
Tadzhikistan represent the only remaining areas where Persian influence
remains strong and self-evident. Within Tadzhikistan itself the Tadzhiks
are divided into two branches: although the mountain Tadzhiks or Pamiris
speak a 'welter of tongues and dialects' they can be generally placed in the
East Iranian group of languages, and are also generally Ismailis who fol-
low the Aga Khan; the Tadzhiks of the plains of Western Tadzhikistan are
speakers of a West Iranian language very similar to Farsi (Persian) and
generally follow the Sunni branch of Islam.[23]

The Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century marked the beginning of
the period which the Russians refer to as the time of the 'Tatar yoke'. By
the mid-thirteenth century the Mongol rulers had divided into the Ulus of
Dzhuchi and the Ulus of Chagatai ruled by the eldest and second eldest

sons of Genghis (Chingis) Khan respectively. The use of Turkic soldiers in the Mongol military machine and the ubiquity of Turkic culture throughout the area eventually led both of these Mongol 'houses' to become Turkic states. Of the three ethnic groups not yet accounted for it is only the Kirghiz's origins that are unconnected to the Mongol dynasties. It is thought that the Kirghiz were originally settled on the Upper Yenesei River but later migrated in the twelfth century to the western Tien Shan mountain range, however one author dates the migration as a century later and attributes the cause to the rise of the Mongols.[24]

When part of the Ulus of Dzhuchi began to weaken the Uzbeks were united under Abul Khayr (1412/13–1468) a descendent of Dzhuchi's youngest son Shaibani. Initially this confederation is thought to have been constituted from twenty-four tribes, but by the sixteenth century with the defeat of the Timurid rulers of Samarkand and the establishment of the Uzbek empire their ranks had swollen to incorporate a total of ninety-two tribes.[25] Although the Uzbeks are more accurately known as the Shaibanids they seem to have taken their name from Khan Uzbek (1282–1342) of the Golden Horde (a section of the Ulus of Dzhuchi). The ethnogenesis of the Kazakhs has been traced to the breaking away of a splinter group from the Uzbek confederation prior to the conquest of the Timurid Kingdom. The split appears to have resulted from a dispute between Abul Khayr, the first of the Uzbek Khans, and the Kazakh leaders Girey and Dzhanibek which led the newly formed Kazakh group to migrate north of the Syr Darya River, the river serving as a natural geographical barrier between themselves and the Uzbeks.[26]

Although the exact dates of ethnogenesis of each of the ethnic groups are not particularly clear the formation of each group is clearly identifiable. Earlier it was emphasised that the connection between the Kirghiz which were established on the Yenisei River and first reported in Chinese annals in the first century BC and the Kirghiz of the Tien Shan mountain range may be a little tenuous. However even if this connection is not accepted, then the Kirghiz are first noted in the twelfth century AD. This would place them as the second longest established group of the region after the Tadzhiks, of which the various groups comprising the eastern branch are reported as early as the second century AD whilst the Tadzhiks of the plains are thought to have coalesced into a single group in the eighth century AD.[27] The identification of the Turkmen as a distinctly separate group from the larger Turkic Oghuz family is debatable. The appellation Turkmen first appeared in the tenth century AD to distinguish between those Oghuz who had been converted to Islam and those who had not. However, the actual consolidation of the Turkmen into a separate entity is

generally placed between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.[28] This would put the final ethnogenesis of the Turkmens in the same period as the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs, the Kazakhs separating from the main body of the Uzbeks during the reign of their first Khan.

These ethnic groups were differentiated by their costume, customs, language, myths and culture. Certain aspects of culture were common to the region as a whole. For example, some of the historical epics (*Alpamysh, Dede Korkut* and *Kör Oghlu*) which were traditionally recited orally by national bards were in fact common to the whole of the region and as such widely known among all Turkic peoples; *Kör Oghlu* is also known among the Iranian population of Tadzhikistan under the name of *Gurguli*.[29] But other epics and national literature reflect and chronicle the individual history of each of the ethnic groups. For example, the Kirghiz epic *Manas* which has been labelled 'the Iliad of the Steppe' relates the trials and tribulations of the Kirghiz and warns of the possible loss of sovereignty if ethnic disunity continues; the Kazakh epics that range from historical accounts of battles (*Koblandy-Batir*) to love stories (*Kiz-Jhibek*); similarly the Turkmen possessed major epics such as *Oguz-Nama*, about the legendary Oguz Khan, mythical predecessor of all Turks, but also romantic folklore, such as *Kör Ogli, Kissa-i-Yusuf* and *Seyid Battal*.[30] The fact that the majority of these populations were illiterate increases the significance of these epics in the formation and maintenance of separate ethnic identities. As one scholar points out, despite their nomadic way of life and an absence of general literacy the Kazakhs were in fact the first group in which a national movement began to take shape, and this is largely attributed to the fact that 'through their epic poems [they] had a considerable knowledge of their history and of their existence as an individual people quite distinct from the Chinese, the Oyrats and the settled peoples of the Oases'.[31]

In addition to the oral epics literary poets in three of the ethnic groups had developed written national works. The Tadzhiks possessed classic literature of which Abu'l-Qasim Firdousi's (934–1025 AD) epic poem *Shakh Name* (Book of Kings) which presents the epic of the Iranian empire is one of the best examples.[32] National literature often acted in such a manner as to promote embryonic national languages. Such was the case with the famous Timurid poet Mir Ali Shir (Navai) who adopted the use of the Chagatai language as well as the more common literary languages Persian and Arabic, thereby promoting the use of Chagatai not only in the Timurid dynasty that rose to power under Tamerlane but also in the Uzbek empire which succeeded it at the end of the 15th century.[33] Similarly the eighteenth-century Turkmen poet, Makhtumkuli, did much

to advance the use of the Turkmen literary language at the expense of Chagatai which had become something of a *lingua franca* throughout the whole of the region since its creation in the 14th century.[34] However, just prior to the Soviet Revolution national literary languages were also being promoted by writers in the two other ethnic groups. Ibrahim Altynsaryn (1841–1889), Chokan Valikhan (1837–65) and Abay Kunanbay (1845–1904) were instrumental in promoting a Kazakh literary language, and although the Kirghiz literary language only appeared in a very inchoate form in 1910, Osmanali Sidik-uulu had published 'The History of the Kirghiz' and 'The History of the Kirghiz Shadman' by 1914, works clearly promoting a national awareness amongst Kirghiz intellectuals.[35]

The most common indication of national cohesiveness and/or national consciousness is the use of a national language. However, this criterion did not fully apply to Central Asia prior to the Revolution. Language may have acted as one of the ethnic delimiters of the region but whether it acted as the defining principle is questionable. The question of how far each of the languages had diverged from their common Turkic origins (with the exception of the Tadzhik language) is debatable. At one end of the spectrum there are scholars who argue that 'it is possible to speak of the Central Asian Muslims as possessing linguistic unity: the dialectical differences, significant as they are to the philologist, neither prevent effective communication among the Turkic inhabitants nor preclude the eventual emergence of a single Turkic literary language for Central Asia'.[36] Others of another persuasion believe that '(L)inguistic differentiation had progressed too far among the Turkic peoples to permit them to find a common language suitable for literature a thousand years after their territorial and linguistic unity had been disrupted'.[37]

One of the main reasons for the differing accounts as to what stage each of the languages had reached is that, although each ethnic group possessed a unique language, these languages had in most cases only recently taken a written form. In fact, two main literary languages were employed throughout the whole of the region, Chagatai and Persian, and these acted as the main form of verbal and written communication between the élites of the various ethnie. Chagatai (nowadays called 'old literary Uzbek'), was first promoted as a literary language by the Timurid dynasty which established itself in Central Asia at the end of the 14th century[38] and had become the literary language of the whole region, aided much by the writings of the Emperor Babur (1482–1530) at the end of the Timurid dynasty and, as already mentioned, by the poet Mir Ali Shir (1441–1501).[39] Its continuing influence was assured by its adoption by the Uzbek empire that succeeded the Timurid dynasty and became associated with the former to the extent

that it is often referred to as 'old Uzbek' rather than Chagatai. The second language was Persian, which was taught in all the religious schools and was an established state language, sometimes displacing Chagatai as the favoured language: for example, the emirs of Bukhara and their administration preferred the use of Persian to Chagatai.[40] The use of both Persian and Chagatai in the various administrations of the regions meant that the majority of pre-revolutionary intellectuals were at least bilingual.

Besides the two main literary languages, Chagatai and Persian, national literary languages had also appeared within the region. The Kazakh literary language was created at the latter end of the nineteenth century by the son of the chief of a Kazakh clan, Abay Kunanbayev, and in the mid-nineteenth century and prior to the Revolution it had begun partly to supplant Kazan Tatar and Chagatai as the language of the region.[41] Similarly, by the end of the eighteenth century literary Uzbek had appeared, although at the beginning of the twentieth century its usage was still fairly limited. During the same period the Turkmen were using a literary language that was half Turkmen and half Chagatai, but its usage was similarly restricted.[42] The Tadzhiks spoke Farsi (Persian), a literary language from the ninth century, although this was only in the settled areas; the Iranian groups in the mountains, such as the Galcha of Central Tadzhikistan and the western Pamir groups (Yagnob, Yazgulem, Rushan, Shugnan, Vakhan, and Vanch) spoke eastern Iranian dialects significantly different from the Farsi of the plains.[43] The Kirghiz were using Kazakh and Chagatai as literary languages, and a Kirghiz literary language was eventually produced a few years before the Soviet Revolution. The Kirghiz were therefore the last of the five ethnic groups to produce a national literary language.[44]

A certain amount of print material was also distributed by the Russian authorities within the region from 1870 until 1917. Initially, the government bulletin *Turkestan wilayatining gazeti* was produced in Tashkent alternately in Kazakh and Chagatai for twelve years. In 1888 separate bulletins were produced in the two languages, the Kazakh publication being produced at Omsk. It has been suggested that this had the effect of 'reinforcing the newly created Turkestan unity while bolstering the nearly nonexistent Kazakh written language and literature, distinguishing it from the powerful Chagatai literary heritage that in the past had dominated Kazakh, Tatar, Uzbek, and related writings'. A little later, between 1904 and 1917, a Tsarist government bulletin was also produced in both the Persian and Turkmen language in the Ashkhabad region, thereby furthering the usage of Turkmen in that area.[45]

The independent newspapers produced at the turn of the century also reflected the various political movements of the time. Just after the turn of

the century several journals in Kazakh had appeared. Despite the small circulation the newspaper contents and titles were significant in their representation of a growing national consciousness.[46] In comparison, the titles of the Persian and Tadzhik newspapers lacked references to this type of ethnic nomenclature, were dominated by Jadidist reformists and promoted the idea of Islamic rejuvenation and modernisation for the region. It is also noteworthy that two of these papers *Sada-i Turkestan* (Voice of Turkestan, Tashkent 1914–1915); and *Ulugh Turkestan* (Great Turkestan, 1917–1918) also advocated pan-Turkism as a solution to the region's problems.[47]

Except for the Kazakh ethnic group, it is highly debatable as to the role language played in separating the various ethnic groups from each other. The degree to which language acted as a delimiter within Central Asia varies according to which text is read; the following illustrates the problems involved in endeavouring to establish an account of the situation. Some writers point to the fact that there have been cases of Turkic and Tadzhik tribes that, over the passage of time, have become fully assimilated into each other's culture.[48] In addition they point to the existence of an ethnic group known as 'Chagatai' which was constituted from both Turkic and Iranian speaking elements, the difference in language apparently creating a minor obstacle to the feeling of mutual kinship.[49]

The writers who emphasise this mutual assimilation go so far as to say that the language difference between the sedentary Uzbeks and the Tadzhiks was of little significance and the two groups were a unified whole – 'there was not any ethnic discrimination against Tadzhiks, and the linguistic differences between Turks and Iranians were of little importance'.[50] The limited importance of language is supported by eyewitness accounts of travellers to the region who have described villages containing both Tadzhiks and Uzbeks sharing the social and religious functions between themselves.[51]

However, other authors are of the opposite persuasion; for example, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone has pointed out that – 'the Tadzhiks of the plains, who mixed freely with numerous invaders, have many Mongoloid racial features and are frequently indistinguishable in physical type from the Turkic-speaking Uzbeks, *their Iranian language alone marking them as Tadzhiks*'.[52] This feeling of 'otherness' is said to have been compounded by the traditional domination of the Uzbeks over the Tadzhiks, this animosity appears to have been more apparent between the mountain Tadzhiks and the Uzbeks than the more sedentary Tadzhiks of the plains.[53]

The evaluation of the significance of language as an ethnic delimiter is therefore a difficult enterprise. Generally, philologists divide the Turkic language group into four branches: the north-western group are represented by

the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Karalkalpaks, Tatars and Bashkirs; the south-eastern group by the Uzbeks; the south-western by the Turkmen, the Ottoman Turks (i.e. Turkey) and Azerbaijanis; the main peoples of the north-eastern group are the Yakuts. The two ethnic groups from the titular nationalities that are closest to each other in terms of language are therefore the Kirghiz and Kazakhs.[54] This is supported by the fact that among all of the contemporary ethnic groups the highest level of mutual comprehensibility is between the Kazakhs and Kirghiz. But generally it seems that the languages of the area had developed to the extent that mutual comprehension had become difficult and language, to some degree, acted to divide the groups of the region thereby promoting the ethnic consciousness of each group.

This view is supported by the fact that although Chagatai in a written form served to unify the élite community, its inability to express Turkic vowel harmonies meant that 'as a spoken currency it was of little use'.[55] The possibility of Chagatai acting as a unifying demotic language is therefore highly questionable. In addition, the failure of endeavours by pan-Turkists at the turn of the century (discussed later) to promote a simplified form of Osmanli Turkish as a Turkic language that could be understood throughout the Turkic community provides further evidence that language had become an ethnic delimiter in Central Asia at the turn of the century.

SUB-ETHNIC IDENTITIES

The following describes the tribal sub-divisions within each ethnic group, although this is only a cursory glance at the pre-revolutionary tribal complexities of the region, it suffices to demonstrate the existence of potent sub-national identities within the region at the time.

At the beginning of this century the Kazakh nation remained divided into three nomadic collectivities called *zhuz* (horde); the Great, the Middle, and the Lesser Horde, a fourth group, the Bukey Horde had also appeared after splintering from the Lesser Horde in 1801. These *zhuz* were further divided into clans which were constituted from the migratory communities (*auls*) that represented the fundamental social unit of Kazakh society.[56] The three main hordes are thought to have been created in the middle of the sixteenth century, although because of the inaccuracies in historical records they may have formed a century later. The most likely explanation for their appearance is either that the groups were created for military reasons or that the division suited the geography of the Kazakh steppes, each horde possessing summer and winter pasture rights in the three areas that the terrain allowed.[57]

With the decline of the Kazakh Khanate at the beginning of the 18th century the hordes developed fully into separate sub-national political entities in which the khan of each horde possessed complete sovereignty. These social/political entities were further sub-divided into tribal affiliations. Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush state that the Great Horde in eastern and Southeastern Kazakhstan was divided into twelve major tribes: Usun (which dominated the grouping), Kangly, Shanshkyly, Ysty, Dulat, Jalair, Alban, Suan, Bes-Tangbaly, Oshakty, Sizgeli and Shaprashty. The Middle horde in central, northern and southern Kazakhstan was divided into five major tribes: Arghine (most numerous of the horde), Nayman, Kipchak, Kungrat, and Kerey. The Lesser Horde in Western Kazakhstan included the Bay Uly, Zhet Ru and Alim Uly tribes.[58]

Sub-national identity was further strengthened by the divergent origins of these tribes, for example the Usun and Kipchaks were originally Turkic tribes of the tenth and eleventh centuries; the Nayman were originally a Mongol tribe; and both the Kangly and Arghine were turkified Mongol tribes. This sub-national structure of identity becomes even further ramified when one considers that these tribes were divided into clanic and sub-clanic formations.

The effect of the break-up of the Kazakh Khanate and the continuing division of the Kazakhs into the four hordes on national consolidation is debatable. But it is not entirely implausible that if these groups had continued to separate that new ethnic formations may have evolved from them. In any case the Russian campaigns that led to the Middle Horde's defeat in 1822, the Little Horde's in 1824 and the Great Horde's in 1848 put an end to any such possibility. Russian conquest brought a Kazakh reaction headed by Kenisary Kasimov in the 1830s and 1840s and with it the desire for an independent Kazakh state, but hope for this faded with the death of Kenisary in 1847. Although a sentiment for unification was revived it is equally significant that these revolts did not succeed in uniting the disparate groups; instead each revolt derived its support from within the horde concerned.[59]

In a similar vein, the Kirghiz were divided into two great federations, the *Otuz Uul* and the *Ich Kilik*. The *Otuz Uul* was composed of two groups, the *Ong Kanat*, and the *Sol Kanat*. The *Ong Kanat* consisted of the following tribes: the Tagay, Adigine, and the Mungush, whereas the *Sol Kanat* was formed from eight clans. The *Ich Kilik*, situated in southern Kirghizia and in the eastern Pamirs, consists mainly of the following tribes: the Kipchak, Nayman, Teyyit, Kesek, Ihoo Kesek, Kandy, Boston, and Noygut. This situation was further complicated by the peoples identity with the clan, the village community and the extended family.[60] The Tagay

tribe was further divided into thirteen clans, of which the Bugu and Sary Bagysh were predominant. At the turn of the century the unity of the Kirghiz was still symbolised by an annual meeting every year in which general festivities and national games were held. Perhaps of greater impor-tance, was that during these festivities a khan was elected. Although he had little authority and real power was in the hands of the clanic leaders, the appointment did symbolise the unity of the Kirghiz people.[61]

The Turkmen group maintained a myth of common origin in which they were said to be descendants of Oghuz Khan's 24 grandsons.[62] The Turkmen's main tribal groupings were the Tekke, Yomud, Ersary, Chowdor, Salyr/Salor, Saryk and Göklen. There were also a host of smaller tribal affiliations, totalling twenty-four in all, of which four were especially important because of their status as holy tribes. The Seyid, Shikh, Hoja and Ata tribes were said to be descended from one of the first four Khalifs and their status therefore far outweighed their size. Members of these four sacred lineages, called *Ewlad*, also acted as peacemakers between the tribes during hostilities thereby acting as unifying agents amongst an otherwise divided people.[63]

Although the Turkmen were conscious of constituting an ethnic grouping and applied the appellation 'Turkmen' to themselves, tribal divisions and conflicts were widespread.[64] These conflicts were intense enough to force the migration of tribes to new pastures (which was often the reason for the attacks) and frequently resulted in perennial warfare between the various groups.[65] However, external threats to the Turkmen in the second half of the nineteenth century prompted them to temporarily form a united front against their enemy. Initially, it was the Persian incursions during the 1850s and 1860s that united the majority of Turkmen under the leadership of Nur Verdi Khan a Tekke from the Ahal region. Russian advances a few decades later again united the disparate groups but this time without success, the defeat of the Turkmen culminating in the massacre of Gök Tepe in 1881.[66]

As was mentioned earlier, the Tadzhiks are divided into two distinct groups, the eastern or mountain Tadzhiks and the western Tadzhiks also known as the Tadzhiks of the plains. Certain scholars on the region have emphasised the sedentary nature of the plains Tadzhiks and concluded that by the turn of the century they had all but lost their tribal affiliations.[67] More recent research has suggested that both groups of Tadzhiks were still organised into clans or *avlods* ('sons'). Each avlod was usually named after a common ancestor of seven generations, every member knew the seven generations of the *avlod* and the group consisted of all living generations of that lineage; this could therefore be up to four generations of kin.[68] In addi-tion to and merging with this social unit was the *mahalla* (part of town or

village). Each *mahalla* had its own mosque and an elected committee of *aksakals* (white beards), these elders then represented their family within the larger community through the *mahalla*.[69] The mountain Tadzhiks were further divided into: the Pamirian peoples, consisting of several sub-groups the majority of which were Ismailis; the Yagnobis who spoke (and in fact still speak) a completely different language thought to be derived from the old Sogdian language; and a group of Turkic origin called the Chagatais.[70]

What is now referred to as the Uzbek nation consisted in the pre-revolutionary period of three ethnic layers. As was explained earlier, the eponym Uzbek was given to the ethnic group that began to consolidate under the leadership of Khan Abul Khayr, a descendant of Khan Shaibani whose lineage can be traced back to Genghis Khan. Because of the lack of ethnic homogeneity within the Uzbek state at the time that it was created it is less confusing to call this group that invaded the region as Shaibanids or, as they were also known, *Taze* Uzbeks ('pure Uzbeks'). These invaders that defeated the Timurid empire and settled in Uzbekistan therefore constituted one of the three aforementioned ethnic groups. The main tribes of the Shaibanid group were: the Lokays, Kungrat, Mangyt, Kiyat, Kitay, Kangly, Keneges, Min, Kirk, Yuz, Saray, Kusheht and the Dur. The second ethnic group were the pre-Shaibanid Turkic nomad or semi-nomad tribes known by their tribal names and were of either Turkic or Mongol descent; the latter were often referred to as *Chagatais*. The main Turkic tribes were the Karluks, Kipchaks and the Turks of Samarkand; Mongolian tribes included the Jalair, Barlas, Orlat, Kanchin and Mughul. The third group were the sedentary population of the region representing the longest established ethnic group of the region. These were the Iranian population who had become Turkified or Turkic nomads that had given up the nomadic way of life. This group, known as *sarts* (traders), also formed the urban population who were often bilingual speaking both Turkic and Iranian.[71]

An examination of the tribal listings for the Uzbek, Kazakh and Kirghiz ethnic groups illustrates the common origins of the Kazakhs and Uzbeks and the later integration of some of these tribes into the Kirghiz ethnic group. Some of the tribes that existed in more than one of these ethnic groups are: the Nayman, Kipchak, Karluk, Kitay, Min, Mangyt, Jalair, Barlas, Kungrat, Kiyat, Keneges, Kesek, Boston and Tangut tribes. This feeling of tribal kinship was still apparent in pre-revolutionary Central Asia (and still survives today) and highlights the problem of delimiting the ethnic groups of the region.[72] In addition to the mutual tribal groupings there existed a group numbering approximately 50,000 in the Chirchik and Angren valleys known as the Kuramas which in Uzbek means 'sewn together' and was formed by a fusion of Uzbek and Kazakh tribes.[73]

This ethnic group along with the aforementioned Tadzhik/Uzbek group known as the *Chagatais* illustrates the complexity of the region and hints at a possible partial merging of some of the groups of the region.

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF CENTRAL ASIA

It has already been described how the decline of the Kazakh Khanate in the 18th century led to the further splintering of the three Kazakh hordes. The Uzbek-Shaibanid Khanate's decline at the beginning of the 17th century was associated with Vasco da Gama's circumnavigation of Africa and the corresponding redundancy of the Silk Route which had provided important revenues to the states of the region.[74] This decline had led to the creation of three separate Uzbek dynasties based on three of the larger tribes within the region: the Mangyt of Bukhara, the Kungrat of Khiva and the Min of Kokand. It is important to note that although the Russians had conquered the whole of the region some of the administrative apparatus remained intact. In fact the Central Asian region was divided into four: Kazakhstan, Bukhara, Khiva, and Turkestan (Map 2). The Bukharan and Khivan Khanates which were captured in 1868 and 1873 respectively were both given protectorate status whilst the surrounding area, Turkestan, was placed under the rule of a governorate-general in 1867. The western sector of Turkestan included most of contemporary Turkmenistan whilst the eastern part included the Khokand Khanate which had been absorbed into Turkestan after its administration had been dismantled once it fell to the Russians in 1876.[75] Kazakhstan, on the other hand, had a dual administration which consisted of Russian direct rule parallel with some self government via the Council of Elders.[76]

These different political entities may have had a significant effect on the various identities of the region. In addition, the colonial apparatus imposed on Central Asia may have had similar unintended consequences. For instance one author has argued that 'by 1864, the Russian Government, regardless of its intent, had changed the Kazakhs' situation in Western Turkestan by reuniting them all under one, albeit foreign, rule for the first time since the Kazakh Khanate was shattered into three separate *zhuzes* (hordes) in the seventeenth century'.[77] However, it must be remembered that a large part of present-day Kazakhstan, Semirechie in the east and Mangyshlak in the west was in fact included in the Russian administrative region of Turkestan and not in the Kazakh Governorate.

The question of Central Asian identity was further complicated by the various city-states or khanates (Kokand, Khiva and Bukhara) existing within

the region. These city-states, although dominated by the peoples contemporarily referred to as Uzbeks, were multi-ethnic states. Khiva, which was also known by its older name Khorezm, had the largest percentage of Uzbeks (80 per cent) but in Bukhara, for example, Uzbeks only made up half of the overall population.[78] In both of these city-states power was consolidated by the Mangyt and Kungrat Uzbek tribes by the employment of a Turkmen army thereby ensuring a power base that was independent of the other Uzbek tribes. In Bukhara this exclusion of other Uzbeks was also applied to governmental posts, generally employing Tadzhiks in their place.[79]

One author who has undertaken a detailed study of the multi-ethnic Bukharan state in the period between 1920 and 1924 has concluded that 'nationality consciousness of the Bukharan people, based on the Bukharan state, conveyed an idea of nationality different from the European ethnic-linguistic concept ... although the Bukharan people mainly spoke both the Turki and Farsi languages, along with some others, they did not identify their nationality with their languages of ethnic groups' and 'not only political leaders but the Bukharan intelligentsia often expressed in writing a consciousness of belonging to this Bukharan nationality'.[80] The same author contends that there is a real possibility that this included illiterate as well as literate Bukharans. This evidence produces a picture of a true multi-ethnic state whose people's allegiance was to the Bukharan state rather than to their own ethnic group. Given that during the national delimitation discussions in 1924 the Khivan Central Executive Committee opposed the incorporation of their republic into Uzbekistan it is possible that some form of Khivan identity had similarly evolved.

However, despite the existence of these states for two centuries, caution is required when inferring a change of identity in the general population from changes in the identity of the intelligentsia. The above depiction of pre-revolutionary Central Asia has been challenged by others who claim that this supra-national identity was only apparent within the élite groups of the state.[81] It is also highly probable that the two Uzbek tribal dynasties of these city-states, the Mangyt and Kungrat, supported these tendencies because it ensured the maintenance of their rule rather than because they actually identified with their citizens.

PAN-ISLAMIC IDENTITY

The Arabic invasions in the seventh century left an Arabic script which was common to all literary languages of the region and an Islamic legacy which spread to the whole of the region so that, prior to the Revolution,

the Central Asians were conscious of belonging to the greater community of Muslims, the *Umma*. Although these invasions were a major agent in transmitting many of the external influences to the region, trade also acted as a conveyor of other cultural traditions. The trade routes of the 'Silk Road' were responsible for Islam spreading North of the Syr Darya River to the Kazakh steppes and to the Kirghiz mountains.[82] Although the Kirghiz and Kazakhs, unlike the Turkmen, Uzbeks and Tadzhiks, were only superficially Islamised during this period, Islam was reinforced later. At the end of the eighteenth century Islam was spread to the Kazakh steppes by the Tatar merchants that were allowed to trade extensively throughout the region during Catherine II's reign.[83] In the early nineteenth century much of Kirghizstan had been incorporated into the Khanate of Kokand and this was followed by efforts to Islamise the population. Significantly, the time of arrival of Islam greatly influenced the type of Islamic adherence depending on which missionaries converted the people and when. In areas where Islam was introduced via the Arab invasions (650–800 AD), Islam tended to be conservative. In areas where it was brought by merchants, Islam was generally liberal often merging with other religious (usually shamanist) practises. Where the Sufi brotherhoods converted the population Islam was highly conservative.[84]

The Sufi brotherhoods or *tariqa* (path leading to God) are unofficial Islamic organisations usually founded by particular Islamic saints or their followers and have their own set of rituals which members must follow. The group's activity is 'centred around holy places (*mazars*) which are usually the tombs of real Sufi sheikhs ... clan or tribal ancestors or Biblical prophets'. The influence of this form of Islam was pervasive and was said to be 'the most important element of popular Islam in Central Asia'.[85]

The effect of Islam on the political movements of the region is detailed later on in this chapter. However, certain elements of Islam in Central Asia are noteworthy. The overall unity and identification with the larger Islamic community (*Umma*) was enhanced because, although a small number of Shi'ite Muslims lived in the area, the population was overwhelmingly Sunni.[86] Unity was also promoted by the fact that all Sunni Muslims in the area belonged to the Sunni Hanafi school of Jurisprudence, this included the Tadzhiks despite their Persian origins.[87]

On the other hand, because the ethnic groups were converted to Islam at different periods the intensity of belief and practice varied accordingly. The plains of contemporary Tadzhikistan and virtually all of Uzbekistan were far more influenced by 'official Islam' than elsewhere because of their historical links with the religious centres of Bukhara and Samarkand. These districts were also affected by unofficial Islam but they were distinct

from everywhere else because of the pervasiveness of a highly conservative official Islam. Turkmenistan on the other hand was marked by the fact that Sufi brotherhoods converted the vast majority of the population to Islam; unofficial Islam therefore prevailed. Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan were marked by the variable nature of Islam: the southern part of both countries tended to be Islamised while the northern part was less so. The Ferghana region of Kirghizstan and the Chimkent, Dzhambul and Kzyl Orda areas of Kazakhstan were affected by their proximity to the holy cities of Samarkand and Bukhara as well as the proselytising campaigns of the Sufis. One example of how these religions may have acted as alternative sources of identity is given by the Lachi Sufi brotherhood which had been ostracised by the unofficial Islamic establishment before the Revolution. This Kirghiz based group actually fought in the Red Army against their fellow Muslims during the Civil War.[88] Islam may therefore have acted as a unifying tendency, but equally it may have served to divide ethnic groups because of its uneven influence within certain regions and the manner in which the population was proselytised.

POLITICAL MOVEMENTS OF PRE-REVOLUTIONARY CENTRAL ASIA

It is highly significant that the first political groupings within pre-revolutionary Central Asia were along religious, rather than national lines. At the end of the nineteenth century the Islamic movement within Tsarist Russia was divided into two camps, the conservative traditionalists (*qadimis*) and the liberal modernists (*jadids*) and it is possible that, in the Bukharan and Khivan khanates, this division within the intelligentsia was as important as the divisions along national lines. The most famous of these modernists was the Crimean Ismail Bey Gasprinsky (Gaspraly) who, amongst other things, called for the union of the Turkic peoples of Russia and set up the magazine *Terjüman* (the interpreter) in which a simplified version of Osmanli Turkish was used. Gasprinsky envisaged this language forming the basis of a common Turkish language which would gain in popularity through the increasing circulation of his newspaper.

Gasprinsky envisaged that in creating a language which could be understood 'by the boatman of the Bosphorus as easily as by the cameleer of Kashgar' a cohesive pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic community would eventually be formed.[89] It was mainly through the efforts of the modernists that a pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic political movement was established, although both the traditionalists and the modernists were involved at the

beginning of the century in convening the first All-Muslim Congress at Nizhniy Novgorod in August 1905 and two subsequent congresses in 1906, the third of which voted to create the Muslim Union Party.[90]

The promotion of Gasprinsky's common Turkic language (*tawhid-i lisan* or *lisan-i umumi*, unified language or common language) was supported by the Turkestani *Jadids* and by the third All-Muslim Congress of Russia (1906). However, this support was not uniform and dissent was apparent amongst the Turkestani *Jadids* and it is noteworthy that this action was opposed by the Kazakhs who asserted their right to develop a distinctive Kazakh language.[91] In fact these congresses were dominated by the Volga Tatars to the extent that no representatives of Turkestan or the Kazakh Steppes were present until the third congress, and then they were both represented by only one member each.[92]

Although the movement's hopes were dashed by Stolypin's reactionary measures from 1906 onwards, the Congress of the Muslims reappeared during the period of the Provisional Government and met in Moscow on May 1, 1917. The Congress declared equality of political rights for both sexes, prohibited polygamy and purdah and supported the eight-hour working day. At the same time the Congress supported the use of Gasprinsky's common Turkic language as the medium of instruction in the upper schools. However, in primary and secondary schools the national language of the region was to be the main language, the common Turkic language relegated to the status of a secondary compulsory subject.[93] If the objective of the conference was to negotiate an agreed common framework within which Muslims of all Russia could work, then it failed through the emergence of two political fault lines. Firstly, the progressive and conservative wings of Islam split completely so that the *Jadids* formed the Islamic Council and the *Qadimists* formed a separate Council of *Ulema* (religious scholars).[94] Secondly, divisions appeared over the issue of whether the Islamic community should be represented as one body which would possess cultural autonomy within a non-federated Russia or whether each ethnic group should gain full territorial autonomy within a federated state. The disagreement between the 'Centralists' and 'Territorial Autonomists' (Crimeans, Kazakhs and Bashkirs) was so great that the latter group did not attend the second congress in July 1917.[95]

It is during the period of the Provisional Government that regional political movements appear on the scene in Central Asia, breaking up the uniform Islamic front. In Turkestan the Turkestani *jadids* formed a political party in 1909, and in April 1917 this group convoked the Congress of the Muslims of Turkestan in Tashkent which appointed a National Committee that, during the October Revolution, endeavoured to seize power and form

a Muslim government. This local party supported the establishment of a national territorial federal system which would create two autonomous republics – Turkestan and Kazakhstan.[96] In the same year, groups calling themselves the Young Bukharans and the Young Khivans were set up in the respective protectorates, taking their inspiration from the Young Turk movement with similar objectives to the progressive *Jadid* movement.

A Kazakh national movement made its first appearance in 1905 when nationalist intellectuals met at Orenburg and Vernyy (Alma-Ata) under the leadership of Ali Khan Bukey Khanov (i.e. Khan of the Bukey horde) and Ahmed Baytursun. In 1912 this movement converged around the periodical 'Kazakh' and formed a national group the *Alash Orda* (Horde of Alash after the mythical ancestor of the Kazakh tribes) and by 1917 the *Alash Orda* had become a political party. It is noteworthy that this group was national and secular in outlook: by July 1917 it was demanding an autonomous Kazakh republic (which it endeavoured to set up at the beginning of 1918); the separation of Church and State; and it was opposed to pan-Islamism describing the movement as 'oriental utopia'. Two other main political parties existed in Kazakhstan: the *Üsh Zhuz* (The Three Hordes) which was formed in Tashkent in 1914, was both socialist and very pan-Islamic in outlook; and the Islamic *Birlik Tuuy* (Flag of the Union) which had formed around the journal of the same name. The different attitudes towards Islam largely reflected the regional origins of the various parties: the *Üsh Zhuz* and *Birlik Tuuy* were formed by Southern Kazakhs of the Syr Dar'ya oblast who were under the influence of Islam to a greater extent than the Kazakhs of the north.[97]

Political movements were therefore often formed along religious and pan-Turkic lines with some of the most important divisions appearing over religious rather than national issues. However, in Kazakhstan the regional variation in the degree to which the population had been converted to Islam began to be reflected in the political movements of the time: the south represented a more religious outlook closer to that of Turkestan, whilst the north represented a more secular outlook through their closer association with Russia and more superficial Islamisation. A national movement was in fact apparent in Kazakhstan, but on closer inspection this movement's support base was more regional than national.

CONCLUSION

The question as to what degree of social cohesion existed within each of these ethnic groups and whether they could be said to represent unified

social entities still remains. As might be expected, the answer is neither straightforward nor irrefutable. The above adumbration of Central Asia prior to the Communist Revolution of 1917 has endeavoured to outline the various identities of the inhabitants of the region.

The historical exposition in this chapter demonstrated that certain events had given the peoples of Central Asia a mutual historical experience; a common Arabic script; a common Turkic language base (bar the Tadzhiks); and the same religion, Sunni Islam (except in Eastern Tadzhikistan), which bound them to the greater religious community (the *Umma*). This resulted in a cultural interfusion within the region to the extent that two literary languages, Chagatai and Farsi, were in operation throughout. These supra-ethnic identities were reflected in the pre-revolutionary political parties of Central Asia, such as, the All-Russian Muslim movement, the *Jadid* movement, as well as in the regional movements such as that of the Young Bukharan and Young Khivan movements.[98] At the sub-ethnic level, tribal and clanic structures remained as nuclei for the inhabitant's loyalty and identity.

As will have become apparent throughout this chapter, which form of identity is said to have been predominant in Central Asia varies from author to author, but it is possible to discern three interpretations of the pre-revolutionary situation. These may be labelled the 'strong', 'medium' and 'weak' interpretations of national identity.

The 'weak' interpretation of national identity posits that 'nationality was a barely understood concept' to the extent that the people 'often had no idea whether they were Uzbeks or Tadzhiks [for example]'.[99] From this viewpoint the peoples of Central Asia had different, and possibly conflicting, identities which were not of a national nature. It is said that at the sub-national level, a Central Asian's fealty, loyalty and identity lay with the village, the clan, the tribe or even the khanate or town. At the supranational level the peoples identity focused on the world Islamic community (the Umma or the Dar-ul-Islam) or the pan-Turkic movement. According to this interpretation the overall situation in Central Asia prior to the Revolution was that these identities related to a person's location, way of life and social position, rather than to their ethnic grouping: 'In the case of *the sedentary people* a purely religious identity – city-dwellers of Central Asia defined themselves as "Muslims". Alternatively, they claimed an identity based on the place of residence such as "Bukharaly" or "Samarkandi". In the case of *the nomads, or semi-nomads*, identity was based on clan or tribal affiliation, "I am a karluk", a "Lokay", a "Mangyt", or even "of the Great Horde" ... *Muslim intellectuals* had a different kind of awareness, also deeply rooted in the history of Islam. They defined themselves as "Turks" or "Turkestani" in Central Asia.'[100]

The strength of this approach resides in the support it receives from the influential Russian 'orientalist', V. Barthold, whose in-depth studies at the beginning of the century concluded that 'the settled peoples of Central Asia regard themselves first as Muslims and then as inhabitants of any given town or region; ethnic concepts having virtually no significance in their eyes'.[101] However, it is often not emphasised enough that Barthold was talking specifically about the sedentary population of Central Asia and not about Central Asia as a whole. On the other hand, this interpretation has been lent further credence by at least one of the Uzbek Communist leaders who described the situation thus: 'The working masses of Uzbeks did not recognize themselves as a single nationality. The Ferghana Uzbeks usually referred to themselves as Kokandi in accordance with the name of the khanate. The Zarafshan, Kashka-Darya and Surkan-Darya Uzbeks called themselves Bukharans. The Uzbek population of our cities did not consider the nomad population of Kashka-Darya and Surkan-Darya Uzbeks'.[102]

The 'weak' interpretation of national identity therefore seems most appropriate to the area contemporarily known as Uzbekistan where three groups can be said to have resided: the pre-Shaibanid tribes; the Shaibanid tribes (or 'true Uzbeks'); and the sedentary Tadzhiks and Turks known collectively as '*Sarts*'. The differences between these three groups should not be underestimated. Indeed, one of the folk sayings of the Sarts at the time stated 'Uzbek! Watch what you say when you call your neighbour thief!', clearly indicating the existence of inter-ethnic antagonisms.[103] In fact it may have been the case that because of the similarity of lifestyles of the Tadzhiks and Turkic *Sarts* the main distinction 'was not as between Turks and Iranians [Tadzhiks], but as between nomads and sedentary people'.[104]

The 'medium' interpretation of national identity within Central Asia accepts that there were embryonic national groupings emerging throughout the region but that these groupings, with the exception of the Turkmen, were agglomerations of the present day titular nationalities: 'It is probable that three national groups were beginning to emerge from the welter of Central Asian peoples, namely, the Uzbek-Tadzhik, Kazakh-Kirghiz-Karakalpak, and Turkmen groups. Indications of national consciousness were most apparent in the first two of these groups. Among the Uzbeks and Tadzhiks of the Turkestan province the principal factor was the so-called Jadid movement.'[105] But this approach downplays the differences between the various Uzbek groups as described a moment earlier. It also appears to ignore the substantial differences between the Tadzhik *Sarts*, the Tadzhiks of the plains and the mountain Tadzhiks. It also appears to place great emphasis on language compatibility, for example, one author

argues for the potential of ethnic fusion by pointing out that 'there were no noticeable differences between the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz except for those of dialect, and it was possible to foresee the consolidation of the two peoples into one nation'.[106] But this completely ignores the existence of separate national epics describing the history of these two nations, the differences in their dress and customs or the possibility of antagonisms arising from power struggles between the dominant tribal groupings of each ethnic group.

The 'strong' interpretation of national identity within the region posits that, despite the existence of sub-ethnic and supra-ethnic identities, most of the ethnic groups possessed a national consciousness in the fact that they were aware of belonging to a larger ethnic identity. This approach views the situation in pre-revolutionary Central Asia as one in which the Tadzhiks (both of the plains and the *Sarts*), the Turkmen, the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz were aware through their oral epics, common history and customs that they constituted ethnic groups distinct from other ethnic groups around them.[107]

The Kazakhs at the turn of the century possessed a highly uniform spoken language (although regional dialects still existed they were of minor significance), a written language which was gaining popularity, and a well-defined territory. They therefore best fitted this description more than any other ethnic group within the region. But even in the case of the Kazakhs, out of the three national parties that were existing at the time only one of them, *Alash Orda*, was both secular and nationalist in outlook. It seems that nationalist views reflected a particular social status so that 'the feeling that they formed a real Kazakh "nation" was fully experienced only by the young modernist intelligentsia'.[108]

During the Civil War that followed the Revolution the tribal and clanic divisions that existed within the Kazakhs became polarised, with some groups opting to support the Bolsheviks and others aligning with the opposition. In December 1917 the *Alash Orda* did in fact proclaim the autonomy of the Kazakh region, but this move did not succeed in creating a unified front for the independence of the Kazakhs. Instead the onset of the Civil War witnessed alliances with the Red and White armies on a tribal and clanic basis. This splintering had little to do with the political divisions within Russian society; rather, it was a reflection of the perennial rivalries amongst the Kazakhs. The Civil War witnessed the Kipchaks of the Middle horde, the political group *Üsh Zhuz* and the Adai tribe of the Caspian Sea region (Mangyshlak) taking a pro-Soviet stance, as opposed to *Alash Orda's* alignment with the White forces. In the case of the *Üsh Zhuz*, their orientation was very much determined by their opposition to

the *Alash Orda*. Similarly, the Kipchaks were more concerned with finally settling in their favour a long running dispute over pasture rights between themselves and the Arghine tribe. The Adai tribe became pro-Soviet for inter-ethnic rather than intra-ethnic reasons, hoping to finally defeat the Ural Cossacks in the region.[109]

The varying degrees of national consciousness that each of these interpretations emphasise does not necessarily mean that they are completely incompatible or that it is impossible to evaluate the situation within Central Asia prior to the Revolution. Rather, it becomes apparent that the varying interpretations arise because of the different emphasis that is placed on different aspects of Central Asian identity. One of the most common mistakes in writing on this subject appears to arise from the desire to generalise about the whole region. The interpretations usually place great emphasis on a particular region extrapolating this condition to the rest of the area. But, as this chapter has illustrated, the conditions pertaining to each group often varied considerably.

In endeavouring to establish the varying degrees of social cohesion within these groups it is worthwhile considering the Soviet definitions of an ethnic group and nation. In fact the Soviet approach incorporated three categories as opposed to the usual two definitions employed in Western anthropology and relied quite heavily upon language to differentiate between these three forms. An intermediate entity between an ethnie and nation, a *narodnost*, was employed to describe a people possessing 'spiritual, cultural and linguistic unity, but whose national language is not yet unified for the reason that it comprises many dialects unlike the concept of nation but does have a common territory and loose economic bonds but not a national market like a nation'.[110] Under the Soviet classification the degree of linguistic unity was therefore a key element in characterising which bracket a particular group fell into.

Employing this classification would place the Kazakhs somewhere between the category of *narodnost* and nation given that they possessed a reasonably well established written language, possessed minor dialectical differences in their spoken language and had begun to form a national intelligentsia whose objective was the establishment of an independent national state. However, using the classifications adopted, the extant clanic and tribal divisions that were apparent at the time would mean that the Kazakhs could not be accurately described as a cohesive, unified nation.

Other groups were more accurately described as ethnie or, using Soviet terminology, as *narodnosti*. The Turkmen and Kirghiz fit under this heading given that they possessed a sense of national consciousness but their literary languages were not fully developed or widely used and they

experienced perennial disunity because of extant clanic and tribal identities. The situation within Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan is slightly more complex because of the existence of different ethnic layers within those territories. As was mentioned earlier, within Uzbekistan three ethnic groups were apparent, and this picture was further complicated by the city-states of Bukhara, Khiva and possibly Kokand, although the latter had been dissolved during the latter part of the nineteenth century. It appears that these khanates acted not only as centres of 'official Islam' but also represented alternative sources of identity and loyalty. In Tadzhikistan it was possible to delimit two areas: the Tadzhiks of the plains with their well-defined national language and retention of clanic and village identity represented a main ethnic group within its own right; whilst the Tadzhiks of the mountains are best described as constituting a number of disparate ethnic groups.

The categorisation of Central Asia in the pre-revolutionary period has proven to be rather complex because of the variety of identities present and because of the historical differences in their development. However, what is most important for this study is the fact that none of these groups can be said to have fully constituted a cohesive consolidated nation. The closest to this description were the Kazakhs, but they remained divided not only by tribe and horde but also through the greater Islamisation of certain southern districts of the Kazakh Governorate in comparison to the northern districts of that territory.

4 The Redrawing of Boundaries: Soviet 'Official Nationalism'

The preceding chapter suggested that the division of Central Asia may have been heavily influenced by a policy of *divide et impera* and *realpolitik* so that the region was divided into national republics in an effort to undermine the pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic movements of the period. At the same time this initiative was inextricably influenced by two principles of Soviet ideology; the principle of federation, and the principle of 'nationalist in form, socialist in content'. The outcome was the eventual creation of five Central Asian republics, each endowed with separate national state institutions within the Soviet Union. These social changes had immense ramifications when coupled with the process of modernisation, as Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone has pointed out, 'The process of rapid modernisation enforced from the top under Soviet rule had far-reaching consequences in Central Asia as it altered the economic base, transformed the social structure, extended the benefits of mass education and communication systems to the Asian peoples, and created a modern Asian elite.'[1]

As explained in the introduction, the Bolsheviks had realised that the initial formation of the state would have to incorporate the desires of the various nationalities that had come to the fore in the years prior to the revolution. The question of how to define the various ethnic groupings within the Soviet State had already been raised in 1913 in reply to the Austrian socialists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer. Renner and Bauer had put forward the view that the triumph of socialism would result in an increasing differentiation of nations rather than a merging of nations. To harness this tendency they suggested the principle of extra-territorial autonomy, in reaction to this, Lenin appointed Stalin the job of producing a critique of the Austrians' theory and a comprehensive counter proposal.

The outcome of Stalin's research was his well known essay 'Marxism and the National Question', which defined the nation as a 'historically evolved, stable community arising on the foundation of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up, manifested in a community of culture'.[2] The essay argued that the Austrians had

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confused the concept of the nation with that of an ethnic group and re-
asserted the principle of the territoriality of the nation, as opposed to the
Austrian principle of treating each nation 'not as a territorial corporation,
but as a union of individuals'.[3] This principle of the 'territoriality of eth-
nicity' proposed by Stalin was taken up by the Party and was reflected in
the form of federation that was later adopted.

Federation was regarded as more of a political necessity and a reaction
to events beyond control, rather than a coherent objective of the Bolshevik
Party. It was essentially a compromise between the two elements, proletar-
ian internationalism and nationalism, eventually resulting in Lenin sup-
porting the creation of a federation with each state having the right to
secession, believing that the right of secession would guarantee unity –
'The more closely the democratic system of state approximates to com-
plete freedom of secession, the rarer and weaker will the striving for
secession be in practise; for the advantages of large states, both from the
point of view of economic progress and from the point of view of the
interest of the masses are beyond doubt, and these advantages increase
with the growth of capitalism'.[4] In other words, the right of secession was
to be somewhat analogous to the right of divorce, and as Lenin pointed out
'the right of divorce is not an invitation for all wives to leave their hus-
bands'.[5] In fact, federation would be a transitional form to the complete
unity of the various nations under communism. Federation was said to
involve two complementary and concomitant tendencies: the flourishing
(*ratsvet*) of nations; and the slow, but inexorable, 'coming together'
(*sblizhenie*) of the nations. These two tendencies of federation would
eventually result in the 'merging' (*sliyanie*) of the proletariat of the vari-
ous nations.[6] Hence, federation was said to involve the three processes of
ratsvet, *sblizhenie* and, eventually, *sliyanie* of the nations.

These changes to the Bolshevik nationality programme that were begun
by Lenin were put into practise in the Union Treaty of December 1922,
otherwise known as the 'federal compromise'.[7] The treaty creating the
Soviet Union offered equality to the larger non-Russian nationalities along
with cultural and administrative autonomy within the Soviet Federation.
Once the treaty was agreed upon, this principle of federation became vitri-
fied and untouchable until the dramatic events of the Gorbachev era tore
the fragile structure asunder.[8]

The Soviet federal principle was thus based on a constitution of plural-
ism which gave political representation both to the fifteen republics and to
the other ethnic groups which resided within those republics. But also the
Soviet state can be said to have been 'instrumentalist' within Central Asia
in two ways. Firstly, the Soviet state endeavoured to instil a universalist

culture throughout the whole of the Soviet Union by establishing Marxism-Leninism, and therefore 'proletarian internationalism', as the ideology of the state. The pluralism invoked by the Leninist federal principle, as mentioned earlier, was meant to be fully complementary with the primary principle of proletarian solidarity. Within the Soviet Union each ethnic group was thus represented by its respective ethno-political administrative unit and at the same time each individual was a citizen of the Soviet Union. Although this Soviet citizenship was a 'de-nationalised and politicised idea of citizenship, which was based on "proletarian and class solidarity"',[9] it was not contrary to the principle of federation. As explained above, federalism was the means by which the political end, the final merging of the nations, would be accomplished and was therefore said to be coherent with the principle of proletarian internationalism.

Secondly, it is possible that Soviet policies were instrumental in forming cohesive national units within Central Asia. The federal principle resulted in the five titular nationalities of the Central Asian republics being endowed with separate state structures within the Union. At the same time certain policies were adopted which closely resemble the processes of nation-building that were outlined earlier. This chapter therefore examines the implementation of Soviet policies and the long term sociological consequences on the ethnic groups of the region.

THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL CLASSIFICATORY GRID

Shortly after the Soviet Revolution the Central Asian region was subject to a fundamental reorganisation of its administrative boundaries, involving the division of the region into the five republics which has remained permanent since 1936 (see Maps 1 and 2). When in 1922 the treaty on the formation of the Soviet Union was signed, none of the ethnic groups in Central Asia possessed republican status. Turkestan and Kazakhstan were part of the RSFSR; Bukhara and Khorezm (formerly Khiva prior to April 1920) were independent People's Soviet Republics although both khanates later joined the USSR, the Khorezm Republic in October 1923 and Bukhara in September 1924. However, as early as October 1919 a Turkestan Commission had been set up to investigate the national delimitation of the area into administrative units based on 'the ethnographic and economic circumstances of the territory'.[10]

One month after the entry of the Bukharan and Khorezm Khanates into the USSR, the Turkestan Commission's proposals were implemented. The Turkestan Republic and the People's Republics of Bukhara and Khiva

were reformed into the Turkmen and the Uzbek Union Republics.[11] The Kazakhs and Kirghiz were initially given the status of autonomous republic and autonomous oblast (province) respectively and were incorporated into the Russian Union Republic.[12] The Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast was initially called the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast and the Kazakh ASSR had the title Kirghiz ASSR. This only changed when the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast was upgraded to autonomous republic in February 1925 and renamed the Kirghiz ASSR in May 1925. Tadzhikistan's status was later upgraded from being an autonomous republic (since October 1924) within Uzbekistan to a union republic, thereby forming the seventh union republic in June 1929. The last great shake-up occurred in December 1936, with Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan having their status changed to that of union republic whilst the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic was integrated into the Uzbek Republic.

This policy of delimitation had the effect of importing in tangible form the concept of the nation-state to the region. Each of the five major ethnic groups were represented within their own territorially bounded states. The only group to have been represented as such just prior to the Revolution were the Kazakhs, under Soviet rule Kazakh territory was expanded to encompass the Kazakh population in sections of the Syr-Darya, Semirechie and Samarkand *oblasts* of the former Turkestan administrative unit.[13] The delimitation process within Soviet Central Asia bears a striking resemblance to the imposition of state institutions by other European countries on their colonial territories. This imposition of state structures is only part of a classificatory process that Benedict Anderson has labelled 'official nationalism'. European colonialism generally entailed the creation of borders defining the colonial state's realm of control and the representation and designation of the population within its borders through the use of the census, map and museum – '(I)nterlinked with one another, then the census, the map and the museum illuminate the late colonial state's style of thinking about its domain. The 'warp' of this thinking was a totalising classificatory grid ... The effect of the grid was always to be able to say of anything that it was this, not that; it belonged here, not there.'[14]

The national delimitation of the Central Asian region had a similar effect of creating a classificatory grid based on nationality, clearly reflected in Maps 1 and 2. A region which had originally been divided by Tsarist Russia into Kazakhstan, Turkestan and the two khanates of Bukhara and Khiva was now administered along national lines with the region represented by five national republics (from 1936 onwards). Obviously, the impact of national delimitation on the population was not uniform but varied according to the level of national consciousness within

each group. According to the description of the situation given in the previous chapter the group with the least potential for being affected were probably the Kazakhs. At the other end of the spectrum, the Tadzhiks and Uzbeks possessed the greatest potential for being affected by these changes.

The lack of national consciousness and national cohesion in the latter two ethnic groups was recognised by the Soviets. One specialist on the region has acknowledged that 'in Tadzhikistan the Tadzhiks did not represent one national entity in an exact sense, because they were divided among a whole range of bekstva and khanates, were separated from one another, and did not have a common economic life. There was no additional market, no economic or cultural national centre ... Naturally, the elements characterising Tadzhiks as a nation, the language, territory, and cultural unity, were formed and existed from ancient times. But before the Great October Revolution these elements were not developed, *and existed at very best only as a potential.*'[15] Similarly, the lack of national cohesion within Uzbekistan had been remarked upon, for example, by Äkmäl Ikramov, First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party between 1925 and 1937, who asserted that '(T)he working masses of Uzbeks did not recognize themselves as a single nationality. The Ferghana Uzbeks usually referred to themselves as Kokandi in accordance with the name of the khanate. The Zarafshan, Kashka-Darya and SurkhanDarya Uzbeks called themselves Bukharans. The Uzbek population of our cities did not consider the nomad population of Kashka-Darya and Surkan-Darya Uzbeks.'[16]

The classification and delimitation of the population into national groups was accompanied by a gradual redefinition of disparate groups so that they were eventually described as belonging to one or other of the larger titular nationalities. Although in general terms the Soviet nationalities policy was intended to represent, in institutional form. the various nationalities and ethnic groups within the federation. there were cases where the Soviet census served officially to eliminate differences within a state's population by incorporating them under the imprecise and rather erroneous category of the titular nationality. In Central Asia, the use of the census endeavoured to merge the three pre-revolutionary ethnic layers of the Uzbek population. Similarly, although the Pamirian or mountain Tadzhiks were initially defined separately. they were (eventually) categorised as Tadzhiks.[17]

To be sure, the taking of a census to determine the composition of the population in the region had already begun under Tsarist Russia in 1897, however it is noteworthy that this census used the 'native language' of a person to determine their ethnicity. In comparison the second Soviet

census asked 'Of what ethnicity (*natsional'nost*) are you?', and this was repeated in all later censuses apart from the 1926 census which asked 'Of what ethnic group (*narodnost*) are you'.[18] The term *natsional'nost* is most closely associated with the term 'nation' whereas *narodnost* is best defined as the equivalent British term ethnic group.[19] The significance of this use of terminology becomes readily apparent when one examines the taxonomic differences of the 1926 census with the censuses that later succeeded it. The 1926 census in fact included separate categories for some of the peoples mentioned in the previous chapter such as the Ferghana Kipchaks (33,500), the Ferghana Turks (29,500) and the Kuramas (50,000).[20] However the later censuses of the area did not include these categories and, in line with the usage of the term *natsional'nost*, these groups were included in the more general definition 'Uzbek'. The census therefore not only served to categorise the population in terms of nationality but smaller groups which were initially recognised as officially constituting separate ethnic groups distinguishable from the rest of the population were later defined as part of the titular nationality.

NATIONAL MODERNISATION WITHIN THE REPUBLICS

The reclassification and division of the region along national lines was part of a wider process of separating the region into modernised national entities. For the purposes of this chapter modernisation is treated separately from industrialisation. Modernisation is therefore taken to incorporate such tendencies as: the increase in education amongst populations; the development of general mass literacy; the improvement in transport links; and the increasing use of communication systems such as print, telegraph, telephone, radio and television to convey information. Referring back to the chapter on nationalism, modernisation is associated with the creation of a 'high culture' which is superimposed over local 'low cultures. The usage of local languages, dialects, idioms, customs etc. are said to diminish with the increasing influence of the official national language, symbols, ceremonies and such like. The essential point with regard to nation-building within Soviet Central Asia is that the modernisation of society occurred within the confines of a national state structure and was conveyed via a standardised national language.

The process of modernisation and the concomitant imposition of national 'high cultures' within the Central Asian region is examined below. Although certain aspects of Central Asian development may have promoted a more uniform national culture, the situation is complicated

both by Soviet ideology and efforts at Russifying the population. The policy of 'national in form, socialist in content' was always fundamentally contradictory in that it represented a compromise between two doctrines; one with a particularist world-view, the other essentially a universalist ideology. National culture was permitted within the present historical epoch whilst at the same time promoting the creation of the greater socialist community. The effect of Russification adds another dimension to the analysis of the region, not only in the extended usage of the Russian language but also the appearance of an 'elder brother' chauvinistic attitude which presented Russians as the leading ethnic group of the Soviet Union.

A good example of how pervasive these two tendencies are given by the symbolic representation of the national regalia of each republic. Each of the Central Asian republics were given a state flag, a state coat of arms and a state anthem. However, each of these emblems were designed along Soviet lines so that symbols such as the hammer and sickle were prominent features and the proclamation 'Proletarians of All Countries Unite' was inscribed, in both Russian and the national language, on the coat of arms of each republic.[21] Deference to Russia was even apparent within the national anthems for example the Uzbek anthem, by no means an exception, actually began with 'Salam Russian brother, great is your people.'[22] There are therefore great difficulties in assessing the effect of what would otherwise be considered nation-building policies.

The Medium of Communication

Although language is one of the clearer examples of infusing the region with 'official nationalisms', it was of course affected by the fact that Russian dominance permeated Soviet policies. In fact, within Central Asia it appears that Soviet linguistic policy had a twofold objective: the first was 'the transformation of tribal and community languages into developed national languages with a rich terminology and vocabulary', and the second was the establishment of a certain degree of bilingualism to facilitate the use of Russian as the language of inter republican communication.[23]

It is generally accepted that although a national language is not the *sine qua non* for the existence of a nation it does act in many cases as the keystone of a nation. The Soviet language policy within Central Asia is thus of major importance for the nation-building that occurred within the region. The fact that the Soviet authorities chose to adopt separate national languages as the verbal and written medium of communication within each republic is therefore of major import, and was to have fundamental implications for the nation-building process within the region.

During the early part of the 1920s the Soviet authorities standardised the national language of each of the five titular nationalities of Central Asia, regardless of their territorial status at the time. Arabic was adopted as the standard script for the written form of all five languages, although this was to change later. The implementation of the national languages for the region can be divided into two categories: the first category incorporated ethnic groups which had a national literary language that was in widespread use amongst the intelligentsia and which was then adopted by the Soviet authorities; the second category included those groups whose national literary language was not in widespread use amongst the intelligentsia, for groups within this category the Soviet authorities created a new literary language. The first category included the Kazakhs and the Tadzhiks, the Kazakhs possessed a fixed literary language since the middle of the nineteenth century and the Tadzhiks had inherited Persian, the literary language of the Iranians. The second category included the Uzbeks, Kirghiz and the Turkmen. Although the Uzbeks had employed Chagatai a literary language from the fourteenth century (also known as 'old Uzbek'), a new literary Uzbek language replaced Chagatai in 1923 (the Arabic script remained). The Kirghiz, who had employed both the Chagatai and Kazakh literary languages, adopted their own literary language that had been developed by the Soviet authorities in 1923. A Turkmen literary language (half Turkmen, half Chagatai) had appeared in the eighteenth century, but despite this a new Soviet literary Turkmen language was introduced in 1922.[24]

The effects of establishing national literary languages should also therefore be divided into two categories. The Tadzhiks of the plains with their well-established Persian literary language and the Kazakhs with their embryonic literary language and lack of large dialectical differences in their spoken language were probably least affected by this language policy. The effect on the second category of peoples (the Kirghiz, mountain Tadzhiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen) must have been more profound. In fact the language policy for this category is very similar to the imposition of a standardised national 'high culture' discussed earlier.

In the case of Turkmenistan the national language was formed from the dialects of the two most dominant tribes, the Yomud and the Tekke.[25] The language policy towards the mountain Tadzhiks can be divided into two periods. As was explained in the previous chapter, each of the languages of this region were mutually incomprehensible to each other despite the proximity of the various groups. From 1931 to 1937 an attempt was made at linguistically uniting these groups around the language of the Shugnis, the largest group of the region. This policy was abandoned in 1937 and

Tadzhik replaced Shugni as the official language of the region, the local languages were therefore relegated to the spoken level and were replaced as a teaching medium by Tadzhik.[26]

An interesting insight into the wholesale imposition by the Soviet authorities of these national literary languages is offered by the Uzbekistan case. The Soviet authorities in Uzbekistan had many problems in choosing which dialect to base the new literary language on; in fact, some of the Uzbek intelligentsia argued for the division of the Uzbek language into various dialects such as Kipchak, Oghuz and Chagatai.[27] Initially it was decided that the language should be based on the strongly Iranised urban dialects which had lost Turkic vowel euphonic harmony and which differed radically from the dialects spoken in the countryside. In 1927 this policy was reversed when the Latin alphabet was adopted: the literary language was to be based on the spoken language of northern Uzbekistan (town of Turkestan) which was 'barely intelligible to the urban population of Uzbekistan'. The language was again altered in 1937 when the literary tongue was finally fixed on an Iranised and unharmonised Tashkent dialect.[28]

This example exposes several aspects of the Soviet language policy within the region: firstly, it highlights the rather arbitrary method employed in choosing the basis for the new literary languages; secondly, it emphasises the role of the state in the creation of the national languages of the region; and finally, the Uzbekistan example serves to confirm that, prior to the Revolution, a standardised literary language had only permeated through to the intelligentsia and large differences existed in regional dialects, especially between urban and rural areas.[29]

Two other changes to the language are worth mentioning. Between 1927 and 1930 all five languages were transliterated from Arabic script into the Latin alphabet so as to foster a move away from Islam, further isolating Soviet Central Asia from their neighbours.[30] But the move also had the effect of alienating the Central Asians from their (often common) history, literature and culture 'it rendered the literacy skills of the educated Central Asian obsolete and denied the new generations of Central Asian youth access to their considerable literary heritage written in Arabic-Persian script'.[31] The language policy was therefore vehemently opposed by the conservative élite which viewed the introduction of the national languages as destroying the divine language – Arabic.[32] Between 1939 and 1941 the Latin alphabet was exchanged for the Cyrillic script in all the Central Asian republics. This was justified in terms of promoting the greater unification of the Soviet people by linguistically integrating Central Asia into the Union.[33] But it may also have had the objective of eroding the pan-Turkic

links between Central Asia and the modernising state of Turkey which had adopted the Latin alphabet on November 1 1928.

Literacy

Despite the radical changes to the scripts of the national languages one of the success stories of the Soviet era is the high rate of literacy achieved throughout the Central Asian region. After the 1919 decree 'on the eradication of illiteracy among the population of the RSFSR' literacy was vigorously promoted in conjunction with a wholesale increase in the education of the population. This educative process was to be implemented on a national basis as set out by the first programme of the Bolshevik Party which had proclaimed 'the right of the population to receive education in its native language, guaranteed by the state's creation of necessary schools for this; the rights of each citizen to be explained in their native language at meetings; introduction of native language on equal par with state language in all local groups and state institutions'.[34] Soviet constitutions consistently guaranteed citizens the right to education, and this right was said to be ensured 'by the opportunity for school instruction in one's native tongue'; significantly, this guarantee was not defined in territorial terms but quite explicitly in ethnic terms, endowing ethnic groups with extra-territorial language rights.[35]

The implementation of these policies meant that all five republics were furnished with schools which taught in the national medium, the actual number of schools largely reflected the ethnic composition of the republic in accordance with statutory obligations. Thus, schools were also established that taught in the language of other ethnic groups, for example in Kazakhstan, schools also taught in the Russian, Uzbek, Uighur and Dungan languages, whereas in Uzbekistan, schools also used the Russian, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tadzhik and Karakalpak languages as media of instruction.[36] Schools using the national language of the respective republic therefore formed the majority of schools within their own republics with the exception of Kazakhstan.

As would be expected, the vast improvement in education and the national form this education took has meant that the population of each of the five ethnic groups has become overwhelmingly literate in their respective national languages. In 1926 the literacy rate for each of the five ethnic groups ranged from 2 per cent to 7 per cent of the population, the Tadzhiks having the lowest literacy level of 2.2 per cent whilst the Kazakhs, with a 7.1 per cent rate of literacy, had obtained the highest level. In comparison, by 1970 all these ethnic groups had achieved a literacy rate in excess of 99

per cent.[37] The consequences of this process are reflected in the fact that the proportion of the Central Asian nationalities that claimed their ethnic language as their native tongue in 1989 ranged from 97 per cent (Kazakhs) to 98.5 per cent (Turkmen).[38] In addition, peoples that belonged to the five ethnic groups concerned who were not resident within their respective republics had largely retained their ethnic language as their native tongue. In 1979 the percentage for this category ranged from 84.8 per cent to 96.9 per cent with the Kirghiz registering the former rate and the Uzbeks the latter (Table A.4).

THE EFFECTS OF RUSSIFICATION

In contradistinction to the creation of national languages there were efforts at the same time to promote the drawing together of the peoples of the Soviet Union. One of the areas for this promotion was Soviet language policy which can be divided approximately into four periods. The first period which began in 1924 under the policy of nativisation (*korenizatsia*) lasted until the first half of the 1930s and involved an effort to increase the number of Central Asians represented in industry and the state apparatus. To facilitate this affirmative action, the national language of the republic was to be used in an official capacity alongside Russian. However, by the middle of the 1930s Russian began to become predominant within the administrative apparatus and this occurred at the same time as the national languages were 'internationalised' by the introduction of Russian loan words.[39] This policy culminated in the passing of the decree of 1938 making the teaching of the Russian language compulsory in non-Russian schools throughout the Soviet Union.[40]

These integrative tendencies continued under Khrushchev, the importance of Russian in forging what Khrushchev termed the new historical community of Soviet people was underlined when the increasing use of the Russian language was defined as one of the basic hallmarks of this emerging community. The enhanced status of the Russian language was represented in the education reform laws of 1958–9 which allowed parents to choose whether their children attended schools taught in their mother tongue or in Russian.[41] This option was generally taken up only by the national élites of the republics to ensure better career opportunities for their children so that, as mentioned earlier, by 1989 only a few percent of the overall population did not declare their nationality language as their first language (Table A.4). The final period began in the late seventies when the use of Russian was further promoted by an increase in the

numbers of hours it was taught as a second language and the introduction of Russian classes in pre-school education.[42] This last policy resulted in the percentage of ethnic pre-school units using Russian as the language of communication increasing to: approximately 25 per cent of all pre-school units in Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan; 15 per cent in Kazakhstan; and 10 per cent in Kirghizstan.[43]

The effects of these policies have obviously varied from republic to republic with the greatest Russification occurring within Kazakhstan because of the vast numbers of Slavs that have migrated there. Surveys produced by the Soviet Union in 1989 indicated that only a third of the Central Asian population held Russian as their second language, with the exception of Kazakhstan where 60 per cent of the population held Russian as their second language – reflecting its ethnic composition (Table A.3).[44] With the exception of Kazakhstan the number of Central Asians with Russian as their second language is therefore rather low when one considers the possible optimum effects of the decree of 1938 and the preceding policies of Russification.

It is also worth noting the effects of urbanisation on the Central Asian population. The first stages of urbanisation are usually associated with population displacements from rural areas to cities and towns which, in a multi-ethnic state, usually involves the interaction of a variety of ethnic groups within a cosmopolitan environment. Urban areas are therefore the type of environment in which assimilation is most likely to occur. Yet, despite the fact that the urban regions of Central Asia do consist of a variety of ethnic groups, the rate of language assimilation is extremely low. In fact, the percentage of city people declaring their nationality language as their native tongue is, at the most, 2.5 per cent below that of the total population (i.e. urban and rural). In other words the rate of linguistic assimilation is surprisingly low in the urban environment registering its highest rate in Tadzhikistan with 4.1 per cent and its lowest rate of 2.7 per cent in Kirghizia (Table A.4).

THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL MYTH-SYMBOL COMPLEXES

'Official nationalism' and the introduction of a national classificatory grid upon a region is not necessarily limited to national delimitation via the census, map and museum. National cohesion is also promoted by a 'myth-symbol complex' which generates a belief in commonality through a myth of a common ancestor, an emphasis on a common history and the creation

or reinvention of such matters as national traditions. It is important to distinguish between two forms of 'myth-symbol complex', the communal and the state type. The communal 'myth-symbol complex' is associated with the myths, history and traditions handed down from generation to generation within an ethnic group. The state 'myth-symbol complex' is generated by state élites and endeavours to create a feeling of national unity and common ancestry through the use of national-state symbols, parades, festivals etc.; it may also involve the reconstruction or even invention of a national history either through selective interpretations or falsification of historical facts.[45]

The existence of ethnic communal 'myth-symbol complexes' within Central Asia were discussed in the previous chapter on the pre-revolutionary condition of the region. The histories of the various ethnic groups usually recounted the various battles between themselves and their enemies or recounted romantic love stories encapsulated in the oral epics of the region such as: the Kazakh *Koblandy-Batir*, *Er sain* and *Er Targyn*; the Turkmen *Korkut Ata*; and the Kirghiz *Manas* which all recount great battles, usually against the Kamlyks. Myths of a common ancestor were also present in the Kazakh belief in their mythical ancestor *Alash*, the Kirghiz myth of *Manas*, and the Turkmen's mythical line of descent from *Oghuz*. It is important to note that certain tribes of the region retained their own lines of descent somewhat apart from their larger ethnic group and it may be possible that these lines of descent are in fact more historically accurate. The best examples of this were the four holy Turkmen tribes who were said to be descended from the first four Khalifs and the Tadzhik clans or *avlods* some of whom claim descent from Alexander the Great or from Arabian or Persian roots.[46]

There were also common supra-ethnic 'myth-symbol complexes' associated with the practice of 'unofficial Islam' and the cult of holy places prevalent within the region. These holy places can take the form of a spring or geographical anomaly identified with the life and travels of a particular saint or mystic, but usually the most important of these sites are the tombs (*mazars*) of the (often mythical) saints and mystics themselves. The latter are said to possess mystical powers especially in the healing of the infirm and infertile.

The possible creation of national 'myth-symbol complexes' within Central Asia by the Soviet state is examined below. Any evaluation of the Soviet reconstruction of the region's history is complicated by the Soviet's general reinterpretation of history along Marxist/Leninist lines. This generally took the form of dividing historical figures into progressive and reactionary agents but it also began to exhibit a strong pro-Russian bias. This often had the effect of delegitimising, in the eyes of the general

population, the new interpretation of a nation's history. However, it is worthwhile examining certain aspects of Soviet history and anthropology for the possible creation of sustainable 'myth-symbol complexes' that may have remained with the nations of the region despite the collapse of the Soviet Union.

RECONSTRUCTING HISTORY

The interpretation of the period of Tsarist invasions of the region and the Central Asian resistance to these incursions experienced several revisions. Four periods have been identified by several authors.[47] The first two decades of Soviet power witnessed a flourishing of academic research on Central Asian culture and associated with this period was the historical interpretation of Tsarist expansion into the region as an 'absolute evil'; resistance to colonial rule was therefore viewed as generally progressive. However, in 1937 these liberation movements were presented in a less favourable light with Tsarist rule described as the 'lesser evil' because 'it had progressed the people from a state of feudalism to the capitalist stage and aided the move to socialism'.[48]

This tendency took a turn for the worst after the Second War when the Tsarist Empire was described as a 'positive good' because Russian occupation had not only propelled the region towards a new economic stage but had also protected it from conquest by other (presumably less-enlightened?) powers. For example, the revolt in 1835 against the Russians led by Kenesary Kasimov in Kazakhstan was criticised for its 'reactionary' character, similarly the Andizhan attack of 1898 by Uzbeks and Kirghiz on a Russian garrison which had been previously described as a liberation movement was now viewed as 'deeply feudal and bourgeois nationalist' because of its religious overtones and anti-Russian character. However, there were other events that were interpreted in a positive light because they were unconnected to the Russian occupation, for example, the 1905 Tadzhik revolts in the mountains of Kulyab, Bol'dzhuan, and Kurgan-Tyube against the Emir of Bukhara were now said to be revolutionary and progressive.[49] The general revisionism of the post-Stalinist period resulted in a more moderate pro-Russian interpretation which described Tsarism as harsh but still historically progressive.[50]

The epics of the region experienced similar vicissitudes in response to the vagaries of the Moscow ideologues. In 1951 Soviet authorities launched an attack on the national epics of the region. For example, the Turkmen's *Korkut Ata*, the Uzbek *Alpamysh*, the Kazakh *Er Sain, Shora*

Batyr and Koblandy Batyr were all condemned as religious, feudal and reactionary and withdrawn from circulation. However, this re-evaluation of epics met with forthright resistance in Kirghizstan when similar criticisms were levelled at the Kirghiz equivalent of the Iliad – *Manas*. The opposition to criticism of this epic found a sympathetic hearing with some elements of the Kirghiz Communist Party and for the first time since the purging of the epics the dissent was given a public airing. As a result a compromise was reached and permission was given for a new version of this particular epic to be written.[51]

One of the other reasons for the denunciation of at least some of these epics was the pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic sentiments contained within them. Epics such as the Uzbek *Alpamysh*, the Uzbek version of *Kör Oghlu* and the Azeri *Dede Korkut* were thought of as dangerous 'not because they were national, but because in many ways they were supra-national'.[52] In the post-Stalinist period the epics were eventually rehabilitated, however, although they were republished much of the content deemed to be reactionary remained absent.

In some instances the reinterpretation of history did assume a national mantle. This was especially the case for Uzbekistan. In the late 1920s Timurid literary writers associated with the use of the Chagatai language such as Navai and Babur were associated with pan-Turkic aspirations and were therefore heavily criticised by writers on the subject. However, after the purges of 1938 these writers and other historical figures such as the philosopher Ibn Sina (Avicenna) were presented in a favourable light. But this rehabilitation also involved a classic example of the reconstruction of history in a national form. The Timurid Chagatai classics of Navai and Babur were now described as 'old Uzbek' literature. This interpretation was in line with the introduction of new terminology that defined the Chagatai and Kipchak languages as 'old Uzbek'. A new interpretation of history was also introduced which argued that the Uzbeks had continuously inhabited the area and that there had been an uninterrupted development of the Uzbek language from the very earliest times through to the contemporary period.[53] A decade later the Timurids, Emir Timur and Zahiriddin Muhammed Babur and others were described as being part of the cultural and historical heritage of the Uzbeks. This version of history was officially sanctioned when it was published in the authoritative History of Uzbekistan in the late fifties. The very adversaries of the Shaibanid Uzbeks, the Timurids, against whom they had fought tooth and nail for primacy within the region, were now represented as Uzbeks themselves.[54]

Tadzhikistan's history was similarly altered in the fifties to present events in a national fashion. The culture and traditions of the plains

Tadzhiks were presented as the earliest origins of general Persian culture which had later spread to the Iranian region. The chronology of cultural diffusion was turned upside down so that medieval Persian culture was said to be 'the Tadzhik culture, developed at the time of the Samanid empire, which spread into Iran and contributed to the development of Western Iranian culture'.[55] This was in direct contradiction to the Western interpretation of events in which it is generally accepted that the plains Tadzhiks are a branch of the Persians, their culture is a branch of Persian culture and that their language is a Persian dialect.

The above examples do indicate that there were some instances in which certain aspects of culture, historic events and figures were arrogated by some of the republics. However, one has constantly to bear in mind the pervasiveness of Russian and Soviet culture. The museums of the region reflected this influence. The Kazakh and Turkmen national museums concentrated heavily on emphasising the ebb and flow of the many groups that have inhabited the area with a very limited amount of space dedicated to the history of the titular nationalities, to the extent that one recent visitor labelled the National Museum of the Kazakh People the 'Non-Museum of the Kazakh People'.[56] In Kirghizstan over two-thirds of the Capital's museum was dedicated to the Soviet Revolution and, just outside, Lenin's statue bestrode the entrance. In fact the museums in former Leningrad actually contained as much if not more information on the titular nationalities of these republics. Furthermore, the majority of street names of these republics were either heroes of the Soviet Revolution or famous Russian writers, composers and so forth; even the names of mountains and capital cities were not exempt from this policy.[57]

SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS ISLAM

Although in the initial stages of the Soviet Revolution some compromises were reached between the state and the Islamic institutions, confrontation between the two was inevitable, given the Marxist/Leninist ideology guiding the Soviet state. Lenin stressed the need to struggle against the clergy and other reactionary elements in general and, in particular, to combat Pan-Islamism which attempted to strengthen the position of the khans, landlords, mullahs, etc.[58] The property and lands of the clergy were therefore expropriated and either redistributed amongst the people or appropriated for state purposes.

In the first decade of Soviet power polygamy, the wearing of the veil (*purdah*) and the Arabic script in which the Quran is written were abolished.

The legal powers of the Islamic establishment were terminated with the final abolition of the *Shari'ah* courts (Quranic law), and of the *adat* (customary law) in 1927. In addition the banning of *waqfs* (endowments supporting pious foundations) in 1930 guaranteed the demise of the clergy's economic power. In addition, the abolition of the religious schools (*medressehs and mektebs*) and termination of the religious training of the *Ulema* (religious scholars) undermined the ideological authority of the Islamic religion.[59] Thus, by the 1930s the public element of Islam represented by its educational, juridical and economic power had been totally undermined.

Despite the constitutional guarantee of personal religious freedom, the private sphere of Islam was also affected by the imposition of Soviet authority. Three of the five pillars of Islam that a faithful Muslim must perform were also made illegal in the 1920s (the *zakat*, the obligatory alms-tax; the *hadj*, the pilgrimage to Mecca; and the fast of Ramadan).[60] In the late 1920s a full-scale purge was underway. In 1927 the Ismaili population of Tadzhikistan were prevented from contacting the Agha Khan and were unable to send their annual tithe to him.[61] This concerted campaign against Islam involved the liquidation of clerics and either the demolition of mosques or their conversion into 'museums, places of entertainment or factories'.[62] By 1941 only 1,500 mosques remained from the 25,000–30,000 mosques open in 1920, all of the 14,500 Islamic religious schools were shut and only 2,000 of the 47,000 clerics survived.[63] These actions were accompanied by anti-Islamic propaganda orchestrated by state-controlled anti-religious associations and disseminated through every form of media.[64]

During the Second World War there was a slight improvement in the Soviet attitude towards Islam with the signing of a concordat in 1941 between the government and the Muslim clerics under the Mufti of Ufa, Abdurrahman Rasulev, thus halting the religious persecution. In 1943–44 Four Muslim directorates were set up as official administration units for the Muslims in the Soviet Union, three of which were Sunni and one Shi'ite.[65] External contacts were allowed for the first time with Muslim delegations from abroad arriving in Central Asia. Muslim leaders were permitted to visit abroad, including Ziauddin Babakhanov, the Mufti of Central Asia, taking part in the Hadj to Mecca in 1947.[66]

This religious relaxation would appear to have been more for an audience abroad than for domestic consideration, coinciding as it did with the emergence of the 'Islamic card' in Soviet foreign policy.[67] This manipulation of the Islamic question was demonstrated most clearly in the Khrushchev period under his policy of 'back to Lenin': by the early sixties another 1,000

mosques had been shut, leaving only 500 operational, yet by the late fifties the use of Islam in foreign policy to present an agreeable face to the Islamic community abroad had become more frequent, especially after the Czech-Egyptian arms deal in 1955.[68] Internationally, in the non-socialist countries, there was said to be a possibility of Islam becoming a 'revolutionary anti-capitalist reformist movement, for instance as was the case in Syria, Algeria or in the United Arab Republic'.[69] But domestically Islam was still viewed as being used in reactionary circles against the Soviet State and even when, under Brezhnev, the use of the 'Islamic card' reached its peak there was minimal relaxation of domestic policy.

By the beginning of the Gorbachev period it was estimated that the total number of Muslim clerics in the Soviet Union numbered 2,000 to 3,000, all of which were obliged to be registered with one of the directorates as well as with the Council for Religious Affairs of the republic concerned. The total number of mosques in Central Asia may have been 250, but there could well have been as few as 150. Only two *medressehs* were in existence, that of *Mir-i-Arab* in Bukhara (1945) and *Imam Ismail al-Bukhari* in Tashkent (1971).[70] Comparing these figures with the ones given earlier highlights the lack of any significant change towards the institutions of Islam throughout Soviet history.

THE CHANGING FACE OF ISLAM

From the litany of Soviet abuses towards the Islamic religion of Central Asia it would be easy to conclude that there had been a concomitant eradication in the beliefs of the Muslim population of the region. However, despite the deliberately destructive nature of Soviet policy towards Islam the religion has survived to a large extent. During the Soviet period it was generally true that even the Central Asians that proclaimed not to be Muslim practised Muslim rites: that is, they observed Muslim festivals, practised circumcision, had religious marriages, and had a Muslim burial. Obviously the local population's resistance has been extremely resolute against the foreign domination and Soviet atheism they have had to endure for over seventy years.

This resistance was aided by the clerical structure of the Sunni religion which is relatively unstructured unlike, say, the Christian or indeed Shi'ite religion. The Imams (priests – leader of prayers) are not appointed by a clerical hierarchy in fact they can be selected by the local population as long as they fulfil the requirement of being able to recite the Qu'ran (in Central Asia some knowledge of Arabic and knowledge of the basic rites

sufficed). In addition 'though the mosque is very important for Muslims, all rites, from prayers to funerals, may be observed at home'.[71] This meant that the daily practices were able to continue largely uninterrupted. The Imams were selected from within the village, collective farm or *mahalla* (city quarter), and prayers were more often than not held in the local *chaikhana* (tea house) or social club.[72] The fact that Central Asia is distinguished by an extremely low rate of movement of the population from their local rural environment to urban centres also meant that these events could continue unreported because each inhabitant's loyalty remained at the local level.

The role of the Central Asian party members and apparatchiks were also instrumental in ensuring that these activities continued unnoticed and unhindered by outside interference. These élites acted as the gatekeepers of Islam; towards the outside world of Soviet officialdom they publicly criticised the religion whilst inwardly remaining Muslim and protecting as best they could their fellow believers. It was in fact quite common for these officials throughout their working life verbally to support the need to eradicate Islam and yet once they had retired they would demonstrate overtly their adherence to the Islamic faith.[73] The degree of influence of this protective lattice of indigenous élites recently came to light during the crackdown on corruption in the Gorbachev era. For example, in the home province (Dzhizak) of the Uzbek First Secretary Rashidov half a million roubles had been spent by party members to restore a mosque; similarly in Bukhara the First Secretary of the region was accused of misappropriating state money for the construction of mosques and even building roads to improve access to religious sites.[74]

Although large-scale adherence to Islam was still present within the Soviet period, it did not remain totally unaltered. In fact, three trends have been noticeable: the increased influence of the 'unofficial Islam' of the Sufi Brotherhoods; the 'nationalisation' of Islam; and the secularisation of Russified urban areas.

'Unofficial Islam' had the advantage of not being controlled by any of the four spiritual directorates and was therefore free from Soviet influence. This 'unofficial' or 'parallel' Islam, as Alexandre Bennigsen calls it, is based on the Sufi brotherhoods or *Tariqa* – 'the path leading to God'.[75] Sufism has always been associated with fierce resistance to external interference such as Ishan Madali's stand against the Russians at Andizhan (1898) (Madali was a Naqshbandi mürshid), Kurban Myrat's defence of Gök Tepe and the Sufi members of the 'Basmachi Movement'.[76] At the same time the secretness, the oath of fealty and the tightly knit hierarchy of the Sufi orders made it impermeable to Soviet efforts of control.

Associated with this 'unofficial Islam' is the worship of holy sites (*mazars*), some of which were present before the spread of Islam into the region and are connected with pre-Islamic spiritual beliefs. A syncretic mixture of the two religions has meant that the pre-Islamic cult of *mazars* has been incorporated into Islam, so that these holy sites not only include the tombs of saints but also geographical anomalies, caves, springs etc.[77] Throughout the Soviet period the majority of these sites were maintained by the local population and served as alternative religious symbols so that in many places 'the holy places' had 'essentially replaced the closed mosques'.[78] In addition it was often the Sufi adepts who retained knowledge of Islamic rites such as circumcision, religious marriage and religious burial; they therefore acted as ideal custodians of the faith in a long period of religious suppression.

The 'nationalisation' of Islam also became apparent in many aspects of Central Asia, but most obviously in the adoption of Islamic holy places and saints by the various republics. An illuminating example of this was the embracement of Ahmad Yasavi as a 'Kazakh national saint', despite the fact that the Kazakhs first appear as important actors in the sixteenth century, four centuries after Ahmad Yasavi.[79] More seriously for the Soviet authorities, this phenomenon had also infiltrated the communist parties of the region so that Central Asian party cadres complied to certain religious rites and customs for 'national' reasons, since 'to spurn the religious traditions of the nation would be tantamount to betrayal of the nation'.[80]

Religion in Central Asia had therefore become a form of ethnic expression inextricably tied to the national consciousness of each republic rather than something which expressed unity between republics, therefore to say 'I am a Muslim' could be more accurately equated to saying 'I am an Uzbek' or 'I am a Kirghiz'. This influence has continued through to the present period: as a journalist from Tashkent observed recently, Islam in Central Asia today 'is a fact of national identity and psychology, together with a body of customs and traditions rather than a denomination'.[81]

The third aspect of Islam in Central Asia worth considering is its regional nature. It was mentioned in the previous chapter how the intensity of religious observance was not uniform even before Soviet intervention. Northern Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan were said to have been less Islamised than the southern parts of these republics (Chimkent, Dzhambal and Kzyl Orda in Kazakhstan; the Ferghana Valley in Kirghizstan). During the Soviet period, as one would expect, the secularisation and Russification of the Central Asian population has been greatest where there has been the largest presence of Slavic settlers. Slavic migration has normally been

concentrated in the industrialised areas of the republics; in both Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan this has been in the northern parts of the country. In Kazakhstan, largely as a result of Khrushchev's 'Virgin Lands' campaign, there is an additional presence of a substantial rural Slavic population throughout the north of the country. The secularising influences of the Slavic settlers has meant that the differences in the influence of Islam between the north and south of these countries has increased, the north has become more secularised and indeed Russified than their southern counterparts. This trend is also apparent in areas which were comparatively uniform prior to the Revolution, for example the northern region of Tadzhikistan and possibly the area around Tashkent.

THE CENTRAL ASIAN ECONOMY

The chapter on nationalism suggested that the increase in the cohesiveness of nations may be associated with the process of industrialisation. It was suggested that the first countries to industrialise experienced a general 'social updraft' of the population, individuals uprooted themselves from their local communities and migrated to urban industrial centres. There was said to be associated with this shift from the rural to urban environment a change in the individual's identity over the passage of time; individuals tended to identify themselves with the larger national community rather than with their rural ties of family and kin.

Before we study the effects of the economic development of Central Asia certain points are worth considering. Firstly, the industrialisation of the majority of countries of the world may not necessarily mimic the development pattern of the first group of countries that industrialised; as one author humorously put it 'industrialisation, like sex but more genuinely so, is rather special the first time'.[82] There are several differences in the development of these two groups of countries but the one which is of most interest to this study is the contrast between the rural migrations in the first group of countries to develop and those that followed later. The rate of rural migration in the latter is significantly less than the developed countries largely due to the improvements in health care. This has meant that the mortality and morbidity rates of the urban population in the initial period of industrialisation in the developed countries has been far higher than their later counterparts. The 'social updraft' of the rural population to urban areas has been correspondingly less in the developing countries because the replacement rate of the urban workforce has diminished to the extent that much of the demand for labour can be met from within the

urban population itself. The tendency for industrialisation to promote national cohesiveness may therefore be attenuated in developing countries because of this reduction in rural migration.[83]

The second point about this section is that the question of whether the region experienced a long term process of exploitation by the more industrialised Slavic and Baltic states is left unanswered. At one end of the spectrum there are those who have argued that the Soviet leadership intentionally maintained the peripheral status of Central Asia so that it would continue to 'provide mineral resources and raw materials for the advanced industrial complexes of European Russia'.[84] As a consequence this core–periphery relationship resulted in the exploitation of Central Asia through the under-investment in industry and the low prices received for raw material production.[85] At the other end of the spectrum there are those who have argued that the capital investment in the region would have brought higher returns if invested elsewhere. From this perspective a vast improvement in the material conditions of the population is said to have been brought about from the fact 'that the Government of the USSR had an industrialising ideology, [they] equated social progress with industry, and paid special attention to the development in formerly backward areas'.[86] Others have emphasised the geopolitical significance of Central Asia to the Soviet Union and have described the relationship as 'welfare colonialism' whereby a Russian presence in the region had been maintained 'even at the price of economic discomfort for its own [i.e. Russian] citizens'.[87] This debate is as yet unresolved and will probably remain so, but it is fairly evident that Central Asia was far less industrialised than the other republics, and the long-term effects of producing cotton, the so-called 'white gold', has been the environmental devastation of vast stretches of the region.[88]

What is significant for this study is that the initial intention to site industry next to the extraction and production of primary products did not occur to any great extent in the Central Asian region.[89] This has resulted in a general lack of industrialisation of the area so that the economy is one based largely on the extraction of raw materials and the production of agricultural goods and livestock. Two other characteristics of the Central Asian economy are also worth examining: the mode of agricultural production and the overwhelming presence of the Slavic ethnic group in the Central Asian industrial sector.

The industrialisation of the Central Asian region varied from republic to republic, with the per capita industrial output at its greatest in Kazakhstan (closely followed by Kirghizstan) and at its lowest in Tadzhikistan. But the whole of the region was marked by the lowest level of per capita industrial

output when compared to any of the other republics of the Soviet Union. By the Gorbachev period the per capita industrial output of the region was less than half that of Russia.[90]

This low rate of industrialisation was reflected in the low percentage of the labour force of each republic employed in the industrial sector. In 1990 the percentage of the work force involved in industry was as low as 11 per cent in Turkmenistan, the highest rates were obtained in Kazakhstan which had approximately 22 per cent of the work force employed in industry. In comparison the percentages of the labour force employed in the agricultural sector on the other hand were far higher than the rest of the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan was the exception to the general rule, with a greater number of workers employed in industry than in agriculture (17.8 per cent). But in fact these figures can be highly misleading given that the majority of industrial workers remained overwhelmingly Slavic.[91] Kirghizstan and Uzbekistan had almost a third of the workforce employed in agriculture whilst Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan were marked by the fact that over 40 per cent of the working population was employed in the agricultural sector (Table A.6).

The fact that larger proportions of the Central Asian work force were involved in agriculture was reflected in the low urbanisation of the population of these republics. This tendency was greatly accentuated in the case of the titular nationalities of each of the republics. In 1979 over two-thirds of the titular nationality of each republic was classed as residing in a rural district. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan had the highest urbanisation rates of 33 per cent and 32 per cent respectively; Uzbekistan was third highest with 29 per cent; urbanised Tadzhiks constituted only a quarter of their total population; whilst 82 per cent of the Kirghiz population remained in the countryside (Table A.5).

Two points would be noted from these statistics. Firstly, the urbanisation rate of Turkmenistan was somewhat anomalous when one considers the percentage of the population employed in agriculture. This may be explained by the fact that the whole of the Ashkhabad region was defined as urban rather than just the city alone.[92] If this is taken into account then it is more likely that the figure was similar to Tadzhikistan given that their populations' employment profile is so similar. Secondly, the industrialisation of Central Asia led to a large influx of Russians into the area who, throughout the Soviet era, dominated the industrial sector of each of these republics. The exception to this trend was Kazakhstan where there was also a large Russian population that had settled on the land during the 'Virgin Lands' campaign. This was represented in the Russian level of urbanisation, which at 56 per cent was significantly lower than the

rest of Central Asia, where 68 per cent of the Russian population was urbanised.[93]

Several reasons have been put forward for the large numbers of Russians in the industrial sector of the Central Asian economies. Some authors have emphasised the rapid rate of industrialisation and the general lack of local skilled labour; others have pointed to a possible ethnic hierarchy reflecting the balance of power within the Soviet Union as a whole; whilst others have looked to the existence of a large Central Asian 'second economy' and cultural factors.[94] Whatever the reasons, it is highly significant that the Russians actually formed the largest nationality in many of the industrialised regions of Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan including the capitals, while in the capitals of the other three republics they represented over 40 per cent of the population.[95] Central Asia was therefore not only conspicuous by its much lower rate of industrialisation but also by the extremely low rates of urbanisation of its titular nationalities. In addition, the urban areas were marked by the presence of large numbers of Russians and other Slavic groups, so that the north of Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan and Tadzhikistan were more secular and Russified than the other regions of those republics, as were the capital cities and the surrounding environs of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The Slavic presence was greatest in Kazakhstan where for most of the Soviet period they were the largest nationality and there were a greater number of Slavs than Kazakhs. However, the Slavic presence was not uniform; Slavs were in the majority in the northern regions (oblasts) whilst the Kazakhs were the majority in the south.[96]

Because the vast majority of Central Asians have remained within their local rural settings the gradual erosion of local traditions and kinship ties associated with industrialisation have not occurred. This conservation of tradition and kinship has also been maintained by the mode of agricultural production introduced into the region. The creation of state and collective farms (*sovkhozy and kolkhozy*) have tended to be based on local villages and have therefore resulted in a syncretic fusion of the tribal/clanic structure and the agricultural production unit.[97] Even when groups were relocated to new areas they generally moved *en masse* so that the kinship structure was retained. This more often than not remained true for state and collective farms that were ethnically mixed; each ethnic group and, within that, each kinship unit remained physically separated from each other living within their own villages on the farms.[98]

In addition to this there existed in the urban settlements of Uzbekistan and some areas of Tadzhikistan closely knit neighbourhoods, or *mahallas*. The concept of the *mahalla* is something quite unique to Central Asia, the

neighbourhood that an Uzbek or Tadzhik is brought up in consists of very close social ties which are often a fusion of family and kinship networks. Neighbours from the district attend each other's ceremonies such as weddings, circumcision celebrations and funeral rites. Advice in all matters is traditionally given by a revered elder (*aksakal*) who has authority conferred upon them by the community. This urban form of community continued throughout the Soviet period and is still very much apparent today.[99]

This retention of tribal and clanic ties was reflected in the selection of personnel in the Communist Party, government organisations and industry. Each tribal/clanic grouping promoted their fellow kinsfolk whenever possible so that personnel recruitment was based largely on who was related to whom in an institution's hierarchy. Some authors have explained the continuation of such practices by the general feeling of insecurity generated by the Soviet system – 'to survive the ruthless power struggles which are such a feature of CP hierarchies, a native secretary of a district (*raikom*) or region (*obkom*) committee surrounds himself with his kinsmen, members of his clan, tribe or horde, since the traditional links of kinship are more reliable and more loyally observed than the comradeship of the CP'.[100]

However, this practise which was referred to by the Soviets as localism and friendship ties (*mestnichestvo i znakomstvo*) was not restricted to the local level. In many of the republics the highest Communist Party posts have been filled by the traditionally dominant tribe/clan of the titular nationality, including the post of First Secretary. With the exception of Uzbekistan (which seemed to reflect a more regional form of politics) post-Stalinist politics in Central Asia witnessed the consolidation of the traditional dominance of these groups. In Kazakhstan the Greater *Zhuz* have filled positions of influence; in Kirghizstan the *Sary Bagysh*; in Turkmenistan the *Tekke*; and in Tadzhikistan the Khodzhent region has been predominant.[101] The tendency for kinship to permeate Soviet institutions was therefore not confined to the local level but appeared at the highest tiers of authority such that the tribal structure has 'in some bizarre fashion fused with the party structure to form a single indissoluble whole in contemporary Central Asia'.[102]

The perseverance of kinship ties within Soviet institutions cannot be fully explained by the agricultural mode of production and the feeling of insecurity of personnel from the power struggles which occurred within the Soviet system. It is also not possible that this phenomenon went unnoticed by the Soviet leaders. In fact it was normal in Central Asia to have a Russian placed 'second in command' in all of the most important republican organisations i.e. Communist Party, government and industrial posts.

For example, the party First Secretary at the national and regional level was usually indigenous whilst the Second Secretary was more often than not Russian.[103] It therefore seems highly likely that the Soviet leadership were well aware of the situation but for one reason or another had decided to leave the situation relatively unchanged.

One author has argued that after 1938 a two-tier policy was introduced in the Central Asian region that allowed a dual society to exist. The 'upper tier' was said to consist of the Russified urban centres of Central Asia where Russian culture and language predominated. Any Central Asian élite wishing to be promoted to the higher echelons of Soviet institutions was required to be fluent in Russian and, ostensibly at least, demonstrate their Communist credentials. On the other hand, the 'lower tier' was said to consist of the traditional way of life of the region. Thus, the traditional group segmentation of the *mahalla*, tribe and clan was retained including the social positions of clanic and religious leaders as well as the hierarchy between the various tribal groupings that constituted the titular nationality.[104] Although the date as to when this two-tier system started to emerge is disputable it is generally agreed that this description of the situation is accurate.[105] Certainly my field trip to the region and the interviews conducted there corroborated this account of the second half of Soviet rule in the area.[106]

CONCLUSION

To what extent these various Soviet policies have promoted a nation-building process within the region has been complicated by the Marxist-Leninist ideology that has often guided Soviet decision-making. The nationality policy of 'national in form, socialist in content' permitted the creation of the national republics of the region but also imposed an ideologically laden culture on the population of each of these republics.

One of the most obvious elements of this nation-building process was the creation of the five republics within Central Asia with their own political/legislative apparatus, which the people identified with as their representative body within the Soviet system. As described earlier, this situation derived from the principle of the 'territoriality of ethnicity'[107] which was adopted by the Bolshevik Party from Stalin's thesis that a nation was, in part, defined by the foundation of a common territory. These communities were, in political and legislative terms, henceforth represented along national lines. Incidental to this, but of equal import, is the 'totalising classificatory grid' that accompanied this transformation of the

region, so that these communities were now represented via the map and the census in national terms.

Whether these ethnic groups would have developed their own national states in isolation is debatable, one author has argued that 'had the choice of identity remained with the Turkistanians, Bukharans, and Khwarazmians, their three heterogeneous states would likely have continued to develop their supra-ethnic identity. If the region had retained the popular name Turkistan in the south as a broad, unifying administrative and territorial designation, subsequent development of group identity in much of Central Asia would have taken a very different course ... The loss of the name Turkistan represented more than a change of designation – it deprived Central Asians of the prerogative to determine their own identity.'[108] Whether this would have been the case or not is a debatable point, but what is important is the effect that national delimitation had upon the Central Asian population.

The modernisation process within Central Asia entailed, in some cases, the creation of a literary language and in all cases the standardisation of the literary language alongside a massive increase in the literacy of the population. In addition, efforts were made to impose a state 'myth-symbol complex' on each of the titular nationalities to replace the communal 'myth-symbol complexes' which had traditionally existed within each of the ethnic groups of the region. The fact that the Soviet interpretation of Central Asia history changed so many times, national epics were denounced or heavily edited and efforts were made to eradicate Islam which was part and parcel of Central Asian culture meant that these versions of national culture more often than not held little legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. In most cases the *longue dureé* of traditional culture outlasted the imposition of a Soviet based culture. For instance, although the veil, and the tradition of polygamy, *sororate*, *levirate* and *kaytarma* have almost disappeared, the purchase of a bride (*kalym*), the act of circumcision and the clanic exogamic and endogamic taboos still persist (for example, the Kazakhs and Kirghiz remember their lineage to seven generations and discourage marriage within this group, whereas the Turkmen tradition of the female marrying within the social unit of the tribe continues).[109]

The retention of local traditions and culture has no doubt been aided by the two-tier structure that evolved during the Soviet period whereby the local way of life remained relatively undisturbed as long as certain requirements were fulfilled, such as economic production targets. This two-tier structure meant that much of the daily life of the Central Asian population remained relatively untouched, whilst the Soviet apparatus

became infused with the clanic/tribal hierarchial structure of the titular nationality. At the same time, in the rural areas many of the *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes* were divided along tribal lines. As a result, the hierarchies within and between the clans and tribes of the area have continued to the extent that it is said that 'pre-revolutionary social position is still the most important determinant of social position today'.[110]

Similarly the Russification of the region has been limited by this policy. Although the Russian language had been compulsory in Central Asian schools since 1938, and Russian had become the 'official' language of Soviet officials, the effects were largely confined to the élites and urban areas of Central Asia. This tendency was strengthened by the settlement patterns of the Russians and other Slavic groups. Except for Kazakhstan these groups tended to live in the urban centres or industrial regions of the republics. This had the effect of limiting the Russification and secularisation of the region. Obviously, the exception to this was Kazakhstan, which of all the republics suffered the greatest from Russian domination. With the Russians constituting the majority ethnic group in the northern half of Kazakhstan the republic was often treated more as an extension of Russia than as an independent republic. The southern part of Kazakhstan has been less influenced by the Russian presence, and it would not be surprising if the majority of those Kazakhs claiming Russian as a second language (60 per cent) lived in the north of the country (unfortunately the language statistics are not forthcoming on this point).

This trend has to a far lesser extent been replicated in other republics. The north of Kirghizstan and Tadzhikistan are more industrialised and therefore have a greater Russian presence than the rest of the regions in each republic. Ashkhabad and Tashkent, the capital cities of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also follow this trend. The industrialised regions and urban centres of Central Asia therefore tend to be more Russified and secular than the other regions of the republics. Because of the very low degree of industrialisation of the region as a whole and the extremely low mobility of the indigenous population the rural areas have acted as retainers of the traditional way of life.

Finally, there is evidence that the Soviet policy towards religion within the region led to Islam being driven underground rather than to its extinction. The clandestine nature of 'unofficial Islam' and its association with local often mystical sites of worship meant that it was virtually undetectable throughout the Soviet period. The destruction of mosques and persecution of the official clergy has maintained and probably increased the importance and popularity of the Sufi brotherhoods of Central Asia.[111] Interestingly, Islam has also become partially 'nationalised' in the sense

that the Muslims of Central Asia tend to associate their religion with their individual nations rather than with the Islamic community (*Umma*) as a whole. The other noteworthy aspect is the regional character of Islam. The more Russified areas of Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan and Tadzhikistan are notably more secularised than the rest of those republics.

The Soviet period has therefore resulted in the national delimitation of the area with the modernisation of the region occurring within a national structure so that national languages and literacy were promoted. However, the limited industrialisation of the region has resulted in a large in-migration of Slavic skilled workers. After the first few decades of Soviet power the Russian language became the *lingua franca* of the region and of the Soviet Union as a whole. The indigenous population of the urban and Russified regions of the republics have tended to acquire Russian as a second language as well as becoming more secularised than their rural counterparts. The lack of mobilisation of the indigenous population has also meant that the traditional forms of society have remained intact. This is most apparent in the fusion of the old tribal and clanic hierarchy with the Communist Party and government hierarchies. The traditional differences between the various groups within the titular nationalities have been added to, and accentuated by, the regional diversity that has appeared during the Soviet period so that those areas with a large Slavic presence have become more Russified and secularised than the other areas of the republics. The potential ramifications of this Soviet legacy for the national cohesion of these states in the contemporary era are explored in the following chapter.

KAZAKHSTAN

KYRGYZSTAN

— Borders of
Tadzhikistan
··· Administrative
boundaries
◆ Capital city
● City

◆ Tashkent

Khodzhent
(Leninabad)
●

Samarkand

CHINA

●

Leninabad Oblast

Dushanbe
◆

*Gorno-Badakhshan
Autonomous Republic*

UZBEKISTAN

Kulyab
●

Kulyab Oblast

Khorag
●

*Kurgan-Tyube
Oblast*

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

Map 3. Tadzhikistan Prior to the Civil War

5 Contemporary Central Asia

The achievement of independence by the Central Asian States as a conse-
quence of the disintegration of the Soviet Union has predictably led to a
cultural renaissance within the region and a reassertion of their pre-Soviet
cultural roots. Following on in the wake of independence the leaders of
these states reaffirmed their common historical ties by renaming the region
Central Asia (*Tsentralnaya Azia*) thereby refusing to recognise the Soviet
imposed separation of Kazakhstan from the other four states which were
grouped together and known collectively as Middle Asia (*Srednyaya
Azia*).[1] Even before the break-up of the Soviet Union a cultural renais-
sance had begun, with calls for the re-establishment of the primacy of the
national language and the re-interpretation of the 'blank spots' of Central
Asian history so that key figures of the *Alash and Jadid* movements could
be rehabilitated.[2] The post-Soviet period has witnessed the attendance of
Kazakhs from around the world at a Kazakh *Kurultai* held in Almaty
which resolved to make the return of the Kazakh diaspora a primary objec-
tive.[3] At the same time efforts are under way to document the family trees
of all Kazakhs in order to create a definitive catalogue of their ancestry. In
1996 Uzbekistan celebrated the 660th anniversary of Timurlane, and is
building a State Museum of the Timurids which will endeavour to collate
and collect all significant artifacts of the period.[4] Likewise, in 1995 the
Kirghiz celebrated the millenial anniversary of their epic poem, *Manas*,
and in a similar fashion Turkmenistan has promoted the celebration of its
reknowned national poet Makhtumkuli. This resurgence has continued
apace, with all the national languages being given the status of 'official
language of state communication', Soviet street and place names have
been replaced by national ones and historic figures have been elevated to
national heroic status by the various states.

However, the sobering influence of the Tadzhik Civil War that erupted in
1992 has indicated the deeper ramifications of the Soviet legacy within the
region. It can be quickly discerned from a brief glance at Table A.1 that all of
the states of Central Asia contain sizeable minorities of other ethnic groups.
The common feature of all the states is the presence of large numbers of
Russians. According to the 1989 figures Russians were almost equal to the
number of Kazakhs within Kazakhstan and constituted a quarter of the popu-
lation of Kirghizstan. This has since changed because of the large outward
migration of Russians from the region: only 100,000 Russians remain of the
500,000 that were in Tadzhikistan in 1989; in Kirghizstan the percentage has

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dropped from 21 per cent to 17 per cent; and in 1993 alone 365,000 Russians left Kazakhstan.[5] It is also highly likely that a similar out-migration of Russians has occurred in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; nevertheless Russians still exist in significant numbers within the region and continue to constitute a large percentage of the population in Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan.

In addition to the Russian presence, Uzbeks constitute almost a quarter of Tadzhikistan's population and form large minorities in Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan. Events just prior to the independence of these states did not bode well for the future. The region was marred by large scale inter-ethnic violence which began with the Almaty riots of December 1986 between Kazakhs and Soviet security forces which then generated into a clash between the Russians and Kazakhs. Worse was to follow: in May 1989 violence erupted in Turkmenistan against the Caucasian market traders in Ashkhabad and Nebit-Dag who were accused of inflating prices; in June 1989 violence erupted against the Meskhetian Turks resident in the Uzbek area of the Ferghana Valley which resulted in at least 112 deaths, again arguments between Uzbeks and Meskhetian market traders were blamed; these events culminated in 1990 in the violent clashes in the city of Osh in Kirghizstan between Uzbeks and Kirghiz which resulted in an estimated 320 deaths.[6] The deteriorating economic situation and high rates of unemployment, especially amongst the young, formed the background to the events of 1989 and 1990.[7]

A combination of supra-ethnic, ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts have therefore been manifestly present just prior to and since the attainment of independence. The objective of this chapter is thus twofold: to outline the existing divisions and antagonisms within contemporary Central Asian society; and to provide a comparison with pre-revolutionary Central Asia to assess the extent to which national consolidation has occurred in these states. The chapter is divided into three broad sections: pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic identities; the political movements of the region; and the intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic divisions within each of the five states of the region. The structure of the chapter is therefore very similar to the chapter on the identities within pre-revolutionary Central Asia, so that the reader can make a ready comparison with the situation that pertained in pre-revolutionary Central Asia.

SUPRA-ETHNIC IDENTITIES

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia has witnessed an Islamic renaissance to the extent that the mosque has again become a

common feature in the towns and villages of the region. This appears to have been mostly attributable to a spontaneous revival by the local population rather than to official state promotion of the religion. Travelling through the countryside in 1994 this enthusiasm was evidenced in the flurry of construction/reconstruction of religious sites, all either completed or nearly completed after only three years of independence.[8] Most of the presidents have made a point of visiting Saudi Arabia, although not all have taken the pilgrimage to Mecca (*hadj*), and President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan symbolically took his oath on the Koran during his inauguration.[9] It is not too difficult to predict that Islam will indeed 'appear in the not-too-distant future as an ascendent, even paramount, feature of at least some of the Muslim states'.[10] But at the same time there are important regional differences that are often downplayed and it is probably incorrect to jump to the conclusion that Islam will act as 'a sobering influence among conflictive ethnic identities' within the region.[11]

Generally, Islam has been sanctioned by each of the states, Tadzhikistan being the exception largely because of the civil war within that country. However, the states' leaders have emphasised that they view Turkey as a model to emulate, i.e. they wish to accommodate Islam within society but not to a degree where the principle of a secular state is threatened.[12] To this end they have embraced 'official Islam' more to influence the direction of Islam than to promote it actively. The representatives of 'official Islam' have generally come out against the formation of Islamic Rebirth Parties within their countries, although the exception to this is again Tadzhikistan.[13]

The support of the institutional clergy for the maintenance of the secular states is generally guaranteed because of their own precarious position arising from their compliance with Soviet policies; they are generally viewed by the population as having been compromised by this association. Both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have recently witnessed calls for the removal of the so called 'collaborationist *muftis*' of these countries. At the end of 1991 the Kazakh Congress of Muslims demanded the resignation of the Kazakhstan's *mufti*, Ratbek Nysanbayev (the *Muftiate* was only created in February 1990), who was charged with corruption and other misdemeanours. However, President Nazarbayev put his full support behind the *mufti* whilst the perceived instigators of the incident, the leaders of the *Alash* party, were prosecuted for causing civil unrest after a brawl involving the *mufti* outside a mosque.[14] In Uzbekistan the calls for the removal of *mufti* Shamsutdinkhan Babakhan were more successful. Following a demonstration in Tashkent the *mufti* was replaced by the rector of the main Islamic institute in Tashkent, Muhammed Sadyk. This action was actually

taken in February 1989 before the break-up of the Soviet Union, an indica-
tion of how early the rejection of the tarnished 'official Islam' had
begun.[15] Although key personnel associated with the Soviet period have
been discredited, the support for the institutional clergy has not waned and
the numbers of students attending the religious schools (*medressehs*) is on
the increase.[16]

Thus far, the Islamic parties of the region have not coalesced to form a
larger supra-national movement, but many of the parties have supported
the idea, and generally the calls for the merging of the existing states has
been imbued as much with pan-Turkic as pan-Islamic aspirations (of
which more later). The most abvious attempt to create a supra-national
religious movement is the Islamic Renaissance Party which held its first
meeting in June 1990 at Astrakhan at which the North Caucasians and
Tatars were most prominent. It was originally intended that national
branches of the party would be established in all five of the Central Asian
states but this only met with success in Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan
where founding congresses were held in October 1990 and January 1991
respectively. Similar moves in Kazakhstan were opposed by *Mufti* Ratbek
Nysanbaev and this has been put forward as the possible reason for the
attacks on him which were outlined above.[17] It is noteworthy that the
greatest revival of Islam has been in the two countries which contained
sedentarised populations prior to the Revolution and were under the con-
trol of the Islamic khanates of Khiva, Bukhara and Kokand as compared to
the nomadic civilisations of Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan
where religion was a syncretic mixture of Islam and local beliefs. A recent
survey comparing the religious attitudes between Kazakhs and Uzbeks
also indicated that Islamic adherence is less intense in the former ethnic
group and this is possibly true of Turkmenistan and Kirghizstan.[18]

At the other end of the spectrum there seems to have been a process of
nationalisation of certain monuments and patrons associated with the
'unofficial Islam' of the region. Qusam ibn Abbas' tomb (said to be a
cousin of the Prophet) is located in Samarkand and although this saint is
associated with the whole of the region with pilgrims visiting from the
other states the Uzbeks have appropriated him as an 'Uzbek national
saint'.[19] Similarly, the Kazakhs have also arrogated to themselves the
tomb of Ahmad Yasavi (b. 1166), the founder of the Yasaviya Sufi broth-
erhood, despite the fact that the saint was alive approximately 400 years
prior to the estimated ethnogenesis of the Kazakhs.[20] National irredentism
over religious centres has recently broken out between the Uzbeks,
Tadzhiks and Kirghiz. Tadzhikistan has claimed what it sees as its historic
right to the religious capitals of the region, Samarkand and Bukhara; but

given the overwhelming strength of its Uzbek neighbour these revanchist claims are unlikely to be recognised. National antagonisms between the Kirghiz and the Uzbeks have centred on the reconstruction of Babur's Khudzhra (small 'mosque' for Friday prayers) on Suleyman Mountain in the city of Osh which had been destroyed in 1963. The Uzbeks of the Ferghana Valley have claimed this and several other religious sites as part of Uzbekistan's heritage despite the fact that Babur was in fact a Timurid – a mortal enemy of the Shaibanid Uzbeks.[21] The antagonism generated by this dispute probably acted as one of the contributing factors in the build-up to the Osh riots of 1990 between the Kirghiz and Uzbeks which resulted in an estimated 320 deaths.

The regionalisation of Islam in Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan has taken on a new significance since the civil war in Tadzhikistan, which was caused in part by the differences in the intensity of Islam between the north-west and the rest of that country (which is described later). There are similarities between the situation in Tadzhikistan and conditions currently pertaining in Kirghizstan. Kirghizstan's clanic groupings are divided into two federations; the *Otuz Uul* which is mainly situated in the north of the country and the *Ich Kilik* based in the south. The differences between these two federations are exacerbated by the fact that the influence of Islam has been greater in the south of the country which is located in the Ferghana valley, a traditional stronghold of Islam. Historically the north was only superficially Islamised and the greater level of industrialisation and Russification of this region has combined with this fact to render the area a more secular outlook. The problems that Kirghizstan currently confronts are detailed later on in the section on intra-ethnic identities.

In Kazakhstan the areas most influenced by Islam are the southern regions of Chimkent, Dzhambul and Kzyl Orda which, prior to the Soviet period, were influenced by the proximity of the two religious centres Samarkand and Bukhara. Again the differences between this region and the north of the country have been exacerbated by the greater industrialisation and concomitant Russification of the north. President Nazarbaev, possibly reflecting on the Tadzhik situation, has dispatched several religious clerics (*imams*) to spread Islam to the more Russified areas of the country to try and redress this imbalance.[22]

Pan-Turkic aspirations are apparent in several of the political parties whose objectives are detailed below: all of these parties have fused pan-Turkism with Islam so that the two supra-national movements have become inextricably tied together. However, many of the leading members of these parties appreciate that it may be a long time before these objectives come to fruition. The desire for unity is tempered by a realistic

appraisal of the contemporary situation but there is the hope that economic necessity may act as a centripetal unificatory force, for example Muhammed Salik leader of the Uzbek party *Erk* whilst recognising the idealism associated with his party's aspirations also argued that 'in the future, it might be possible to create a Turkestani federation or confederation based on economic ties ... when the mutual advantages of unification become evident to all concerned we will unite'.[23]

However, there is a certain wariness towards these aspirations for greater unity from the Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Turkmen because of their fear of the possible ulterior motive for Uzbekistan's support: that of Uzbek expansionism. These states are very much aware of the possibility of jumping out of the frying-pan and into the fire by allowing the Uzbek 'big brother' to fit into the shoes left by the Russians. This fear of dominance has not been helped by Uzbek irredentist claims to parts of Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan.[24] It is noteworthy that the feeling of isolation of the latter group has been increased by the exclusion of the Tadzhiks from many of the regional organisations because of their Persian origins despite the historic ties with the rest of Central Asia. Some Tadzhik intellectuals have in turn revived cultural ties with Iran and Afghanistan and emphasised their Persian roots at the expense of their shared history with the Turkic population of the region.[25] In addition, some Tadzhik writers have begun to argue that most of Turkic culture was derived from their contacts with the Tadzhiks and Persians. Babadzhan Gafurov, First Secretary of the Communist Party from 1946 to 1956, has once again become popular because of his book entitled 'The Tadzhiks' which argues that the Uzbeks are indebted to the Tadzhiks both culturally and genetically.[26] Turkic unity may act to swell the ranks of nationalist Tadzhik parties, such as the 'Soil Movement', which has emphasised the Persian roots of the Tadzhiks and has actively encouraged feelings of Russophobia and Turkophobia within the country.[27]

POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY CENTRAL ASIA

There are a range of opposition parties within Kazakhstan with a variety of programmes. The *Zheltoksan* (December) Party, named after the Alma Ata riots, has adopted a nationalist stance stating that ethnic Russians should be encouraged to leave Kazakhstan. Its leader, Hasan Kozhakhmedov, was unable to take part in the Presidential Elections in December 1991 after he was attacked and his list of supporters was taken from him two days before the deadline for the collection of signatures which were required

for the candidate's eligibility.[28] The *Alash* Party are a group named after the Kazakhs' mythical ancestor and who purport to represent the successors of the pre-revolutionary *Alash* Party. The party calls for the expulsion of Russians and espouses the idea of a single community of Muslim peoples advocating a mixture of Islam and pan-Turkic solidarity as the basis of the regeneration of the Kazakhs and the creation of a Central Asian confederation. However, this party has little in common with the original, which was essentially the first national party to make an appearance in Central Asia. The Original *Alash* Party advocated the national revival of the Kazakhs, was suspicious of the pan-Turkic movement and was essentially secular in outlook unlike its opposition of the period, the *Üsh Zhuz*.[29] Pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic aspirations are also held by the Turkestan Party whose goal is to establish an independent Islamic state of Turkestan that would unify all five of the Central Asian republics. *Azat* (freedom) shares a common goal with *Alash* in that it seeks the explusion of Russians from Kazakhstan; this movement is also committed to pan-Turkism, but not as passionately as the other parties. The Socialist Party of Kazakhstan was allowed to set up in September 1991 and contains moderates from the former Communist Party which was initially refused registration in 1992 (this was later overruled by the courts).

Many of the parties that have materialised within Kirghizstan are democratic, have a platform of civil reform and stress the importance of unity. The prime example of this commonality was the formation from a variety of organisations of the Democratic Movement of Kirghizstan (DDK) in May 1990 that supported both the political and economic liberalisation of Kirghizstan. From this movement embryonic political parties have formed with their own agendas and political platforms. The largest of these parties, *Erkin* Kirghizstan (Free Kirghizstan), was formed a year later in February 1991, and its leader, Topchubek Turgunaliev, has recently (1997) been given a four-year sentence for allegedly using state funds for personal benefit.[30] However, *Erkin* Kirghizstan divided in November 1992 and one faction set up *Ata Meken* (Motherland Party); this party, although maintaining its democratic credentials, has taken a less critical stance against the government. Its power base is in the south of the country and one of its main objectives is therefore greater investment in that region, warning that there may be dire consequences if investment is not forthcoming.[31] Other parties have taken on a more nationalist outlook, one of the main ones amongst these being *Asaba* (Banner). Parties have also risen from the ashes of the Osh riots that represent the two opposing camps of Kirghiz and Uzbeks. *Osh Aymagy*, which originated as a protest group for Kirghiz rights to housing plots and is generally blamed for playing a key

role in the riots of 1990, has now grown into an embryonic party.[32] Similarly, the Uzbek minority in the republic has organised around the Uzbek party *Adolat* which has called for the introduction of Uzbeki as the official language of Osh, the preservation of the Uzbeki culture, and the creation of an autonomous Uzbeki region inside Kirghizstan.[33]

Two legal parties currently exist in Uzbekistan, the People's Democratic Party (formerly the Communist Party) and Vatan Tarikiati (National Progress Party). However these are essentially 'potemkin' parties controlled by the President and set up by him so as to give some semblance of pluralism.[34] Opposition parties have formed and, as with the rest of Central Asia, reflect a variety of views. The *Birlik* Party's (Unity) goal is to create a pluralistic government that respects Islamic culture and values. Prior to the creation of the CIS, *Birlik* adopted a resolution calling for Central Asian states to set up a commonwealth of Turkestan. In February 1990 a splinter group from *Birlik* formed *Erk* (freedom) and its leader, Muhammed Salih, actually took part in the December 1991 presidential elections taking only 12.3 per cent of the vote (*Birlik* was not allowed to register and *Erk* has now been banned).[35] Some of the leaders of both *Birlik* and *Erk* have advocated some type of united Turkestan but although they support the renaissance of Islam within society they favour the retention of the secular state. As mentioned earlier, the Islamic Renaissance Party was founded in February 1991 and was banned soon after its inception, its cooperation with *Birlik* has meant that its views on Islam have been moderated so that it now advocates that Islam should occupy a central place in public life, but that all forms of belief and non-belief should be respected. *Adolat* (justice) is another Islamic political organisation and has a strong following in the conservative Ferghana Valley where it was founded (Namangan) and has proven to be far more influential than the Islamic Renaissance Party.[36] *Adolat* initially started out as a volunteer group whose objective was to try and control the market traders of the Ferghana Valley from inflating their prices beyond the means of the average person.[37] They have since formed into a party and the volunteers/vigilantes have extended their role to the enforcement of Islamic morals and have begun ensuring that women are not 'improperly dressed' and that a ban on the sale of alcohol is adhered to.[38]

Four main opposition parties have emerged in the post-independence political environment of Tadzhikistan and generally represent the various regional factions that have aligned themselves against each other in the ongoing civil war that erupted in the country in 1992. As mentioned earlier, the Islamic Renaissance Party was set up at the beginning of 1991, and its leader, Muhammedsharif Khimmatzoda, is from the Gharm region,

as is Shodmun Usupov, who heads the Democratic Party of Tadzhikistan which wishes to establish a democratic electoral system and the protection of basic human rights. Both of these parties therefore derive most of their support from the Gharm region (which is East of Dushanbe close to the Pamirian mountains) and the Gharmi peoples who migrated to the south of the country during the Soviet period.[39] The *Rastakhiz* Party (Rebirth) which was created two years earlier is a nationalist party calling for a cultural revival within the country, it also derives much support from this region. *Lali Badakhshan* (Ruby of Badakhshan) advances the rights of the Pamiris of the Autonomous Republic and has demanded greater autonomy for that region.[40] These parties formed a coalition for the Presidential Elections of November 1991 in opposition to the communist-dominated government, and became known as the Islamic Democratic Opposition. The opposition therefore represent a mixture of democratic, Islamic, regional and nationalist tendencies.

In Turkmenistan the Communist Party has been renamed the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan with President Niyazov as chairman who retains control over all aspects of political life. The embryonic opposition groups, *Agyz Birlik* (Unity Party) headed by Nurberdi Nurmamedov and the Democratic Party headed by Durdymurat Khojamuhammed, have remained unregistered, and their leaders have been constantly harassed: for example, a leader of *Agyz Birlik* was jailed in 1990 on what are believed to be largely trumped-up charges of fraud.[41] *Agyz Birlik* is a democratic nationalist party that wishes to reassert Turkmen culture, but both parties support democratic and economic reforms. Niyazov has encouraged the creation of a second political party to represent the interests of the rural regions. The Peasant Justice Party was set up in July 1992 but, as was the case in Uzbekistan, it is another 'potemkin' party and has been created mainly to give some semblance of democracy.[42]

INTER-ETHNIC AND INTRA-ETHNIC DIVISIONS

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan's predicament is dominated by the fact that Russians constitute approximately 37 per cent of the population, roughly equal to the number of Kazakhs.[43] The main bone of contention between the Russians and the Kazakhs is the Kazakh language policy. In August 1989 Nazarbaev put forward legislation that named Kazakh as the state language and Russian as the language of inter-nation communication, thereby

according the latter a secondary status. There has been vociferous opposi-
tion to this in the north where Kazakhs make up a minority of the popula-
tion.[44] In December 1992 approximately 15,000 Russians demonstrated in
Ust-Kamenogorsk in East Kazakhstan Oblast, demanding that Russian be
given the status of a state language; that dual citizenship be recognised;
and that the oblast be given extensive rights of self-determination in lan-
guage, culture, and exploitation of natural resources. In addition to this the
Slavic Culture Society of the region has threatened to set up an
autonomous Transirtysh republic.[45] The 'Organisation for the Autonomy
of Eastern Kazakhstan' has also been created, its stated objective being for
the eastern oblasts to be declared an autonomous region so that they will
be exempt from Kazakh-language legislation.[46]

These issues have recently (July 1995) resurfaced with the drafting of a
new constitution patroned by President Nazarbayev which has not really
addressed any of the grievances voiced by the Russian community:
Kazakh remains the official state language although Russian will now be
an 'official language' employed in governmental bodies at the local and
national level; but dual citizenship is not countenanced. In response to this
the Slavic movement *Lad* ('Harmony') organised a protest march in
Almaty which was attended by several parties, including the Trade Unions
(who were unhappy about the absence of rights to Trade Union representa-
tion at the workplace).[47]

These differences are given additional significance when the demo-
graphic features of the republic are taken into account. Although there has
been a large out-migration of Russians in the last few years it is still accu-
rate to say that Kazakhstan's demography is defined by the fact that Slavs
constitute the majority of the population in the north while the Kazakhs
comprise the majority in the south of the republic. State policies that are
insensitive to these differences can thus become politically charged, and
this was illustrated by the protests that met the government's fiscal policy
which sought to redistribute money from the industrialised north to the
agricultural south by exempting the latter from certain taxes. Although at
least part of the rationale behind the policy was to try to correct the histor-
ical imbalance of investment between the regions it was particularly insen-
sitive to the current anxieties of the northern community.[48]

However, since the Alma Ata riots of 1986 Kazakh–Russian relations
have not been marred by large-scale violence: although there were riots
in Novyi-Uzen and other towns in Western Kazakhstan in June 1989,
these were against the Caucasians who are said to number 20,000 out of
the 56,000 inhabitants. The accusations were similar to those brought
against minorities in the other states, that they occupied jobs that the

Kazakhs coveted and that they received housing out of turn.[49] An absence of violence does not repudiate the fact that tensions continue between the Kazakh and Russian (or Slavic) communities. The large-scale replacement since independence of Russians by Kazakhs in the higher echelons of private and public institutions continues to rankle, and the discord between the two factions is immediately discernible in everyday life.[50] The seriousness of the problem is indicated by the government's decision to move the capital to Akmola. Akmola is situated right on the edge of the regions in which the Russians are predominant; it therefore enables the government to keep a closer eye on events in the north and sends a signal to the Russian population that the unity of the Kazakh state is inviolable.

As was discussed in Chapter 3, prior to the 1917 Revolution the Kazakhs themselves were divided into the Great Horde in Southern Kazakhstan, the Middle Horde in northern, central and eastern Kazakhstan and the Lesser Horde (or alternatively *Zhuz*) in Western Kazakhstan. These three identities and the ancestral lines associated with them retain significance for Kazakhs today. It is unusual for a Kazakh not to remember at least seven generations of ancestors, and even with the urbanised population the traditional introduction remains whereby each person states from which *zhuz* and tribe they come.[51] Historically, the Greater *Zhuz* have occupied the higher positions of power. A recent study of the seventies and eighties, for example, has indicated that although the Middle Zhuz predominated in most state organs possibly because they were more Russified (the northern oblasts in which they reside have had the greatest influx of Russians), the Greater Zhuz held the most influential posts.[52] This practice is still very much apparent in the newly independent state. President Nursultan Nazarbaev is from the Greater *Zhuz* and the most important posts are also held by people from this group.[53]

The social and political significance of these extant intra-ethnic divisions has not gone unnoticed. In 1993 President Nazarbayev argued for the ideological consolidation of society as a necessity for the future progress of Kazakhstan. The speech itself is noteworthy as it reveals rather candidly the extent to which internal divisions persist. The document states that in contemporary Kazakhstan there have 'sprung up altogether new trends of intra-national division, far from innocent and harmless ... certain independence in the activities of regions came to be used as levers of exclusive control over the available resources exercised by the local élite. Various forms of trivial protectionism, clannish and territorial lobbies manifest themselves here and there in power structures, in financial and commercial spheres.'[54]

It is apparent from these criticisms of current trends that Nazarbayev's administration is aware of, and worried by, the centrifugal tendencies of the regions and the resulting loss of control by the centre. Nazarbayev concluded that one of the priorities of the state must therefore be to implement a process of nation-building – 'overcoming tribal stereotypes should become one of the key guidelines of state ideology. (i.e. unitary state structure, territorial integrity, unity of centuries-old national culture)'.[55] Yet this process can be a double-edged sword as the promotion of a Kazakh identity may act to further ostracise the other ethnic minorities in the country. This is especially true for the Russians who are almost as numerous as the Kazakhs and, as pointed out earlier, actually form a majority in most of the northern oblasts.

Most of the large mineral deposits, apart from phosphate and manganese, are located outside the territory of the Greater *Zhuz*. The coal, iron, aluminium, copper, gold and other rare metal deposits of any significance are located in the territory of the Middle *Zhuz*. Oil, gas, nickel and uranium are located on the territory of the Lesser *Zhuz*; in addition to this the Caspian Sea port in Atyrau, along with the fish harbour and off-shore oil deposits happen to be on the territory of the Lesser *Zhuz*.[56] Recent extraction agreements with foreign companies has raised the question of what proportion of the profits should be distributed to the region concerned. The 1993 talks between Kazakhstan and Chevron on the development of the Tengiz oil field demonstrated that the centre cannot assume tacit consent on such issues. These negotiations were hampered by the demands of the Atyrau governor, who sought specific assurances that his region would receive a reasonable proportion of the proceeds.[57]

It may be because of this that representation of these regions in certain key posts has been recently evident. In the summer of 1994 Tazhkora Shardabayev, who is from the Lesser *Zhuz*, was appointed as oil and gas minister; this is significant, as it is highly unusual for Lesser *Zhuz* members to hold high posts.[58] The appointment of Akezhan Kazhegeldin, from the Middle *Zhuz*, as Prime Minister in the cabinet reshuffle in October 1994 can be considered in a similar light.

Faced with the pressures of a resurgent Kazakh identity and the fears of the other ethnic groups arising from this resurgence, Nazarbayev has implemented a dual policy of 'Kazakhisation' and a state-building project of 'harmonisation' (*garmonizatsiia*).[59] The policy of 'Kazakhisation' has involved the 'parachuting in' of Kazakhs to key regional administrative posts which were occupied by non-Kazakhs as outlined earlier. The government has also established the *Kazakh Tili* (Kazakh Language) organisation whose purpose is to promote the Kazakh language and Kazakh culture

in the north of the country where the population has become more Russified. The government has also endeavoured to revive a greater interest in Islam by sending several *imams* to the north of the country to redress the religious imbalance between the north and the south.[60] This 'Kazakhisation' process would appear to include the encouragement of Kazakhs to return to Kazakhstan and the housing of such Kazakh immigrants primarily in the north, possibly to balance the predominant Russian presence in the northern oblasts.[61]

At the same time these policies which seek to promote Kazakh culture and representation throughout the state are supposed to be balanced by a policy of 'harmonisation'. Essentially this involves a process of state-building that aims to ameliorate the inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic tensions that have become apparent since independence. This policy of 'harmonisation' has included the banning of associations seeking to promote 'social, racial, national, religious, class, or tribal discord', organisations that wish to be registered by the state must therefore be ethnically neutral in character.[62] At the same time, although Russian dissension remains over the unequal status of the Russian langauge, Nazarbayev, in an effort to assuage Russian fears, has endeavoured to dilute the recent language law passed by parliament that makes a knowledge of Kazakh compulsory by claiming that it is unconstitutional.[63]

If Nazarbayev's power-sharing policy between the three *Zhuzes* continues, then the weaknesses in Kazakh society may diminish. However, his policy of 'Kazakhisation', although it may not intend to antagonise the Russian population, has certainly increased the feeling that they are now second-class citizens. Nazarbayev may have achieved some balance where intra-ethnic divisions are concerned, but the lack of Russians in government and the systematic rooting-out of Russians in influential jobs in education and industry by Kazakh nationalists points to possible conflict between the two groups.[64] Much hinges on how well Nazarbayev balances the understandable resurgence of Kazakh culture and representation with a policy of 'harmonisation' that seeks to balance this resurgence with the rights of all citizens to equal representation.

It is apparent therefore that Kazakhstan is faced with both inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic divisions. The intra-ethnic divisions at the moment appear to be attenuated by the inclusion in the government of representatives from the various *Zhuz*. However, inter-ethnic discord is currently very prominent with the exclusion of Russians from top administrative jobs, the refusal to bestow equal status to the Russian language alongside Kazakh and non-acceptance of dual citizenship serving to further antagonisms between the two nationalities.

Kirghizstan

In much of the contemporary literature on Kirghizstan there appears to be a common misperception that takes one of two forms: either that politics within the country has a regional but not a clanic/tribal flavour to it; or, that 'tribal divisions are not forgotten but they have no practical meaning'.[65] In fact, the political system is influenced both by a regional dimension, usually in the form of the north–south divide that exists in the country, and by the clanic and tribal divisions that continue to retain political significance.

It appears that cadre and *nomenklatura* appointments were more often than not influenced by tribal and regional considerations. Because of the uncertainty of the former Soviet political system it was customary for leaders to surround themselves with people from their own clanic group and possibly with people from the region which they had formerly controlled. The regional element was not altogether dissimilar to the practice that developed throughout the rest of the Soviet system whereby regional cliques were rewarded with promotion once one of their group had risen to the higher echelons of the Communist Party. So that, for example, when Turdakun Usubaliev was elected First Secretary of the Communist Party he promoted several of the people who had previously worked with him in Naryn; similarly, some of these were replaced by the Osh cadre when Absamat Masaliev became First Secretary.[66] In addition to this, promotion was based on tribal relations with the two major tribes, the Salto and Sary Bagysh, filling the most important positions. The Salto have traditionally filled the military positions whilst the Sary Bagysh have provided the political leaders – both the former First Secretary Usubaliev and President Askar Akaev come from the Sary Bagysh group.[67] The exception to the rule was Absamat Masaliev who became First Secretary during the Gorbachev period but this was precisely because Gorbachev was endeavouring to undermine the localism and friendship ties (*mestnichestvo i znakomstvo*) that were prevalent in the Central Asian republics.[68]

These intra-ethnic relations continue to influence the social, political and military organisation within the newly independent state. Promotion to influential administrative posts is often on a tribal basis, for example, in industry and other institutions such as state educational establishments.[69] More worrying for the political leaders of the country is the emergence of divisions within the military. According to one Kirghiz officer, there had previously existed divisions within the army between north and south so that 'the Chui people fiercely beat the Talas people' to the extent that the government decided that units should be organised regionally. However, this has resulted in scuffles between the 'sub-regions and towns'.[70]

In the political realm the issue of tribal favouritism has been denounced by broader based parties such as the national party *Erkin Kirghizstan* (Free Kirghizstan). Its chairperson, Topchubek Turgunaliev, for example, made an appeal in an open letter to the general public stating that 'Clan personnel policy damages all of Kirghizstan and serves the interests of a small tribal group which has seized power'; he also expressed his fear that the present system of foreign investments 'is designed to enrich certain tribes and territories'.[71]

The southern regions of Kirghizstan, Osh and Jalal-abad, are geographically separated from the rest of Kirghizstan by the physically formidable Tien Shan mountain range. Historically these two regions have therefore been more influenced by the Islamised Ferghana Valley than the more industrialised and Russified north of the country. In addition to this the Kirghiz ethnic group is divided into two federations, the *Otuz Uul* and the *Ich Kilik*. The *Ich Kilik* federation is located in the south of the country. Whether this becomes an issue will depend largely on how the parliament votes with reference to the reallocation of resources from the industrialised north to the predominantly agricultural south which suffers from a chronic unemployment problem. One southern-based party, *Ata-Meken*, has already expressed dissatisfaction with the way that the north is receiving the majority of the loans made available by the IMF.[72]

Any divisions that do exist between the north and south are sure to be exacerbated by Bekmamat Osmonov who has been described as 'one of the omnipotent masters of the south'.[73] Osmonov was the head of the Jalal-abad region until the events of October 1991. He not only comes from an influential family, but also comes from the Kipchak clan; his familial ties therefore connect to influential figures in other Central Asian states.[74] In the Autumn of 1991 Osmonov had been severely criticised by many Kirghiz newspapers accusing him of corrupt practices and suggesting that he should be relieved of his post. In response to this his relatives and supporters protested in Jalal-abad city where there was much talk of southern separation and identifying themselves as *Ich Kilik*.[75]

There have been recent attempts (Spring 1995) by the centre to reassert control over the south by appointing a northerner, Janysh Rustambekov, as the governor (akim) of Osh. This was countered by Osmonov who allegedly hinted that he may even try to set up an autonomous region in the south if power in the centre eludes him.[76] However, this was before the outcome of the 1995 parliamentary elections which resulted in himself, Omurbek Tekebayev and another influential southern figure, Sheraly Sydykov, being elected.[77] Only the future will tell whether this southern *troika* will be satisfied with this result or will use their positions to highlight the differences

between the north and the south and what they see as the inequality between the two.

There are however several mitigating factors which ameliorate the intra-ethnic divisions described. Firstly, the government is well aware of the problems outlined and will hopefully act accordingly. One promising sign of this is the recent plan to build a trans-Kirghiz railway linking the north to the south. According to the Presidential Public Relations Department this will have the dual purpose of connecting the industrialised north with the agrarian south and will also serve as a unifying force for the population.[78] Secondly, the traditional practices and historic links of the tribal groups from which the Kirghiz ethnic group is constructed may act as a powerful unifying force negating the aforementioned divisive tendencies.

The government must also contend with the Russian and Uzbek minorities within the country and the inter-ethnic antagonisms that have arisen between them and the Kirghiz. The region of Osh, situated in the Ferghana Valley, was the site of recent riots between Uzbeks and Kirghiz. The Uzbeks constitute a third of the total population of the Osh region. Unrest within the area in the summer of 1990 soon turned into pogrom-like riots in which it is estimated that 320 people were killed. The riots were started when the soviet of the city of Osh acceded to the demands of the informal Kirghiz group *Osh Aymagy* (Kirghiz for Osh Oblast) and reassigned the land of a collective farm, Uzbeki Lenin Kolkhoz which had been farmed by Uzbeks for years, to the Kirghiz for private housing. A few days later there were riots in Uzbekistan, and Soviet Interior Ministry troops closed the border between the two republics. Again, overcrowding, economic stagnation and acute poverty formed the backdrop to the clashes. Since independence there have been no significant clashes between these two groups but both camps have established embryonic political parties, the Kirghiz *Osh Aymagy* and the Uzbeks *Adolat,* to represent their claims.

As was mentioned earlier, the 1989 census indicates that the Russians constituted 21 per cent of the overall population of Kirghizstan but this has since declined to 17 per cent. Some of this decline may be attributed to what was referred to as the *vengeance des berceaux* (revenge of the cradle), the demographic trend favouring the Central Asian population. Another contributing factor is probably the economic benefits of higher wages in Russia.[79] But the main reason for this out-migration is a similar one to that which pertains in Kazakhstan: Russians are now daily discriminated against; and since independence there has been a widespread replacement of Russians by Kirghiz in many of the higher-level posts in administration and industry.

Thus far there has not been any outbreak of violence between the two groups and President Akaev, recognising the damage that this out-migration has had on the economy, and the growing resentment amongst the remaining Russians, has endeavoured to rectify the situation by pushing for Russian to be accepted as an official language in 'industry, health care, technical and other areas'.[80] He has also prevented the more openly discriminatory bills from being passed, for instance he vetoed the Kirghiz Parliament's proposal that the land of Kirghizstan and its natural resources were to be the sole property of the Kirghiz people.[81] This section will not dwell further on this aspect of inter-ethnic discord because of the similarity between this situation and the one that obtains in Kazakhstan. It will suffice to point out that the resentment and antagonisms are tangible in everyday life in Kirghizstan and that one of the contributory factors for the industrial decline of the country is the large out-migration of many highly skilled Russian personnel as a direct result of this.

Uzbekistan

Politics in Uzbekistan is said to reflect a contest among five regions – Ferghana, Khorezm, Samarkand/Bukhara, Surkhandarya/Kashkadarya, and Tashkent – with Ferghana and Tashkent the most influential out of the five. How far these regions are influenced by kinship ties is debatable. One writer on the region claims that the regional divisions are 'partially kin-reinforced with the political and economic life of the capital, Tashkent, controlled by seven influential families'.[82] Efforts at establishing how accurate this picture actually is have been hampered by the Uzbek state's general clampdown on intellectual freedom. Earlier literature on the subject has identified extant Kinship ties in the more rural areas, for example, in the mountainous region adjoining Tadzhikistan marriage customs between the tribes are still observed.[83] In addition to this, people still identify themselves by their tribe and many villages also carry the name of the tribe that live there.[84]

It would appear that tribal relations are therefore still significant in the more rural regions. In the areas that were settled prior to the Russian presence in Central Asia, Bukhara, Samarkand and the Ferghana Valley, tribal relations amongst the sedentary population, which were already losing their significance, have diminished to the point where they have either disappeared altogether or they are of no importance. However, the family unit still retains importance for the sedentary Uzbeks who are able to trace their lineage back nine generations. In addition, neighbourhood ties represented by the *Mahalla* have retained their significance. Under the Communist

system these familial and neighbourhood ties took on a regional aspect whereby these two factors merged so that favouritism was shown to the extended families of each of the members of the *Mahalla*.

New writings on this subject would suggest that the Uzbek Communist hierarchy became infused with these regional relations as soon as the Uzbek state was created.[85] However, this practice reached new heights under Sharaf Rashidov, First Secretary of the republic from 1959 to 1983, who was born in Dzhizak (Samarkand) Oblast and represented the Samarkand–Bukharan regional alliance. This phenomenon of 'friendship ties' became so well-established and unchallenged in the Brezhnev era that Rashidov even created a new Dzhizak Oblast from the surrounding Samarkand and Syr-Darya Oblasts and promoted one of his relatives to the position of regional First Secretary. Following the death of Rashidov and the changes in Moscow after Brezhnev's death there was a general crackdown on the corruption within the Uzbek Republic which witnessed 76 per cent of the party officials being replaced over the space of three years.[86] An indication of how ingrained these regional alliances were and the powerful interests at stake (associated with the 'second economy') was the subsequent dismissal for corruption of First Secretary Usmankhodzhaev who had been given the responsibility of eradicating the corrupt practices.[87]

President Islam Karimov came to power in the middle of 1989 and relies on the same Samarkand/Bukharan regional power base that Rashidov did during his time.[88] He was therefore First Secretary for only two years before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Indications that this was not long enough for him to consolidate his position came soon after when in October 1991 his vice president, Shahrulla Mirsaidov, tried to oust him by parliamentary means. Mirsaidov belongs to one of the influential Tashkent families and it was widely rumoured that his endeavours were backed by a coalition of Tashkent families.[89] The attempt at a constitutional coup may have been prompted by Rahmon Nabiev's successful reinstatement as head of state in Tadzhikistan by similar means only a few weeks earlier.[90] However, since the failed attempt at his removal Karimov has kept a firm hand on the reins of power whilst making an example of the former vice president, thereby sending a strong signal to those who may wish to question his authority.

The best example of the influence of regionalism in recent government policy has been the 'cotton affair' amnesty. Under Soviet rule thousands of officials were dismissed between 1984 and 1988 after it was discovered that production figures for cotton were falsified so that billions of rubles were lost in embezzlement. Two key figures in this scandal were Akhmajon Adylov, the chairman of Pap Agroindustrial complex, and the former

Uzbek Council of Ministers Chairman Narmakhonmardi Khudaiberdiev who were both accused of corruption. Since the August coup the Supreme Court dropped the charges against the former and the Supreme Soviet has pardoned the latter. Both belong to the Ferghana Valley clans and the recent re-evaluation of the 'cotton affair' may be viewed as both a necessary policy of appeasement towards that region and as a national gesture undermining the legitimacy of the old Soviet system.[91]

Regional factors are also inextricably tied to the influence of religion on Uzbek politics. The Ferghana Valley, consisting of the Ferghana, Namangan and Andizhan *vilayeti* (administrative regions), has traditionally been the most influential region within Uzbekistan and it is also the most Islamic. During the Brezhnev period Margilan (situated on the outskirts of Ferghana) was the main centre for the 'second economy' and the families from this area were said to control the regulation of this trade throughout Uzbekistan to the extent that it 'functioned as a state within a state'.[92] Centralised decision-making has in fact already been challenged in the region; for example, in 1992 there was a campaign against the selection of an outsider as head of the Namangan region. The *Adolat* (Justice) party, which is based in Namangan and enjoys the support of the clergy, joined the campaign.[93] The banning of this party and the harassment of its leaders can thus be seen as a preventative measure against the undermining of state control in the region.

Inter-ethnic divisions must also prefigure heavily in the government's deliberations. Unrest within the Osh region of Kirghizstan in the summer of 1990 between Uzbeks and Kirghiz resulted in the estimated death of 320 people. Although, according to the 1989 census, the Kirghiz constituted just under 1 per cent of the Uzbek population the Uzbeks constitute 13 per cent of the Kirghiz population. The majority of these live in the Kirghiz part of the Ferghana Valley so that a repeat occurrence of the Osh riots could spill over into the neighbouring parts of Uzbekistan. The civil war in Tadzhikistan has also had a major impact on Uzbekistan. Following the riots in Dushanbe in May 1992 the borders between the two countries were closed and there was a general clamp down on the Uzbek opposition.[94] The situation in Tadzhikistan must be deeply worrying for the Uzbek authorities not only because of the general instability created by a civil war on their doorstep but also because of the possibility of an analogous situation developing within Uzbekistan. One result of this has been Karimov's change of policy towards Islam. Karimov had initially endeavoured to obtain greater legitimacy by becoming overtly Muslim. During the summer of 1992 Karimov took part in the *hadj* to Mecca and at his presidential inauguration he took his oath on the Koran, but the rise of

Islam in the Ferghana Valley and the events in Tadzhikistan have meant that the Islamic card is now rarely played.

The worsening economic and social conditions within Uzbekistan does not bode well for the future. The fact that an estimated two million Uzbeks are unemployed, approximately 10 per cent of the total population, in a country where more than half the population is under 30, may further aggravate the apparent societal divisions.[95] With this in mind Karimov has argued for a slow transition to a market economy, stating that 'thoughtless acceleration of events may lead to conflicts, civil confrontation, inter-ethnic clashes and the further proliferation of problems rather than to their solution'.[96] Karimov has also initiated a cult of Rashidov by erecting monuments to him and naming streets and buildings after him. The objective of this policy, which has become known as 'Rashidovism' (*Rashidovshchina*), is possibly twofold: to encourage national unity by the rehabilitation of a national figure vilified under the Soviet regime; and to consolidate Karimov's regional power base by flattering Rashidov's relatives who come from the same Samarkand/Bukharan region as Karimov.[97]

At the same time it appears that national myths created under the Soviets have continued during independence. A statue of Timurlane as Uzbekistan's national hero has now replaced the statue of Lenin in the centre of Tashkent. In 1996 state-wide celebrations were held for the 660th anniversary of Timurlane; this commemoration of a national hero has been followed by the commissioning of a State Museum of the Timurids which will endeavour to collect and collate all artifacts of the Timurid period.[98] As mentioned earlier the Samanid philosopher Avicenna and the Timurid Babur who was chased out of Central Asia by the Shaibanid Uzbeks have also been appropriated by the Uzbeks. Whether this is an intentional policy by Karimov to orchestrate some form of national unity cannot be determined; however, given the strict control he retains over all state affairs it seems unlikely that this is occurring without his tacit approval. In tandem with these nation-building policies, Karimov has also asserted control over the traditional *mahalla* system. By taking the heads of these neighbourhoods (*aksakals*) into his employment Karimov has established an element of control at the micro-social level and a highly efficient information network which he no doubt intends to use to prevent any further opposition unrest to his rule.

Turkmenistan

President Saparmurat Niyazov was elected in June 1992 with a total of 99.5 per cent of the vote, although it is rather hard to examine critically

this support given that he was the only candidate. Niyazov's rule has been virtually guaranteed for the next ten years due to a constitutional amendment via a referendum that allows him to be re-elected.[99] In a similar vein, elections to the Turkmenistan parliament, the *Mezhlis*, were held in December 1994. Candidates were all unopposed and had to gain 51 per cent of the constituency's vote, which should not have been too difficult to do considering that no one stood against them. Virtually all of the candidates were members of the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, formerly the Communist Party whose chairman is Niyazov.[100] In fact the elections were so farcical that, due to the redundancy of electioneering tactics, it was difficult to guess that they were actually taking place.

However although there have been minor protests such as the spoiling of ballot papers during the elections, opposition parties continue to have a rather small support base. The effects of authoritarianism may be the main cause of this but, as one author has pointed out, it may also be because of the 'continued pre-eminence of tribal identities over any sense of Turkmen nationhood'.[101]

A good example of the extent to which tribal identity is still present is that the former status of the four holy tribes, the Ewlad, has been retained and possibly enhanced by the fact that during the Soviet period they took on the responsibility of custodianship of the Muslim cemeteries and the tombs of saints.[102] Further evidence of the retention of the clanic and tribal structure is to be found in writings on the strains within the armed forces caused by these sub-national allegiances, a problem echoed in the Kirghiz military establishment.[103] Certainly during my visit there it became apparent that any important appointments to state institutions and industries were still determined by clanic relations.

There are seven main clanic groupings within Turkmenistan; the Tekke, Ersary, Yomud, Göklen, Salor, Saryk and Chowdor.[104] The Tekke is the largest and most politically influential group amongst these seven, it is therefore not surprising that President Saparmurad Niyazov is from this group. Competition for political influence is mainly between the Tekke and Yomud clans, and this rivalry is said to have increased since the opening of the Turkmen border which has re-established contacts with the various tribes from the Göklen and Yomud clans in Iran and their brethren in Turkmenistan.[105] The Tekke's hold on power is reinforced by control of the National Security Committee, the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Defence. However, responsibility for the republic's oil and gas sector has been entrusted to Nazar Suyunov from the Yomud whose territory abuts the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea and includes one of the largest gas fields in Turkmenistan. This appointment may therefore be one of the first

efforts by Niyazov at power-sharing between these two main groups.[106] However, divisions are also said to exist within the Tekke group in the form of traditional rivalry between the Ahal and Mary Tekhines. This is contemporarily represented by the rivalry between Niyazov who is said to be an Ahal Tekine and K. Orazov, the local governor of the Mary district administration, which eventually led to the sacking of the latter.[107]

Niyazov has been disarmingly candid about the intra-ethnic divisions that exist within Turkmen society: in an address to the nation he stated that 'to have our state united in future we must completely eradicate the epidemic habit of talking about tribal relationships. No matter what tribes we come from, we remain the sons of the one big family of Turkmenistan.' As Niyazov is an orphan he is likely to be extra sensitive on this issue, despite being from the Tekke clan. Turkmen tradition is similar to the rest of Central Asia in placing great importance on one's ancestry, and it is normal for Turkmen to be able to name their patrilineal lineage as far as 'seven fathers'. It is likely that this is the motivation behind Niyazov's request for the historical society of Turkmenistan to research his own lineage.[108]

In outlining the solution to these internal divisions, Niyazov explained the necessity of press control – 'During the first stage of the transitional period there will be an established control over mass media to prevent any possible conflicts between the ethnic groups and tribes residing here. The experience of the neighbouring states shows that the publications about land disputes would inevitably give birth to nationalistic aspirations, and the feeling of loyalty to one's own tribe.'[109] The relationship between weak society and strong state apparatus is very much apparent here. Niyazov's reasons for state censorship of the media are clearly couched in terms of the problems that arise from the internal divisions within society.

Niyazov has cultivated his own 'cult of personality', designating himself 'Father of the Turkmen' (*Saparmurat Turkmenbashi*). This has resulted in streets being named after him; on almost every corner of the capital Ashkhabad there is a portrait of the patriarchal President; and at one point a whole city, Krasnovodsk, was named after him. It may be possible that these actions are deliberate attempts to promote national unity, indeed Niyazov has been quoted as saying that 'I do not need this, but our state does ... In the transition period in our state there must be one leader. Multipower centres would engender anarchy.'[110] How far Niyazov's authoritarianism and cult of personality can be explained by a quest for unity may be debatable but it does seem to be at least part of the reason for it. Further legitimacy for his actions have been sought from the religious authorities who called on all Muslims to vote for Niyazov in the

elections ,[111] and by the promise of prosperity for all citizens by the end of a ten-year transitional period.

Tadzhikistan

Since the end of May 1992 civil war has raged in the south of Tadzhikistan where the estimates in the loss of life range from 20,000 to 50,000. Within a three-year period between 1989 to 1992, 600,000 Tadzhiks and Uzbeks fled the country and out of a total of 500,000 Russians that were there in 1989 only 100,000 remain.[112] To understand the events leading up to these tragic circumstances one must first understand the regional and religious complexities of the country.

Four main regions can be said to exist within Tadzhikistan. The Khodzhent (Lenninabad) Oblast is situated in the north-west of the country bordering Uzbekistan and the Ferghana Valley. This region has dominated Tadzhik politics since the creation of the republic in 1929. The Kulyab faction is from the oblast of that name centred in Southern Tadzhikistan. Both of these regions are of pro-communist orientation and, historically, have been over represented in the old Soviet government. The two other regions are where the opposition are centred. The Kurgan-Tyube oblast has long been a stronghold of Islamic piety, and is the Islamic Renaissance Party's stronghold. The region contains many of the Gharmi mountain people who were relocated in the 1940s and 1950s to provide labour for the cotton fields. The lack of assimilation of these peoples within the region has meant that a separate Gharmi identity is still very much present. The importance of the Islamic religion to this separate identity divides them even further from the rest of the population.[113] The Pamiri people of Gorno-Badakshan feel that they are a completely different ethnic group from the Tadzhiks, their party, *Lali Badakhshan*, has demanded greater autonomy.

Although the latter two regions form the centres of opposition, they should not be confused. Kurgan-Tyube and the Gharm region are Sunni Muslim. The Pamirian peoples live in the East, are part of the Ismailis sect of Islam, they speak eastern Iranian languages, not Farsi, and feel they are totally different from other Tadzhiks.[114] What these two groups do have in common is a history of discrimination by the other two politically dominant groups, the Khodzhent and Kulyab factions, possibly promoted by a 'divide and rule' policy pursued by Moscow. It appears that the Pamiris and Gharmis were used primarily as agricultural workers to the extent that they now compare their history to that of the black plantation workers of the United States.[115] The antagonism between the Pamiris from

Badakhshan and the Kulyabis seems to have been worsened by the onset of the Afghanistan war. Possibly to ensure Badakhshani loyalty during the war, the Badakhshan regional élite were given important positions within the Ministry of the Interior, at the expense of the Kulyab faction. This shift of privilege appears to have been one of the exacerbating factors that furthered the enmity between these two groups. During the civil war the Kulyabis represented the main fighting force of the government, viewing it as an opportunity not only to regain political influence but as a chance to enhance it.[116]

The competition for political influence was therefore not only based on clanic/regional ties but also on historical allegiances to the Communist Party. After the collapse of the Soviet Union these differences served to divide the political spectrum into two camps. Shortly after independence the new President of the republic, Kadriddin Aslonov, who had replaced the former First Secretary of the Tajik Communist Party (CPT), banned the CPT and allowed the registration of opposition parties. However, this flourishing of democracy was short-lived, brought to an abrupt end by Aslonov's dismissal and replacement by Rakhmon Nabiev in October 1991. This was quickly followed by demonstrations by the opposition in protest at the clampdown on democracy. The situation was worsened by Nabiev's removal of the head of the Minister of the Interior in March 1992; as mentioned earlier, this position was held by a Pamiri, and his dismissal only heightened tensions between the regions.[117]

The seeds of civil war were sown in May 1992 when President Rakhmon Nabiev, under pressure from demonstrations organised by the various opposition parties that formed the Islamic-democratic opposition, set up the Government of National Reconciliation which gave the 'Islamic-democratic opposition' a third of the seats and Davlat Usman, Deputy Chairperson of the IRP, became Deputy Prime Minister.[118] The Khodzhent and Kulyab factions protested vigorously, refusing to recognise the new government and threatening to secede from Tadzhikistan. On 7 September 1992 the Islamic democratic opposition captured Nabiev and forced a letter of resignation from him and the Pamiri Akbarshah Iskadarov became acting president. Large-scale fighting ensued in the south and east of the country and on 6 December a force from Hissar, with backing from Uzbekistan, took control of Dushanbe and the Kulyabis moved into Dushanbe after taking control of Kurgan Tyube.[119]

External influences, mainly Russian, Uzbek and Afghan interference, have tended to intensify the conflict. The Russians have propped up the government both militarily and economically. Tadzhikistan has until recently (1995) remained within the ruble zone and has received significant

aid, and the 201st Motorised Rifle Division operates on the Tadzhik/ Afghan border. Islam Karimov, maybe reflecting on a possible similar demise to his government, actually urged Russian intervention stating in September 1992 that if Russia failed to 'understand her strategic interests in Central Asia, then her southern borders will face directly onto Islamic countries'.[120] But there is also the 'Uzbek factor' to be considered within Tadzhikistan – approximately one-quarter of the Tadzhikistan population is Uzbek with the greatest concentrations in Hissar, Khodzhent (formerly Leninabad) and to a lesser extent Kurgan Tyube. Uzbek fighters from at least two of these regions, Hissar and Kurgan Tyube, have received arms and training in Uzbekistan.[121] In March 1993 the Islamic Renaissance Party formed a United Tadzhik Opposition with other exiled opposition groups in northern Afghanistan. It is claimed that Opposition fighters reside over the border in training camps maintained by both the Tadzhik Afghan Ahmed Shah Mahsud and the Pashtun Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. It has been estimated that 7,000 Tadzhik rebels are ready for combat north of the Afghan city of Qunduz (controlled by Hekmatyar) and that 3,500 rebels are said to be in training camps run by the Mujahidin forces.[122]

By August 1993 Gorno-Badakshan and the government had reached an agreement whereby aid would be resumed and government forces would not enter the region providing that Dushanbe's authority was recognised and Badakhshan's own forces repel the Tadzhik rebels within its borders. However this represented the government's *de facto* recognition that the Badakhshanis now controlled most if not all of their own territory. On the other hand, the government had quelled much of the uprising in the south and had gained control of the vast majority of its western regions.

When the session of the Supreme Soviet in the fall of 1992 re-established the pro-communist government from the Leninabad and Kulyab regions the Kulyabi, Imomali Rakhmonov, was made head of state. This reflected the overall political dominance of the Kulyabis who are now the most influential group within the government and administration of the country and have therefore taken over the reins of power from the Khodzhentis. This has caused resentment amongst their former allies, the Khodzhent and Uzbek Hissar groups.[123] To make matters worse, shortly after Rakhmonov's selection the Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube provinces were merged into one and renamed the Khatlon oblast. Given the large numbers of Uzbeks resident in Kurgan Tyube, the Uzbeks regard this as an effort to strengthen Kulyabi influence at their expense.[124]

The competition between the Khodzhent and Kulyab regions was very much apparent in the recent (6 November 1994) presidential elections with Abdumalik Abdulladzhanov from the Khodzhent region running against

the chairperson of the Supreme Soviet, Imomali Rakhmonov, from the Kulyab region. The latter won 60 per cent of the vote which means that the Kulyabis retain their influence.[125] However, three former Prime Ministers from the Khodzhent region, Abdulladzhanov, Abdudzhalil Amadov and Dzhamshed Karimov, set up the National Revival Movement in July 1996 and this is likely to become an influential power bloc within the region. The creation of this party may also be regarded as a reaction to the events of February 1996 when two ethnic Uzbek leaders of the Hissar clan from western Tadzhikistan ordered their troops to march on Dushanbe demanding the removal of Prime Minister Karimov. Although the removal of the latter prevented a crisis at the time, it has led to the alienation of the influential Khodzhent leaders who have founded the aforementioned National Revival Movement (NRM). This party has thus far been excluded from the national reconciliation talks between the government and opposition. Successful implementation of the latest peace accord signed on the 23rd of December 1996 by President Rakhmonov and the leader of the United Opposition, Said Abdullo Nuri, will therefore depend heavily upon whether such discussions become all inclusive, i.e. inviting the NRM to the negotiations.[126]

There are several reasons why the outlook for the latest ceasefire agreements and peace accord is quite encouraging. Firstly, during the clash between the government and the Uzbeks of western Tadzhikistan the opposition forces took advantage of the government's weakness to take the key cities of Tavil-Dara and Gharm, thus placing them in a much stronger strategic position. This may mean that the government is more likely to accept at least some of the opposition's demands. Secondly, Russian support for this process should not be underestimated; President Yeltsin has made it clear that aid from Moscow is now conditional on the Tadzhik leadership continuing direct dialogue with the opposition.[127] Finally, the seizure of Kabul in September 1996 by the Taliban has a twofold implication on the talks. The opposition must now be aware that their bases and support from the ethnic Tadzhik Ahmed Shah Mahsud are becoming evermore precarious with the Taliban continuing to push north towards Mahsud's stronghold. Equally the government must be wary that an agreement between the Pashtun, Uzbek and Tadzhik factions of Afghanistan would have devastating geostrategic implications. It may be that both the government and opposition now regard an agreement as in their best interests.

Kazi Turadzhonzoda, the deputy leader of the IRP, has outlined the opposition's demands – 'We are not aiming to seize power by force of arms, as Russian official spokesmen declare. We demand the resignation of the current leadership, the creation of a provisional government, with

inclusion of representatives from all regions, the return of all refugees, and the disarming of all military groups, both government and opposition. Only then, in our opinion, will it be possible to prepare universal democratic elections.'[128] Whether these demands are met, or a suitable compromise is reached, remains to be seen but the joint statement by the government and the opposition following the most recent ceasefire appeared to go some way in satisfying the above demands. The joint statement declared, 'We intend jointly to implement democratic reforms and changes which will completely abolish armed resistance and make diversity of political views the norm in public affairs. ... We condemn war and armed resistance .... We hope that national reconciliation will gradually come into effect from today'.[129] This meeting of minds provides hope that this ceasefire will actually hold. At the same time the present geostrategic situation as outlined above may act as a catalyst for this reconciliation.

The strength of the peace agreement is that there are signs that each side is prepared to countenance some degree of compromise. The agreement's primary objective is the setting up of a National Reconciliation Commission to serve as an interim body, building confidence between the two sides and laying mutually agreed foundations for the running of a unified Tajik state. The Commission's main task is to oversee the introduction of the opposition members into government posts, ministries and local authorities and the disarming of the various factions. However, no consensus has been reached over the actual percentage of seats the opposition will hold on the Commission or the security arrangements for those members. Two major obstacles remain. The Khodzhent National Revival Movement are currently demanding that they occupy a third of the seats in the Commission but this is at the moment being opposed by the government.[130] At the same time there is little incentive for the Badakhshanis to reintegrate themselves into a larger Tadzhik state. They remain in a strong position militarily, the Pamirian mountains acting as a natural defence against any government advance. In addition to this the civil war has served to promote the feeling that they have little in common with the Tadzhiks and should retain their hard-won autonomy.[131] The absence of these major regional political groups does not bode well for the future success of the talks; indeed it is difficult to envisage an effective process of national reconciliation without their participation. Secondly, several skirmishes have already taken place this year as a result of regional groups taking matters into their own hands.[132] If centralised control is not asserted by both the government and opposition then such incidents are more than likely going to reignite the powderkeg. However, if these two obstacles are

overcome then the peace agreement represents the best chance so far of a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOVIET ERA

This chapter has been structured in a similar manner to Chapter 3 on 'Identities in Pre-Revolutionary Central Asia' so that an evaluation of the effects of the Soviet period on Central Asian identity can be readily made by comparing contemporary Central Asia to the period before the Revolution. It becomes immediately obvious that Soviet aspirations towards the eradication of pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic movements has not been successful. The fact that these contemporary movements have not made any serious inroads in Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan does not negate this assertion. It should be recalled that the political parties associated with such aspirations were located in Kazakhstan and present-day Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan but not in the two aforementioned countries. The contemporary situation therefore has more in common with turn-of-the-century Central Asia than is at first appreciated. At the same time the absence of such parties in these countries does not accurately reflect the renaissance of Islam which is manifestly apparent in the cultures of these contemporary societies.

The influence of Islam in the region has not diminished despite ruthless Soviet attempts to eradicate it, yet there have been significant developments that should be noted. Firstly, nationalisation of Islam has occurred to some degree, so that being a Muslim is part of the national identity of each of these groups. This is most apparent in areas where the population is only superficially Islamised. In these areas the life cycle rituals have become inextricably melded with the national culture so that whether or not a person is a believer they will still have a religious marriage, have their sons circumcised and ensure they are given a religious burial. The often-heard statement 'he who is not circumcised is not an Uzbek (or Turkmen, or Tadzhik etc.)' encapsulates the fusion of nationalism and Islam in these regions.[133] However, in the areas where religion has retained a stronger foothold and 'official Islam' has preserved its role a greater feeling of belonging to a wider Muslim community (*Umma*) is apparent.

The industrialisation within each of the states of Central Asia has been very uneven. Where industrialisation has occurred there is a high number of Russians and other Slavic groups who were brought in largely because of their experienced labour. Central Asians within these urban and

industrialised areas have tended to become more secularised and indeed Russified than their rural counterparts. In the north of Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan these industrialised areas were only superficially Islamised at the turn of the century anyway. But in Tadzhikistan where the north-west of the country has become more secularised, the relative degree of change has been far greater. One commentator has suggested that Islam may act as 'a sobering influence among conflictive ethnic identities'.[134] However, this chapter has argued that in many of the states the degree of Islamisation varies from region to region and may act in an opposite manner to that suggested so as to further identify differences between groups. Again, one only has to look at the case of Tadzhikistan in which the greater degree of Islamisation of the opposition as compared to the government forces has served to exacerbate the situation. President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan is clearly aware of the potential for discord from the regionalisation of Islam and has actively endeavoured to attenuate the differences through his policy of 'harmonisation'.

The clanic structures which existed within each of the ethnic groups at the turn of the century are still very much apparent in contemporary Central Asia. The fusion of the clanic structure with the Communist hierarchy, a low level of industrialisation and low rates of movement from the rural to the urban environment have meant that clanic relations have been preserved throughout the period of 'modernisation' of Central Asia. Uzbekistan, the country which had one of the least developed senses of national identity, is now the one country where tribal and clanic relations have taken on a less significant role: as one author put it – '(I)t is ironic that the most artificial of all Central Asian nations – the Uzbeks – should be emerging as a real 'nation' with strong 'imperialistic' tendencies. ... At present, the Uzbeks are by far the largest and most developed group among Central Asians and their position has been further strengthened by the settling of former nomadic groups, such as the Lokays.'[135] But even in Uzbekistan the more isolated rural areas retain their tribal ties and regional identities are still very much apparent. The differences between Uzbekistan and the other states may be explained in large part by the high level of sedentarisation of the population at the turn of the century. Before the Revolution the settled areas of Uzbekistan had generated close neighbourhood ties (*mahalla*) in which the members of the city quarter attended the ceremonies of each other's life-cycle rituals and even the economic regulation of each quarter came under the control of this community. The *mahalla* had therefore already become highly significant within Uzbekistan before the Revolution and the importance of this system seems, if anything, to have grown during the Soviet period.

Extant supra-ethnic and intra-ethnic identities and alliances do not necessarily imply that a sense of national identity has not increased under the Soviet system. In fact there are interesting examples in Uzbekistan where the national myths generated under the Soviet period have continued. In a curious reinvention of history the mortal enemies of the Shaibanid Uzbeks, the Timurids Tamerlane and Babur, are now depicted as Uzbek national figures. Similar nationalisation of religious figures have occurred both in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and the national Tadzhiko-centric interpretation of Central Asian history has gained popularity in present-day Tadzhikistan.

The arrogation of the common heritage of the region by the various nations has helped to foster a degree of animosity between the various national groups. National irredentist claims have been made by every single state in the region bar the Kirghiz: the Kazakhs claim the Tashkent area of Uzbekistan; the Uzbeks have staked a claim to the Chimkent region of Kazakhstan and of the Ferghana Valley of Kirghizstan and Tadzhikistan; and the Turkmen regard parts of Khorezm (formerly Khiva) as theirs. These revanchist claims also merge with claims to the cultural heritage of the region, for example the Tadzhiks claim Samarkand and Bukhara not only because of the large Tadzhik populations there but also because they were Persian cultural centres. The number of violent clashes between the various national groups is also an indication of the intensity of national feelings in the area and unfortunately these incidents have only served to heighten the antagonisms between the groups. National identity is therefore very much evident in contemporary Central Asia but to what degree this reflects a national consolidation of these groups during the Soviet period is of course highly debatable. However, the case of Uzbekistan does indicate that, in some cases, one should not be too sanguine in dismissing such a notion.

6 Iron Fist or Velvet Revolution?*

This book has concentrated on the internal divisions and concomitant legitimacy problems of the Central Asian states, endeavouring to establish to what extent these fledgling states are prone to internal instability. In so doing little emphasis has been placed on the many inter-state agreements that have been successfully negotiated. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Kirghizstan have become members of the Economic Co-operation Organisation originally consisting of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey; Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are members of the new Caspian Council which involves all of the Caspian's littoral states.[1] At the beginning of 1994 an agreement was signed by all five states to set up a fund to save the environmentally devastated Aral Sea.[2] There is also the possibility of a Central Asian common market being created following the recent (February 1994) agreement between Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan to abolish customs tariffs on trade among the three states.[3] At the beginning of 1993 Turkey added five letters to its alphabet that represent sounds in the Central Asian languages, and the five states have responded by a long-term plan to swap the Cyrillic alphabet for the Roman script.[4] The Ankara government is also contemplating the introduction of an identification document for citizens of the former Soviet Central Asian republics permitting them free travel and free business activity.[5] Given these contemporary developments one could possibly foresee some type of Central Asian common market that would include at least the four Turkic states of Central Asia and Turkey.

At the same time relations with their Russian neighbour have stabilised, despite the initial snub of not being invited to Minsk on December 8 1991 alongside Ukraine and Byelorussia for the founding meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). After some deliberation in Ashkhabad over the merits of joining such an organisation the Central Asian states opted in and signed up for membership at the second meeting, held in Alma Ata on the 21 December 1991. The exception was Turkmenistan's Niyazov, who declined to sign up for the collective security arrangements, settling for a bilateral arrangement whereby Russian and Turkmen troops would jointly guard its borders. In March 1996 the most enthusiastic regional advocates of closer co-operation between the Soviet successor states, Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan, also became members of an

economic union which at the moment includes themselves, Byelorussia and Russia.

Despite these inter-state agreements there remain extant territorial disputes within the region. The Kazakhs lay claim to the Tashkent region as part of the territory of the Great Horde whilst the Uzbeks claim that the southern area of Kazkhstan was historically theirs. Other claims to Uzbek territory come from the Turkmen and their desire to see their ancient capital Khwarazm (Khiva) returned to them and the Tadzhiks who lay claim to Bukhara and Samarkand.[6] The Uzbeks in return claim that the Khivan territories in Turkmenistan belong to them; there have also been murmurings of the possible integration into a greater Uzbekistan of the Osh region of Kirghizstan and the Khodzhent region of Tadzhikistan where there are large concentrations of Uzbeks.[7] Inter-ethnic problems have also arisen between Tadzhikistan and Kirghizstan over water rights between two border villages. In January 1993 diplomatic relations between the two were set up: the Kirghiz delegation wanted a treaty confirming the inviolability of the existing borders, but the Tadzhik delegation was unwilling to sign such an agreement.[8]

Although the fears of irredentist claims have been somewhat allayed by the leaders within the region agreeing to respect the old Soviet administrative boundaries, anxiety surrounding these claims would be further diminished if a regional declaration were to be signed agreeing to base inter-state relations on the principle of *uti possidetis*, whereby old administrative boundaries are retained as international frontiers regardless of the ethnic content within each state. This principle was applied in practice by the Organisation of African Unity in 1964 when state representatives agreed to 'respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence'. This move helped to assuage fears on that continent and a formal agreement amongst all the countries of the Central Asian region would hopefully do the same there.

THE SOVIET LEGACY

Although these inter-state agreements and disputes are crucial to any understanding of the problems and possibilities that each of the Central Asian states is confronted with, the emphasis of this book has been to outline one of the main problems emanating from within their own borders: societal cohesiveness. By comparing the experience of the ex-colonial states of the 'South' with the longer-established and highly industrialised states of the 'North' it became apparent that these ex-colonial states often

had several characteristics in common, one of which was the existence of an 'insecurity dilemma'. This condition is not restricted solely to 'Southern states' but is usually more intense and problematic in such states. Many ex-colonial states contain a polyphony of ethnic communities within their borders to the extent that they are more accurately described as state-nations rather than nation-states. Whilst the difference between the two forms of state is in reality one of degree rather than kind, the terms were adopted because they emphasise that many ex-colonial states have suffered from ethnic conflicts within their borders during their brief experience of independence. This book set out to examine whether the newly independent states of Central Asia suffer from a lack of legitimacy similar to that of other ex-colonial states.

Three possible sources that may challenge the stability of these states were identified: ethnic, sub-ethnic and supra-ethnic identities. The possibility of these newly independent states experiencing inter-ethnic conflicts was left until Chapter 5 on 'Contemporary Central Asia' because of the relative transparency of this source of dissonance. However, the possibility that within each of the titular nationalities of these states there exist subnational and supra-national identities that possibly undermine national cohesiveness is more difficult to assess. It was argued that to understand the complexities of the situation a historical perspective of the region needed to be adopted. By examining the situation of pre-revolutionary Central Asia it was ascertained that at the turn of the century the region consisted of a combination of multi-ethnic Islamic states and nomadic groups in which supra-ethnic and sub-ethnic identities were very much apparent. The national delimitation of Central Asia after the Bolshevik Revolution gave rise to the suggestion that a form of nation-building has occurred under the Soviet regime whereby the intensity of these two forms of identity have decreased amongst the population whilst a sense of national identity has increased.

It was asserted that Soviet policy on the national question had been largely based on the principle of 'national in form, socialist in content'. This not only entailed the creation of the Soviet Union on a federal basis but also a limited cultural autonomy infused with socialist interpretations and values. This meant that whilst nationalisms as political movements were banned, there was a thorough categorisation of nationalities together with some form of cultural/political representation within the Union for such groups. In the case of Central Asia, Soviet policy was further influenced by *realpolitik* and the principle of *divide et impera*. The principle of 'national in form, socialist in content' suited the purposes of the Soviet leadership who desired to undermine the supra-national Islamic

and pan-Turkic movements of the region. In the Marxist progressivist interpretation of history nationalism was regarded as a more progressive movement when compared to pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism, which were viewed as much more reactionary. It was thought that national delimitation concomitant with the promotion of proletarian international-ism would eventually lead to the final merging of the population into the greater community of Soviet people. Central Asia was therefore delimited into national republics despite the fact that other forms of delimitation presented themselves as viable alternatives.

The outcome of Soviet policy within Central Asia was the imposition of a national classificatory grid in which the population was nationally delim-ited so that each of the five ethnic groups were represented by their own republics. At the same time a national 'high culture' was imposed upon the population in the form of national standardised literary languages. Prior to the revolution, Persian and Chagatai were used by the élite as the literary languages of the region. Although national literary languages had begun to emerge, only amongst the Kazakhs was one in widespread use, and of course among the plains Tadzhiks, where the spoken language of Farsi was represented by the Persian literary language. The introduction of the national literary languages alongside the vast increase in literacy resulted in the demise of Persian and Chagatai in the region. At the same time, national histories were reinterpreted by the Soviet authorities so that political movements and rebellions that were deemed 'reactionary' were condemned and their leaders heavily criticised. The epics of the region, whether they were common to all the national groups or were national epics, were also condemned at the end of the Stalinist era. Despite the con-tinual reinterpretation of the national histories and epics of the region and the Soviet ideological framework, parts of these national versions of Central Asian history have been retained.

As was discussed in Chapter 2, a key influence associated with the con-solidation of national identity is industrialisation. It is often postulated that the uprooting of individuals from their local environment to industrial urban centres is accompanied by a shift of identity. The distanciation of familial relations is said to lead to the diminished importance of familial ties and an increased affiliation with the larger national community. Hand in hand with this is an increased mobility of the population, creating social networks of communication between previously self-contained locales, thereby giving more concrete foundations to the 'imagined community' – the nation. However, it was also pointed out that the large-scale migration of the rural population to the urban environment has to some extent been unique to the countries that experienced industrialisation first, and that the

promotion of national cohesiveness associated with industrialisation is probably attenuated in countries that have developed much later.

In the case of Central Asia, industrial development has lagged far behind the rest of the Soviet Union to the extent that per capita industrial output was half that of the Russian Federation. The economy of the region has been overwhelmingly dominated by the extraction of raw materials and the production of agricultural goods and livestock, epitomised by the cotton monoculture of Uzbekistan where the production of the 'white gold' has led to the environmental devastation of the land. Because the region initially lacked an industrially skilled workforce the industrialised areas of Central Asia contain large numbers of Slavs (predominantly Russian) who migrated to the area in order to fill many of the job vacancies. This traditional preponderance of Slavs within industry continued throughout the Soviet period, despite affirmative action to reverse the trend. Several reasons have been put forward explaining this: the preponderance of Slavs made industry an unappealing prospect for Central Asians; the existence of a 'second economy' especially in the agricultural and service industries meant that it was far more beneficial to remain employed in these sectors; Central Asian culture regarded industrial work as lowly and denigrating.[9] The high level of Central Asians remaining in agricultural production has led to a low rate of migration from the rural area to the urban centres; on average more than two-thirds of the indigenous population remain in the countryside and in some cases, such as Kirghizstan, more than 80 per cent of the population reside in their local rural settings.

This partly explains why clanic and tribal ties have retained their importance in contemporary Central Asia. Not only were kinship ties preserved during the Soviet era, but also the traditional dominance of particular tribes and clans continued within the republican administrative organs and communist parties. The tribal structure became fused with the hierarchial structures of the Soviet system, thus vitrifying the pre-revolutionary social status of the tribal and clanic groups to the extent that it is said to be 'one of the best-kept secrets of Central Asia that pre-revolutionary social position is still the most important determinant of social position today'.[10] Uzbekistan and some parts of Tadzhikistan stand out as an exception to this rule where the tribal and clanic relations have been largely replaced in the urban settlements of the two countries by the *mahalla* system. In areas where the population have been sedentarised for several centuries the social relations of the neighbourhood have largely replaced that of the tribe and clan. This factor combined with the continued significance of the family unit (whereby the lineage of nine generations is remembered)

has meant that within these two countries regional allegiances have become highly significant to the population.

The most likely explanation of the persistence of tribal, clanic and regional ties is that the Soviet leadership adopted a two-tier policy, either during the late Stalinist period or just after, which allowed a type of dual society to exist within the region. An 'upper tier' consisted of the Russified urban centres where Russian language and culture dominated to the extent that any Central Asian wishing to be promoted through the ranks of the Soviet system had to acquire Russian and, at least outwardly, pay lip service to Soviet ideology. The 'lower tier' consisted of the traditional relations of the region so that group segmentation and the social position of these groups were left unchallenged. Central Asian élites generally protected the traditions of the region while ensuring that production quotas were met, thereby satisfying Moscow and their brethren at one and the same time.

The Soviet clampdown on religion led to the practice of Islam being driven underground. Although Soviet policy led to the virtually total destruction of the mosques and religious schools of the region, plus the elimination or control of the clergy who attended to these establishments, Islamic beliefs and practices are still very much apparent. Three aspects of Islam in Central Asia are worth considering. Firstly, the clandestine nature of the 'unofficial Islam' of the Sufi brotherhoods meant that these practices were almost impossible to detect by the Soviet authorities. This has meant that their popularity was maintained and in all probability increased during the Soviet period. Secondly, there is evidence to suggest that Islam has become partially nationalised in the sense that each nation associates the religion with the national culture of their group more than with the Islamic community (*Umma*) as a whole. Lastly, within some of the countries a certain degree of regionalisation has occurred so that the Russified areas of Central Asia have become more secular in outlook. In Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan this process has increased the traditional differences between the north and the more Islamic southern regions of these two countries, whilst in Tadzhikistan the previously Islamic north-east of the country has become more secular in outlook.

To what extent it can be said that a process of nation-building has occurred leading to an increase in national identity is of course highly debatable. Certainly, clanic, tribal and, in the case of Uzbekistan, regional identities and allegiances are very much apparent and still permeate the administrative and political systems of these countries. Furthermore, the last few years have witnessed the resurgence in popularity of 'official Islam' amongst the population. Political parties within Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan

and Tadzhikistan have emerged that espouse pan-Islamic and, in the case of the first two countries, pan-Turkic beliefs. However, it should be noted that these parties realise that these objectives may never be fulfilled and if they are it will be a very long time before they are attained. The Russian presence in the industrialised centres of the region has meant that the indigenous population of these areas have become Russified and secular, thereby exacerbating the differences within the Tadzhik, Kazakh and Kirghiz nationalities.

At the same time there are some clear examples of national myths that were created under the Soviet period continuing to operate in the states of the region. During the Soviet period Uzbek, history was reinvented so that the Timurids, Timurlane and Babur, who actually fought for control of the region against the Shaibanid Uzbeks, were represented as Uzbek national figures. This reinvention of history has continued after independence to the extent that Timur now stands in the centre of Tashkent as a national figure replacing the statue of Lenin that once stood there. Similarly, in Tadzhikistan, Soviet writings which over-emphasised the cultural and even genetic debt that the rest of Central Asia owed to the Tadzhiks have continued to be used as authoritative sources by Tadzhik nationalists. Just as significant has been the 'nationalisation' of certain Sufi saints which are worshipped throughout the whole of Central Asia so that they are now described as Kazakh or Uzbek national saints or similar.

Some of the effects of the Soviet period have been somewhat unexpected and rather paradoxical. The Kazakhs who had the most developed sense of national consciousness amongst the Central Asians have not experienced the degree of national consolidation that one would have expected given these initial foundations. More than any other nation in the region, the Kazakhs have suffered from the Russification policies of the Soviet period. At times the Russians constituted the largest national group within Kazakhstan and it is only recently that the Kazakhs have reasserted themselves as the most numerous nationality. Russians and other Slavs remain preponderant in the north of the country so that they outnumber Kazakhs in most of the northern oblasts. Because the overwhelming majority of Russians resided in the north this has led to the greater Russification and secularisation of the Kazakhs that remained in the area, thereby increasing the differences between them and the southern Kazakhs, who tend to be more religious and have been less affected by the Russian presence (this is especially the case in the Chimkent, Dzhambal and Kyzl Orda oblasts).

At the other end of the spectrum is the example of Uzbekistan, which had one of the least-developed senses of national consciousness. In fact at

the turn of the century three ethnic groups were apparent in the area now known as Uzbekistan: the Shaibanid tribes or 'pure Uzbeks'; the pre-Shaibanid tribes; and the sedentarised population often referred to as *sarts* (traders). Although there still exist tribal identities in contemporary Uzbekistan especially in the rural areas, these are being replaced by regional allegiances and it is these that are most influential in the political alliances within the country. It seems likely that this process was more successful in Uzbekistan because of the relatively large number of peoples that had already adopted a sedentary lifestyle prior to any Soviet, and indeed, Russian intervention.

Tadzhikistan represents the greatest failure of Soviet social engineering and this has led to the most tragic of consequences: civil war. The Russian presence in the north west of the country has resulted in the Tadzhik population of this area becoming more Russified and secular in outlook as opposed to the Gharmi and Badakhshan regions of the country. The multitude of extremely diverse cultural groups of the Pamirian mountains in the Gorno-Badakhshan region and their relative inaccessibility have meant that they have not become assimilated by the Tadzhiks of the plains. The traditional political domination of the Khodzhent and Kulyab regions during the Soviet period further exacerbated the differences between themselves, the Gharmis and the Badakhshanis. The failures of the nation-building process within this country have meant that these divisions resurfaced almost immediately after independence and have resulted in the civil war that we are now witnessing.

To what degree national consolidation has occurred in the region during the Soviet period depends ultimately on which interpretation of pre-revolutionary Central Asian identity is adopted. In Chapter 3, which examined the forms of indentity within pre-revolutionary Central Asia, and it was argued that, broadly speaking, three interpretations on the degree to which national identity existed were apparent from writings on the subject: the 'strong', 'medium' and 'weak' interpretations. The 'weak' interpretation of national identity posited that nationality was a barely understood concept in the region. The 'medium' interpretation of national identity accepted that embryonic national groupings were emerging throughout Central Asia but that these were agglomerations of the present-day titular nationalities so that left in isolation three national groupings would have eventually emerged: the Uzbek-Tadzhik, the Kazakh-Kirghiz-Karakalpak, and the Turkmen. The 'strong' interpretation of national identity within the region accepts that sub-ethnic and supra-ethnic identities were indeed prevalent within the region but that the plains Tadzhiks, the Turkmen, the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz possessed a national consciousness which was

reinforced by their oral and written epics, common history and customs that distinguished them from other ethnic groups in the area.

Because of the uncertainty in interpreting the degree of national consciousness of each of the titular nationalities in pre-revolutionary Central Asia it is difficult to ascertain the degree of nation-building that has occurred within the region. However, it is possible to make a rough comparison of each of the titular nationalities concerned. The contemporary events in Tadzhikistan obviously indicate that it is within this country that the nation-building process has been least successful. When one considers that at the turn of the century the Kazakhs possessed the greatest degree of national consciousness and were the only group in which a national movement had actually developed, the Kazakhs represent the second group in which the process of national consolidation has occurred to the least degree. This does not imply that civil war is about to break out amongst the Kazakhs. It is a relative comparison between the level of national consciousness of the pre-revolutionary Kazakhs and the degree to which this has intensified under the Soviet regime. At the other end of the spectrum are the Uzbeks who, despite the divisions at the turn of the century, have a strong sense of Uzbek national identity. Between these two poles lie the Turkmen and Kirghiz in which national consolidation has occurred to the degree that their sense of unity has increased, but not to the same extent as that of the Uzbeks.

THE INSECURITY DILEMMA REVISITED

This book has focused on the nation-building process within Soviet Central Asia in order fully to understand the internal divisions and concomitant legitimacy problems that the newly independent states of the region face. Three sources that may possibly challenge the stability of these states were suggested: ethnic, sub-ethnic and supra-ethnic identities. An analysis of the historical evolution of these states has indicated that sub-ethnic and supra-ethnic identities are still very much apparent within the region and that in fact all three elements play a part within the states of the region.

Contemporary inter-ethnic divisions are most apparent in Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan. The situation in Kazakhstan is dominated by the fact that the Russians are almost equal in number to the Kazakhs and have mostly settled in the north of the country so that the Kazakhs are a minority in many of the northern oblasts. The widespread replacement of Russian personnel in the higher echelons of power (in the industry, administration,

and government of Kazakhstan), the non-recognition of Russian as a state language and the demands by some Kazakhs for the Russians to leave Kazakhstan have fuelled antagonisms between the two groups. Some of the Russian movements have demanded the creation of northern areas which possess a large degree of autonomy from the Kazakh state. Similarly, in Kirghizstan there is a large Russian presence, constituting 17 per cent of the population, and the majority again reside in the industrialised areas which are in the north of the country. The tensions between the Russians and Kirghiz do not appear to be as great as that between Russians and Kazakhs but tensions have been exacerbated by the ousting of Russians from influential jobs. So far Kirghizstan has not been marred by large-scale violence between these two ethnic groups; however, the same cannot be said about the antagonisms between the Kirghiz and Uzbeks who represent approximately 13 per cent of the overall population and are concentrated in the Ferghana Valley. Although the violence of the Osh riots in 1990 that left hundreds dead actually occurred a year before independence, the simmering discontent that was left in its wake remains the greatest source of instability within Kirghizstan.

As this study has made clear, tribal, clanic and regional allegiances still exist within the titular nationalities of the region. Not only have these sub-national identities persisted but social position within the region reflects the traditional hierarchy of these tribes and clans. The appointment of personnel in industry, government and administration is determined to a significant degree by their tribal and clanic origins and their social standing within those groups. This has in some cases led to a history of under-representation of certain groups, which in turn has generated discord between the various factions. Tadzhikistan is a tragic example of how these latent antagonisms evolved into open conflict after lying dormant for so long.

The hope that a supra-ethnic identity such as Islam or pan-Turkism might serve to attenuate the inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic differences within these states has proved to be misplaced. This book has argued that in many of the states the degree to which the population is Islamized varies from region to region and may act in an opposite manner to that suggested so as to further identify differences between groups. Again, one only has to look at the case of Tadzhikistan in which the greater degree of Islamization of the opposition as compared to the government forces has served to exacerbate the situation. As has been already mentioned, this is not an isolated case and similar conditions pertain in both Kirghizstan and Kazakhstan.

Eduard Shevardnadze once described Central Asia as 'a crescent of conflict',[11] and, echoing this assertion, the World Health Organisation and UNICEF warned in 1992 that these successor states were all in danger of

'a sudden and massive collapse of existing systems that could set off a vicious spiral of hunger and disease and political and economic chaos'.[12] Yet these prognoses have thus far turned out, with the exception of Tadzhikistan, to be largely inaccurate. In fact Tadzhikistan may act as a looking-glass for the state élites of the region, stimulating a critical examination of the possible effects state policy may have on the stability within their own domains.

The intensity of instability obviously varies from state to state and has been generally aggravated by the worsening economic situation and social uncertainty related to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Reform of the old system is fraught with the possibility of antagonising the situation, for example, privatisation and redistribution of the land has become ethnically charged and has been identified as an aggravating factor in the Osh riot and similar conflicts so that most of the Central Asian states have now opted for leasehold schemes where the state retains the title to the land.[13]

Antagonisms between and within various ethnic groupings should therefore not be separated from their social, economic and political context. The legitimacy of the state depends upon the balanced representation of the various interest groups existing within its borders. This extends to the economic sphere where the provision and extraction of resources from the citizens of a state may become highly charged if the process is carried out in a partisan manner. Legitimacy is also inextricably linked to a state's ability to provide basic social welfare; the provision of some type of basic economic safety net becomes crucially important, especially in areas of high unemployment. Any economic decline may therefore further exacerbate existing divisions, and the latest statistics on manufacturing output for these states are not favourable in this respect.[14]

How far these inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic divisions lead to internal instability is highly dependent on the particular conditions prevalent within each society and the policies of their respective states. Most of the state leaders within the region have reacted by sharing a degree of power with the various clanic and tribal groups. However, this has not been the case when it comes to the inclusion of the Russians in the power-sharing process, even in Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan where the Russians are most numerous.

REFORM OR REACTION?

In Chapter 1 it was explained why it is that the condition confronting leaders of many 'Southern States' is designated the 'insecurity dilemma'. Such

a term has the advantage of emphasising the contrast between those states which are most concerned with external threats and those which are more concerned with threats emanating from within their own borders. At the same time such a title also highlights the dilemma that faces such leaders as to which policies to pursue to overcome their condition of insecurity. In particular, élites of those states that are ethnically heterogeneous are confronted with the choice of increasing the state's coercive means or of ensuring both equitable distribution of resources and greater political representation of the various ethnic groups' interests. The dilemma that faces such élites is that there is an 'unresolvable uncertainty' as to whether, in the short term, democracy and more equitable policies will bring greater or less stability.

There are two main reasons for this uncertainty. Firstly, there is the possibility that giving greater political representation to the various ethnic groups will encourage such groups to 'turn inward and focus on their 'difference'' at the expense of a more general form of citizenship.[15] Recent work on transitions to democracy has indicated that such a period is bedevilled by instabilities. Given the diversity of interests that exist within multicultural societies, it is difficult for the state to attend to all of the demands of all the groups all of the time. It has been suggested that under such conditions there is a tendency for élites to get their issues on the agenda by drumming up nationalist sentiment for their causes. Given such support the state may acquiesce to such demands, but this practice runs the risk of engendering hypertrophied forms of nationalism and further instability.[16] Secondly, by promoting greater representation of other ethnic groups and pursuing more equitable distribution of resources the leaders of such states may find that they have alienated their own support base, possibly to the extent that new contenders surface to challenge them.

However, the continual suppression of political dissent and the absence of any mechanism for the voice of ethnic interests to be heard may only serve to store up trouble for the future. There is an essential flaw in arguing, as many state leaders contend, that the potentiality of instability prevents reform of the political system: more authoritarian forms of rule do not provide a mechanism for peaceful succession. Indeed, such transitional periods are usually plagued by political infighting and internal crises. In Central Asia it could be argued that the patrilineal cultures provide a means of circumventing this problem by preparing the leaders' sons for political office but in fact only President Akaev has male offspring.[17] Central Asia is no exception, then, to the problems associated with authoritarian political sucession.

At the same time the Central Asian states have come under increasing international pressure, especially from the United States, to democratize.

The United State's promise of aid and the establishment of good relations has invariably been linked to democratic reform. For example, shortly after Nazarbayev's dissolution of the Kazakh Parliament in March 1995, following the Constitutional Court's ruling that the 1994 elections were invalid, it was made clear by the US Secretary of State at the time that normal relations were dependent upon new elections.[18] It is also apparent that agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development have been far more responsive to the needs of the more democratic states, Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan, than to any of the other three.[19]

In response to these pressures all five states have held elections to legislatures of one form or another since their independence. However, as was previously mentioned in Chapter 5, in many of the cases the elections were mostly for appearances. The exceptions to this rule have tended to be Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan where opposition parties in the proper sense of the word have been allowed to register. Even in these cases strong presidential rule remains and certain parties continue to be banned.

In Kazakhstan Presidential elections took place on 1 December 1991 in which nobody ran against Nursultan Nazarbaev (he had previously been first secretary of the Communist Party since June 1989 but had become independent after the coup); he therefore obtained 98.8 per cent of the vote. Elections for a new unicameral state legislature were first held in March 1994 following the disbanding of the Supreme Soviet at the end of the previous year. President Nazarbayev endeavoured to guarantee support for his policies by helping to set up the Union of People's Unity of Kazakhstan (SNEK), a political party which gained 33 of the 177 seats available. In addition to this 42 of the deputies were personally nominated by the President, and certain opposition parties, such as *Azat* and the Socialist Party, were not allowed to register.[20] The elections returned 105 Kazakh deputies, 49 Russian deputies, 10 Ukrainians and a small proportion of deputies representing other minorities.[21] This meant that the Kazakhs, who make up 42 per cent of the population, possessed approximately 60 per cent of the seats whilst the Russians who constitute 38 per cent only obtained 28 per cent. Although the results did not correspond to a true representation of the ethnic population it did not significantly differ from that found in the old Soviet legislative body and, given the understandable resurgence of Kazakh national sentiment, the elections produced a reasonable representation of the state's ethnic demography.[22]

However, the elections were censured by the CSCE delegation monitoring the process who identified several irregularities, including proxy voting and the lack of access to the media for opposition parties. The question

of electoral integrity would not disappear, and a year later the new parliament was dissolved after the Constitutional Court's ruling that the 1994 elections were invalid. New elections to a bicameral state legislature were therefore held in December 1995 which resulted in 68 Kazakhs, 31 Russians and 2 Ukrainians being elected deputies to both houses (67 seats in the *Mezhlis* or lower house and 40 in the Senate). Again, support for the President was assured by his personal nomination of 7 Senators and the success of the pro-Presidential parties, SNEK and the Democratic Party, who gained 24 and 12 seats respectively.[23]

Under President Akaev's relatively liberal rule opposition parties such as the Democratic Movement of Free Kirghizstan (DDK), *Erkin Kirghistan*, and *Ata Meken* have been able to establish themselves unhindered by state interference. A new-style 105-seat bicameral state legislature (the *Zhorgorku Kenesh*) was established in February 1995 after the final dissolution of the Soviet-era parliament in the Summer of 1994 in which the 35-seat Legislative Assembly would convene all year round whilst the 70-seat People's Assembly would meet a few times a year. As was mentioned in Chapter 5, this resulted in many of the well-established names of Kirghizstan's southern region being elected, including Absamat Masaliev, the former First Secretary from Osh who, despite his dismissal for the mishandling of the Osh riots in the Summer of 1990, now heads the Communist Party of Kirghizstan.[24] However, at the local level the competition between the north and south has continued with the conflict between the local governor of Osh, a northerner appointed by Akaev, and the local council resulting in paralysis of the local government.[25]

The February elections mirrored those in Kazakhstan in that they were marred by accusations of bribery, intimidation and fraud.[26] Similarities were also to be found in both Presidents following the example of Niyazov and Karimov in seeking an extension of their presidencies to the year 2000 and beyond. Unlike Nazarbayev who decided in favour of a national referendum in keeping with the Presidents of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, President Akaev decided to face the electorate in presidential elections. Although this may have been a more democratic method of extending his term of office, the December 1995 Presidential election itself called into question Akaev's real commitment to democracy, given the barring of certain candidates and tight control of the media.[27]

However, compared to the other three states of the region the Kirghiz and Kazakh electorate were at least given a fairly varied choice of candidates. Elections in Uzbekistan were held to a unicameral state legislature on 25 December 1994, but the majority of candidates were either from the reformed Communist Party, the People's Democratic Party, which gained

69 seats, the presidentially approved Fatherland Progress Party which gained 14 seats or were nominated by their local councils. Out of the 250 seats in the new legislature, 144 seats were filled by candidates nominated by the latter.[28] Shortly after these elections Karimov promoted the formation of another political party which has taken its name from one of the banned religious parties, *Adolat* Social Democratic Party which attracted 46 of the deputies from the new legislature. The reason for its formation so soon after the elections seems to be twofold. Firstly, it has taken the same name as a recently established opposition party (*Adolat* i.e. 'Justice') formed by Karimov's political opponent, the previous Vice-President Shakrulla Mirsaidov, who in turn had taken it from the Ferghana-based party of that name. This therefore gives the impression that Karimov and his followers are endeavouring to represent the varied interests of the population and possibly hope to undermine Mirsaidov's efforts at creating an effective opposition. At the same time it may be that Karimov hopes to gradually introduce a degree of plurality which is initially strictly controlled by the state but, conditions allowing, would evolve into a slightly freer form of pluralism.[29]

A few weeks before Uzbekistan's population went to the polls Turkmenistan held its first post-Soviet elections. However, the majority of the 50 seats in the lower house or *Mezhlis* were uncontested so that all but one of the deputies mostly from the reformed Communist Party, the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, were elected unopposed.[30] A second chamber was also created under the constitution, the *Khalk Maslakhaty* (People's Council), which consists of 100 appointed deputies that meet fairly infrequently. This latter body is sometimes referred to as the Council of Elders because it is said to be 'based upon the tribal assemblies of Turkmenistan's past' and as such reflects the traditional respect found in Central Asian culture for the wisdom of the tribal elders in the community.[31]

Understandably the situation in Tadzhikistan has rendered full and open elections extremely difficult; nevertheless elections for the new Parliament went ahead on the 26 February 1995. Parties from the United Tadzhik Opposition such as the Islamic Renaissance Party, *Rastakhiz* (Rebirth), the Democratic Party and *Lali Badakhshan* were not allowed to put candidates forward. As a consequence of this the elected deputies were predominantly from the Communist Party, the military and the state apparatus. The elections also confirmed the new dominance of the Kulyab region and probably further weakened the Kulyabi/Khodzhent alliance with the former Prime Minister Abduladzhanov from Khodzhent crying foul play over the government's control of the media and alleged voting irregularities.[32]

In general the Central Asian leaders seem to have been more concerned with portraying their states as multi-party democracies to the outside world than with ensuring the existence of substantive representation of the population's interests. Even in Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan where, by and large, opposition parties are permitted to gather support without government interference, the tendency has recently been towards a strong form of presidential rule. The last year has witnessed President Nazarbayev's sidelining of the new Parliament with the creation of new ministries directly accountable to himself, despite the fact that a compliant Parliament is virtually ensured by the majority hold of the presidentially backed parties.[33] Similarly, following the presidential elections at the end of 1995, President Akaev gained approval via a referendum to change the constitution. These amendments, such as presidential appointment of the Cabinet and Supreme Court Judges, have served to further strengthen the hand of the President.[34] Even if one were to concede that these two states have established multi-party democracies, they have not managed to maintain a political environment which one usually associates with full-blown democracy or, to employ Robert Dahl's term, they have not yet established themselves as fully fledged polyarchies.[35]

However, given the problems associated with Central Asia's 'insecurity dilemma' and the current transition to a market economy, the reluctance to democratise is understandable. Indeed, the dual international pressure to follow neo-liberal economic reforms and democratisation at one and the same time is more likely than not a recipe for disaster. It is not surprising therefore that the Central Asian leaders have not wholeheartedly embraced a move towards greater democracy. On the other hand, rather than taking on a semblance of democracy by holding elections that are strictly controlled and biased towards compliant political parties, it might be more useful to explore other possible options that would improve the representation of the population whilst ensuring the maintenance of political stability.

One solution to the multi-ethnic challenge that these states face is of course to adopt some form of federalism which confers a very high degree of autonomy to the various ethnic groups. But, in its territorial-based form at least, this solution only seems viable for the Badakhshan region of Tadzhikistan and possibly the Karakalpak autonomous republic within Uzbekistan. Even in both these cases the high degree of ethnic intermingling within such territories would probably limit any move towards greater autonomy. In the Karalkalpak Autonomous Republic the three main ethnic groups, the Karalkalpaks, Uzbeks and Kazakhs number about 350,000 each and there are also approximately 70,000 Turkmen. The Karakalpaks have sought greater autonomy since the dissolution of the

Soviet Union but the central authorities have been reluctant to acquiesce to their demands. Similarly, the Pamiri peoples of the Badakhshan Autonomous Viloyat (formerly Oblast), although united by the Ismaili religion, are actually constituted from a variety of separate ethnic groups such as the Shugni, Bartangi, Rushani and Wakhani. In addition to this there are a significant number of Tadzhiks from the plains who have migrated to the region and now constitute a large proportion of the population.[36] Despite calls from the *Lali Badakhshan* party for greater autonomy and the resurfacing of this issue during the referendum on the new constitution at the end of November 1994 when a group of Badakhshanis requested the upgrading of the region's status to that of autonomous republic, demands for a greater degree of independence have been ignored by the central authorities.[37]

Another way forward might be to implement some form of consociationalism which would hopefully engender greater accommodative behaviour between both ethnic and clanic groups within each of the Central Asian states. The main characteristics normally associated with consociationalism include the principle of proportionality applied not only to government but also to the allocation of resources; 'summit diplomacy' whereby the ethnic élites come together to settle disputes, the agreements of which are then presented to the legislature; the right of veto on major issues for the minority ethnic groups; and a large degree of cultural autonomy over such issues as education.[38] Obviously, given the historical injustices carried out against the titular nationalities of the region and the instabilities associated with such reforms, I am not suggesting the implementation of all of these points. Indeed, even the suggestion of bestowing an equal status on the Russian language has caused major ructions in these states. However, one of the major methods of encouraging accommodative behaviour, the regular meetings of the various political leaders from the ethnic and clanic groups within these states to facilitate agreement over major legislation and government decisions, may pave the way for greater reforms in the future. Although this may seem overly optimistic at the present time and is not without its risks, efforts at establishing a consensus on major issues has already been tried, albeit with limited success, for example in Kirghizstan, where President Akaev organised a Constitutional Convention which included major representatives of the regions, political parties, trade unions etc. to discuss proposals for a new constitution.[39] Similarly, if Turkmenistan's upper assembly, the so-called 'Council of Elders', was given real political teeth it could possibly act as a forum for promoting reconciliation between the various clanic groupings if and when the need arises.

At the moment it is sufficient to identify the divisions outlined above as potential sources of friction which may lead to internal threats to Central Asian security. To what extent these divisions will become an overriding factor within the region largely depends on the policies of the leaders of each of the states and the type of reforms they implement. Whether these state leaders will move further towards an authoritarian 'iron fist' form of rule whilst endeavouring to attenuate the economic hardships felt since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, or whether they will risk slowly implementing a 'velvet revolution' of further democratisation already evident in Kirghizstan and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan, will have to be seen.[40] I have indicated that the state leaders are very much aware of the problems that they face; it is therefore possible that they will further implement policies which will diminish the possibility of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic antagonisms arising. To this end the situation in Tadzhikistan will hopefully serve as a timely reminder of the devastating potential of ethnic discord.

Appendix

Table A.1 Ethnic composition of the Central Asian Republics, 1989 (percentages)

	Kazakh SSR	Uzbek SSR	Turkmen SSR	Tadzhik SSR	Kirghiz SSR
Kazakhs	39.7	4.1	2.5	0.2	0.9
Uzbeks	2.0	71.4	9.0	23.5	12.9
Turkmen	–	–	72.0	0.4	–
Tadzhiks	–	4.7	–	62.3	0.8
Kirghiz	–	0.9	–	1.3	52.4
Russians	37.8	8.3	9.5	7.6	21.5
Karalkalpaks	–	2.1	–	–	–
Uighurs	1.1	–	–	–	0.9
Tatars	2.0	2.4	1.1	1.4	1.6
Germans	5.8	–	–	0.6	2.4
Ukrainians	5.4	0.8	1.0	0.8	2.5

Source: Richard Kaufman and John Hardt, *The Former Soviet Union in Transition* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993).

Table A.2 Republic populations total and urban, 1979 and 1989

	1979			1989		
SSR	Total (000s)	Urban (000s)	% Urban	Total (000s)	Urban (000s)	% Urban
Russian	137,551	95,374	69	147,386	108,419	74
Kazakh	14,685	7,920	54	16,538	9,465	57
Uzbek	15,391	6,348	41	19,906	8,106	41
Turkmen	2,759	1,323	48	3,534	1,603	45
Tadzhik	3,801	1,325	35	5,112	1,667	33
Kirghiz	3,529	1,366	39	4,291	1,641	38

Source: Graham Smith (ed.), *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union* (London: Longman, 1991).

Table A.3   Percentage of Central Asians declaring a knowledge
of Russian as a second language. 1970, 1979 and 1989

	1970	1979	1989
Kazakhs	41.8	52.3	60.4
Uzbeks	14.5	49.3	23.8
Turkmen	15.4	25.4	27.8
Tadzhiks	15.4	29.6	27.7
Kirghiz	19.1	29.4	35.2

Source: Graham Smith (ed.), *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union* (London: Longman, 1991).

Table A.4   Percentage of the nationalities declaring their nationality language as
their native tongue, 1979 and 1989 (first column only)

	Total 1989	Total 1979	Urban 1979	Residing in own-nationality republic	Residing outside nationality republic
Kazakhs	97.0	97.5	97.1	98.6	92.8
Uzbeks	98.3	98.5	96.1	98.8	96.9
Turkmen	98.5	98.7	97.0	99.2	90.4
Tadzhiks	97.7	97.8	95.9	99.3	92.8
Kirghiz	97.8	97.9	97.3	99.6	84.8

Source: Graham Smith (ed.), *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union* (London: Longman, 1991), and Michael Ryan, *Contemporary Soviet Society* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990).

Table A.5   Urban/rural distribution of titular nationalities, 1926 and 1979

	1926		1979	
SSR	% Urban	% Rural	% Urban	% Rural
Uzbek	18.3	81.7	29.0	71.0
Kazakh	2.1	97.9	32.0	68.0
Tadzhik	4.8	95.2	25.0	75.0
Turkmen	1.4	98.6	33.0	67.0
Kirghiz	0.8	99.2	18.0	82.0

Source: Shirin Akiner, *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1986), and Robert Lewis (ed.), *Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia* (London: Routledge, 1992).

Table A.6   Labour force by sector, 1990 (percentages)

	Kazakh SSR	Uzbek SSR	Turkmen SSR (1989)	Tadzhik SSR (1989)	Kirghiz SSR
Industry	21.7	17.7	10.8	13.4	19.0
Agriculture	17.8	29.0	42.0	42.9	32.6
Construction	11.5	10.5	10.0	8.3	8.7
Transport and Communication	10.4	3.7	4.0	3.3	3.2
Trade and Distribution	8.2	6.8	5.7	7.5	6.6
Forestry	0.2	NA	0.1	NA	0.2
'Service Sector'	28.4	30.4	25.7	24.5	27.9

Source: Amalgam of data given in the five World Bank reports of the Central Asian states.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. See for example, Peter Ferdinand, *The New Central Asia & its Neighbours* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1995); Kiaras Gharabaghi, 'Development Strategies for Central Asia in the 1990s: in search of alternatives', *Third World Quarterly*, 15/1 (1994); Martha Brill Olcott, 'Central Asia's Post-Empire Politics', *Orbis* (Spring 1992).
2. In January 1992 this intensity rose to new heights with the West's concern over the forging of economic alliances within the region in the form of the Economic Co-operation Organisation originally consisting of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Kirghizstan joined) and the Caspian Council consisting of the Caspian littoral states (Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan joined).
3. Martha Brill Olcott, 'The Myth of "Tsentral 'naia Aziia"', *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, 38/4 (Fall 1994).
4. For one of the best summaries of the effects of independence on the Central Asian economies refer to Michael Kaser and Santosh Mehrotra, *The Central Asian Economies After Independence* (London: Royal Institute of International affairs, 1992).
5. Donald Carlisle, 'Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks', *Problems of Communism*, 40 (September–October, 1991), p. 35.
6. Brian Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States* (London: Lynne Reinner, 1992).
7. Martin Klatt, 'Russians in the "Near Abroad"', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3/32 (19 August 1994), p. 41.
8. Refer to 'Few Russians left in Tadzhikistan', *Labyrinth*, 1/3 (Summer 1994), p. 11; Emil Shukurov and Anara Tabyshalieva, 'Ways to Ethnic Peace', *Kirghizstan Chronicle*, 41 (October 11 1994), p. 3; Martin Klatt, 'Russians in the "Near Abroad"', op. cit.
9. Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 66.
10. Because, as Lenin put it, 'a free union is a lying phrase without the right to secession'. V. I. Lenin, 'The Socialist Revolution and the Right of nations to self-Determination', *Lenin on the National and Colonial Questions* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), p. 2.
11. Quoted in Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 38.
12. Ronald Suny, 'The Soviet South: Nationalism and the outside world', Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), *The Rise of Nations in the Soviet Union* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991).
13. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 36.
14. V. I. Lenin, *Preliminary Draft of Theses on the National and Colonial Questions* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1975).

15.   Ibid., p. 8.
16.   Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers* (New York: Macmillan, 1970).
17.   Walker Connor, 'Nation Building or Nation Destroying', *World Politics*, 24 (April 1972).
18.   Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), p. 212.
19.   Rogers Brubaker, op. cit., p. 24.

1   THE SOUTH'S 'INSECURITY DILEMMA'

1.   The term 'insecurity dilemma' reflects the fact that most of the time threats to these states emanate from inside their borders as compared to the security dilemma that faces other states where the main threat is external, emanating from other states. For more on the insecurity dilemma facing 'Third World' states see Brian Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992).
2.   This is a recurring theme in Mohammed Ayoob's work. Refer to 'Security in the Third World: the worm about to turn?', *International Affairs*, 60/1 (1984); 'The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33/1 (1989); 'The Security Problematic of the Third World', *World Politics*, 43/2 (1991); and *Regional Security in the Third World* (London: Croom Helm, 1986).
3.   Walker Conner, 'Nation Building or Destroying', *World Politics*, 24 (April 1972), p. 320.
4.   Although the expression 'self-determination' can be traced to 1865, it was not officially endorsed by an international organisation until the creation of the United Nations. See Walker Conner, 'Nation Building or Destroying', *World Politics*, April 1972.
5.   For a historical description of these competing forms refer to E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan Ltd., 1945) and for the contemporary problems stemming from this dichotomy refer to Kamal Shehadi, 'Ethnic Self-determination and the Break-up of States', *Adelphi Paper*, 283 (December 1993).
6.   Caroline Thomas, 'New Directions in Thinking about Security in the Third World' in Ken Booth (ed.), *New Thinking About Strategy & International Security* (London: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 267.
7.   For example, Hedley Bull, *Justice in International Relations* (Ontario: University of Waterloo, 1983); Brian Job, op. cit.; Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood', *World Politics*, 1 (October 1982); Mohammed Ayoob, 'The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia of Growing Pains?', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33/1 (1989).
8.   For example see Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1948) and *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York: Knopf, 1951); E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis* (London: MacMillan, 1939); and R. Niebuhr, *Nations and Empires* (London: Faber and Faber, 1959).
9.   Hedley Bull, *The Anarchichal Society: a study of order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977); James Mayall, *Nationalism and International*

Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Terry Nardin, *Law, Morality and the Relations of States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

10.   Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, op. cit., p. 13.
11.   For more on the triad of cornerstones that underpin the international system see Caroline Thomas, *New States, Sovereignty and Intervention* (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company Ltd., 1985).
12.   Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations & the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
13.   Ibid., p. 168.
14.   Ibid., pp. 5 and 34.
15.   Ibid., pp. 29 and 168. Also his work on Weber's definition of the monopoly of force and African states in Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood', *World Politics*, 1 (October 1982).
16.   Jackson, *Quasi-States ...*, p. 169.
17.   Fred Parkinson, 'Ethnicity & Independent Statehood', in Robert Jackson and Alan James, *States in a Changing World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 325.
18.   Jeffrey Herbst, 'The creation & maintenance of national boundaries in Africa', *International Organisation*, 43/4 (Autumn 1989), p. 676.
19.   I am indebted to Caroline Thomas for this insight; for more on this see Caroline Thomas, 'Southern Instability, Security and Western Concepts – On an Unhappy Marriage and the Need for a Divorce', in C. Thomas and P. Saravanammutu (ed.), *The State and Instability in the South* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989).
20.   Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. i (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 54.
21.   Michael Mann, 'The Autonomous Power of the State', in John Hall (ed.), *States in History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 113–16.
22.   Anthony Giddens, *The Nation State & Violence*: vol. ii, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), p. 20.
23.   Ibid., p. 5.
24.   Ibid., p. 160.
25.   Fred Riggs, 'Ethnonationalism, Industrialism, & the Modern State', *Third World Quarterly*, 15/4 (1994), p. 589.
26.   Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-state ...*, op. cit. Giddens uses Charles Lindbolm's definition of polyarchy which is said to involve 'the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens considered as political equals'; see chapter 8, p. 199.
27.   This approach is obviously influenced by Gramsci's description of class hegemony and the role ideology plays in maintaining class dominance. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Prison Notebooks* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971).
28.   David Held and Anthony McGrew, 'Globalisation and the Liberal Democratic State', *Government & Opposition*, 28/2, p. 265.
29.   Robert Jackson,'Juridical statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Journal of International Affairs*, 46/1 (1992).
30.   See Caroline Thomas' article which criticizes Barry Buzan's use of the term weak state in 'Southern Instability, Security and Western Concepts – On an

Unhappy Marriage and the Need for a Divorce', op. cit. One author has used the converse of this terminology by stressing that the problem is one of strong societies bounded by the administration of weak states. See Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

31.   Herbert Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (London: Collins, 1951), p. 20.

32.   Nick Wheeler and Ken Booth, 'The Security Dilemma' in John Baylis and Nick Rengger (eds), *Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 30.

33.   Brian Job, 'The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World' in Brian Job (ed.), op. cit., p. 18.

34.   Ibid., p. 18.

35.   Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, op. cit.

36.   Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, 'Return of the Citizen' in Ronald Beiner, *Theorizing Citizenship* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 304.

37.   Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 'Democratization and War', *Foreign Affairs*, 74/3 (1995) and 'Democratization and the Danger of War', *International Security*, 20/1 (Summer 1995).

38.   That is the modern state which is highly industrialised, a high level of infrastructural development and greater degree of surveillance and general control of communication networks. Refer to the chapter 'Theories of Nationalism' for the relationship between the modern state and nationalism.

39.   Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), p. 6.

40.   See Mohammed Ayoob's writings cited in n. 2.

2   ETHNICITY, NATIONALISM AND NATION-BUILDING

1.   Lord Acton, *Essays on Freedom and Power* (Illinois: The Free Press, 1948) and Ernest Renan, *Discours et Conferences* (Paris: Calman-Levy, 1887). The full essays are to be found in Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1955), pp. 121–5 and 135–40.

2.   Ephraim Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of Political Crisis* (London: Pluto Press, 1991), p. 1.

3.   E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan Ltd., 1945), p. 34; Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1953), p. 190.

4.   Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 183.

5.   A. D. Smith, *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1979) p. vii.

6.   M. Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East & North Africa* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1963) p. 207. Quoted in T. V. Sathyamurthy, *Nationalism in the Contemporary World* (Frances Pinter: London, 1983).

7.   For example see Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986); Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London:

Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964); Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, op. cit.; and of course Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1960).

8.   Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 1.

9.   Mostafa Rejai and Cynthia H. Enloe, 'Nation-States & State-Nations', *International Studies Quarterly*, 13/2, pp. 140–58.

10. Walker Conner, 'A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group is a ... ', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1/4 (1978), p. 382.

11. Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 88.

12. Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, op. cit., p. 31.

13. Ibid., p. 31. Also refer to Kenneth Minogue, *Nationalism* (London: Batsford, 1967).

14. J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government*. Quoted in James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 27.

15. Anthony Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (London: Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1971), op. cit., p. 21.

16. Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1960), p. 9.

17. Elie Kedourie (ed.), *Nationalism in Asia and Africa* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970), p. 28.

18. Ibid., p. 29.

19. Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, op. cit., p. 138.

20. Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought & the Colonial World* (London: Zed Books, 1986), p. 7.

21. Ali Mazrui, 'African Nationalism's Rhetoric', in Yashpal Tandon (ed.), *Readings in African International Relations* (Kampala: East African Literature Bureau, 1972), p. 129.

22. Kedourie, *Nationalism*, op. cit., p. 135.

23. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. i (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 389.

24. Walker Connor, *A Nation is a Nation ...*, op. cit., p. 381.

25. Fredrik Barth (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 14.

26. A. D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, op. cit., p. 176.

27. Walker Connor, *A Nation is a Nation*, op. cit.; for a very similar opinion see Roger Scruton, 'In Defence of the Nation', J. Clark (ed.), *Ideas and Politics in Modern Britain* (London: MacMillan, 1990).

28. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), p. 6.

29. For a more detailed exposition of the various approaches, refer to Anthony Smith, 'State Making & Nation Building', in John Hall (ed.), *States in History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

30. Edward Shils, 'Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties', *British Journal of Sociology*, 7 (1957).

31. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1975), p. 35.

32. Ibid., p. 44.

33. Clifford Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States', in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 109.

34. James Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 10.

35. Pierre van den Berghe, 'Does Race Matter?', *Nations and Nationalism*, 1/3 (July 1995), p. 360. Also Thomas Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives* (London: Pluto Press, 1993); Anthony Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (London: Polity Press, 1995).

36. James Kellas, op. cit., p. 10.

37. Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 30 and 56.

38. Fredrik Barth (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969), p. 14.

39. Refer to Fredrik Barth's discussion of the Fur and Baggara ethnic groups of the Sudan in Fredrik Barth (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, op. cit., p. 26.

40. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991, 2nd edition), p. 6.

41. Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations & Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

42. T. V. Sathyamurthy, *Nationalism in the Contemporary World* (London: Francis Pinter, 1983), p. 72.

43. Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, op. cit., p. 15.

44. Ibid., p. 21.

45. Ibid., p. 66.

46. Ibid., p. 71.

47. Ibid., p. 21.

48. Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Association* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955).

49. Walker Connor, 'Nation Building or Destroying?', op. cit., p. 347.

50. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. i, op. cit., part 2, Chapter 5, 'Ethnic Groups', p. 389.

51. For example refer to Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Mohammed Ayoob, 'The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33/1 (1989) and 'Security in the Third World: the worm about to turn?', *International Affairs*, 60/1 (1984).

52. Joeseph Strayer, *Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), quoted in Charles Tilly, op. cit., p. 43.

53. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983) p. 57. See also *Thought and Change* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965). Another way of describing this difference is to associate industrialisation more with the economic and scientific techniques used

within a society, whereas modernisation may be described as the transfer of a new type of education, that of modern science.

54. Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, op. cit. footnote p. 171.
55. Ibid., pp. 154–5.
56. Ibid., p. 157.
57. Ibid., p. 48.
58. Ibid., p. 57.
59. Karl Deutsch, op. cit., p. 152.
60. Ibid., p. 78.
61. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, op. cit., p. 46.
62. Ibid., p. 109.
63. Ibid., p. 184.
64. Hugh Trevor-Roper, 'The Highland Tradition of Scotland' in Eric Hobsbawm (ed.), *The Invention of Tradition*, op. cit., pp. 15–16. For more examples refer to the same edited volume and also Anthony Smith, 'The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?', *Millennium*, 20/3 (1991).
65. This has been discussed in more detail in the first chapter, refer to Anthony Giddens, *Nation-States ...*, op. cit., p. 199.
66. Patricia Mayo, *The Roots of Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 150.
67. Refer to Walker Connor, 'Nation Building or Destroying', especially section 9 on 'Improper Regard for the Factor of Chronological Time'.
68. The first quote is from Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, 2nd ed. (London: NLB, 1981), p. 329; the second is Ephraim Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis* (London: Pluto Press, 1991), p. 1.
69. Erica Benner, 'Marx and Engels on Nationalism and National Identity: A Reappraisal', *Millennium*, 17/1 (Spring 1988).
70. Tom Nairn, op. cit., p. 329.
71. Ibid., p. 340.
72. Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology* (1846), (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1940), pp. 39–41 and p. 59.
73. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1978), p. 9.
74. For more on this refer to Erica Benner, op. cit., p. 6.
75. Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, op. cit., p. 166.
76. Andre Gunder Frank, 'The Centrality of Central Asia', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 24/2 (1992), p. 29.
77. Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, op. cit., p. 335.
78. Ibid., p. 340.
79. Ibid.
80. On the myth symbol complex refer to Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, op. cit., p. 14.
81. Anthony Smith, 'The Origins of Nations', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 12/3 (July 1989), p. 348.
82. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 24.
83. Anthony Smith in John Hall (ed.), *States in History*, op. cit., p. 258.

3 PRE-REVOLUTIONARY IDENTITIES IN CENTRAL ASIA

1. Nazif Shahrani, 'Central Asia and the challenge of the Soviet legacy', *Central Asian Survey*, 12/2 (1993), p. 129. Other scholars that agree with the proposition that a nation-building process has occurred at least to some degree include: Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967); Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson); and Donald Carlisle, 'Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks', *Problems of Communism*, vol. XL, Sep–Oct 1991.

2. Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Quelquejay, op. cit., p. 224.

3. Donald Carlisle, 'Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks', op. cit., p. 24.

4. Boris Rumer, *Soviet Central Asia – 'A Tragic Experiment'* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989) and Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities* (New York: Macmillan, 1970).

5. Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 151.

6. Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Quelquejay, op. cit., p. 224.

7. Boris Rumer, 'Central Asia's Gathering Storm', *Orbis*, 37/1 (Winter 1993).

8. See e.g. Martha Brill Olcott, 'Central Asia's Political Crisis', in Dale Eickelman (ed.), *Russia's Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis* (Indianapolis: Indian University Press, 1993), p. 50.

9. 'National excesses' was the general catchall phrase applied to a republic's or individual's promotion of their nation at the expense of proletarian internationalism.

10. The notion of an 'ideal-type' is not supposed to convey some form of value judgement, it is a method of clarification of the subject matter entailing the 'abstraction and combination of an indefinite number of elements which, although found in reality, are rarely or never discovered in this specific form', Anthony Giddens, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 141.

11. G. Duncan Mitchell, *A Dictionary of Sociology* (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1968), p. 30.

12. I. Deutsch and W. J. Foltz (ed.), *Nation-Building* (London: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 4.

13. Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge: CUP, 1981), p. 66.

14. Anthony Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, op. cit., pp. 171 and 175. Smith's definition of a nation is stated more clearly in a later section of the book where he breaks the definition down into seven features (p. 186). These are: (1) Cultural differentiae (i.e. the 'similarity–dissimilarity' pattern, members are alike in the respects in which they differ from non-members). (2) Territorial contiguity with free mobility throughout. (3) A relatively large scale (and population). (4) External political relations of conflict and alliance with similar groups. (5) Considerable group sentiment and loyalty. (6) Direct membership with equal citizenship rights. (7) Vertical economic integration around a common system of labour.

15. For more on this subject refer to Thomas Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives* (London: Pluto Press, 1993).

16. Andre Gunder Frank, 'The Centrality of Central Asia', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 24/2 (1992), p. 3.

17.   Richard Frye, *Bukhara: The Medieval Achievement* (Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Press, 1965), p. 112.

18.   Lawrence Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971), p. 76.

19.   For more on the rise and fall of the various empires of the region refer to C. E. Bosworth, *The Islamic Dynasties* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1967).

20.   Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 42–53. Refer also to the first chapter of Serge Zenkovsky's *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960). One author disagrees with the division of the Oghuz into 24 tribes and puts the number at 9 – refer to Mehmet Saray, *The Turkmens in the Age of Imperialism* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 1989), p. 14.

21.   Gavin Hambly (ed.), *Central Asia*, p. 72. Although Arabic was the language of administration and of much scientific writing it was during this period that Persian literature began its full development.

22.   Shah Ismail founded the Saffavid dynasty in 1502, which lasted until the death of Shah Abbas III in 1736 when Nadir Khan became the Shah of Iran. Nadir Shah invades Central Asia in 1740 and is assassinated in 1747.

23.   Lawrence Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia*, op. cit., pp. 40–43. For a general history of the waxing and waning of empires within the area refer to Shirin Akiner, *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1986).

24.   This interpretation is by Olaf Caroe, op. cit., but other authors do not make this connection – see R. Vaidyanath, *The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics: A study in soviet Nationalities Policy 1917–1936* (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1967), pp. 15–19. Other scholars are more circumspect about the connection between the Yenisei Kirghiz and the Tien Shan Kirghiz, for instance Lawrence Krader, op. cit.

25.   Edward Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century To The Present*, (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), p. 36. The 24 tribes were the Barak, Bayly, Durman, Imchi, Jat, Kengas, Kitay, Kiyat, Kungrat, Kurlaut, Kushchi, Mangyt, Min, Nayman, Qarluq, Tangut, Taymas, Tubay, Tuman, Ugrish-Nayman, Utarchi, Uyghur, Uyshun, and Yiyjan/Alman). Some of the later tribes were also part of the Kazakh confederation – e.g. Qirq, Jalayir, Qongrat, Alchin, Argun, Nayman, Kipchak.

26.   V. V. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia:* vol. 1, (Leichen [Netherlands]: E. J. Brill, 1962), p. 66.

27.   Refer to Shirin Akiner, *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union*, op. cit., p. 303.

28.   Ibid., p. 315.

29.   G. Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 209.

30.   More information on the epics of the region are to be found in Zev Katz, *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1975).

31.   Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia* (London: Bodley Head, 1966), p. 21.

32.   This information on the cultural epics of the region is to be found in Zev Katz, *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1975), passim.

33. Ali Shir wrote under the *nom de plume* of *'Navai'* (the melodious) when using Chagatay, while for his Arabic and Persian writings he used *'Fani'* (the transitory). G. Wheeler, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 23.

34. Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 211.

35. Zev Katz, op. cit.

36. Richard Pipes, 'Muslims of Soviet Central Asia: Trends and Prospects', *Middle East Journal*, 9 (Spring 1958), p. 159.

37. Serge Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 33.

38. Timur (Tamerlane), born in 1336, established himself in the declining Chagatai ruling house and established himself as de facto ruler by 1369–70. It was the Timurid dynasty which encouraged the development of Chagatai Turkish as a literary language. See Gavin Hambly (ed.), *Central Asia* (London: George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd., 1969), pp. 150–62.

39. Chagatai was a literary language written in Arabic characters which derived its name from one of Genghis Khan's sons.

40. Sergey Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism*, op. cit., p. 74.

41. See Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, op. cit., p. 37.

42. Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), Appendix.

43. Zev Katz, *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1975), p. 326.

44. Lawrence Krader, op. cit., p. 45.

45. Edward Allworth, 'The "Nationality" Idea in Czarist Central Asia', in Erich Goldhagen (ed.), *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), p. 234.

46. Some of the titles of these journals were *Qazaq gazeti* (1907) *Qazaqstan* (1911–13), *Qazaq* (1913–18), *Qazaq mungu* (1918), *Qazaq 'agli* (1919), and *Qazaq sozu* (1919). The most significant of these was *Qazaq*, which reached a circulation of 8,000 at one point. Edward Allworth, 'The "Nationality" Idea in Czarist Central Asia', op. cit., pp. 244–5.

47. For example: Bukhari-i Sharif (Bukhara, 1912); *Khursid* (Sun, 1906); *Ayinä* (Mirror, Samarkand 1913–15); *Asiya* (Asia, 1908), *Samarqand* (Samarkand, 1913–14); *Sad-i farghana* (Voice of Farghana, 1914–1915); *Sada-i Turkestan* (Voice of Turkistan, Tashkent 1914–1915); and *Ulugh Turkestan* (Great Turkistan, 1917–1918). Ibid., pp. 244–5.

48. e.g. the Hazarasi Mongols who over centuries became Iranised and then crossed over from N. Afghanistan to CA and became Turkified at the turn of century. Refer to Alexandre Bennigsen, *The Evolution of the Muslim Nationalities of the USSR* (Oxford: Central Asian Research Centre, 1961), p. 14.

49. Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, op. cit., p. 24.

50. Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire*, op. cit., p. 92.

51. For instance O. Olufsen, *The Emir of Bukhara and his Country* (London: Heinemann Publishers, 1911), p. 286.

52.   Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan* (London: John Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 8.

53.   For example, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone sums up the traditional hostility between the two groups by an Uzbek proverb – 'When a Tadzhik tells the truth he has a fit of colic'. See *Russia & Nationalism in Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 9. Zev Katz points out that the mountain Tadzhiks harboured a degree of antagonism against Uzbek overlords in the principalities of western Bukhara in Zev Katz, *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1975), p. 326.

54.   Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 22.

55.   Olaf Caroe, 'The Heritage of Chagatai: Language in Russian Central Asia', *Royal Central Asian Society Journal*, 40 (1953), p. 88.

56.   Dr. Rustem Kadyrzhanov, 'Evolution of the Ruling Elite of Kazakhstan', *Labyrinth*, 4/2, p. 30.

57.   Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Publishing, 1987), p. 11.

58.   Bennigsen and Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire*, op. cit.; for a slightly alternative version of the structure of Kazakh society refer to Dr. Rustem Kadyrzhanov (Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Almaty), op. cit.

59.   Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, op. cit., pp. 66–75.

60.   Bennigsen and Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire*, op. cit.; refer to section on the Kirghiz.

61.   Dr. Anvar Mokeev, 'Stages of Kirghiz Ethnic History', *Kirghizstan Chronicle*, 2 (January 11 1994), p. 2.

62.   William Irons, *The Yomut Turkmen: A Study of Social Organization Among a Central Asian Turkic-Speaking Population* (Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1975), p. 5.

63.   Ibid., p. 66.

64.   F. Skrine and E. Ross, *The Heart of Asia* (London: Methuen, 1899), p. 266.

65.   Nikolay Murav'yov, *Journey to Khiva through the Turkoman Country* (London: Oguz Press, 1977), p. 102 and p. 21. First published in Russia in 1822.

66.   For more on this see the last four chapters of Mehmet Saray's *The Turkmens in the Age of Imperialism* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 1989).

67.   Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, op. cit., p. 89.

68.   Valentin Bushkov, 'The population of Northern Tajikistan between 1870 and 1990', in Vitaly Naumkin, *State, Religion and Society in Central Asia: A Post-Soviet Critique* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993), p. 227.

69.   Ludmilla Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, *Islam in Central Asia* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1994), p. 97.

70.   Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, op. cit., p. 89.

71.   Refer to R. Vaidyanath, *The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics*, op. cit., p. 11; Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, op. cit., section on Uzbeks.

72.   Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, op. cit., p. 58.

73.   Alexandre Bennigsen, *The Evolution of the Muslim Nationalities of the USSR* (Oxford: Central Asian Research Centre, 1961), pp. 30–34.

74.   For more on this refer to 'The Decline of the Uzbek Khanate' in Gavin Hambly (ed.), *Central Asia* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982).

75. Also known as the 'Turkistan Wilayati'. See Edward Allworth, 'The "Nationality" Idea in Czarist Central Asia in Erich Goldhagen, *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union* (London: Praeger, 1968), p. 233.

76. For more on this see Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967).

77. Edward Allworth, 'The "Nationality" Idea in Czarist Central Asia', op. cit., p. 230.

78. Based on the 1920 census the city-states were constituted as follows: Bukhara (Uzbeks 50.7%, Kazakhs 1.6%, Tadzhiks 31.6%, Turkmens 10.3%, Kirghiz 0.5%); Khiva (Uzbeks 79%, Kazakhs 4.3%, Turkmens 14.6%); the Turkestan administrative region (Uzbeks 41.4%, Kazakhs 19.4%, Kirghiz 10.7%, Tadzhiks, 7.7%, Turkmens 4.7%). Statistics from R. Vaidyanath, op. cit., p. 157.

79. In Bukhara this process of state-building was most associated with Amir Nasrullah Bahadur Khan who took the throne in 1840 until 1860 and employed Turkmen to drive out the Uzbek army who traditionally served the Amir and then set up a regular army. Refer to Edward Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks*, op. cit., p. 111; Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?* (London: Zed Books,1994), p. 191; and Mary Holdsworth, *Turkestan in the Nineteenth Century: A Brief History of the Khanates of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva* (Oxford: Central Asian Research Centre, 1959), p. 2.

80. Timur Kocaoglu, 'The Existence of a Bukharan Nationality in the Recent Past' in Edward Allworth (ed.), *The Nationality Question in Central Asia* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1973).

81. See, for example, Mohiaddin Mesbahi, *Central Asia & the Caucasus after the Soviet Union* (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1994).

82. Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire*, op. cit., p. 6.

83. Ram Rahul, *Politics of Central Asia* (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1973), p. 120.

84. This is according to Bennigsen and Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire*, p. 5.

85. A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Mystics & Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 94.

86. The appellation Sunni is derived from Sunna – 'the Beaten Path' – and refers to the supporters of Abu Bakr, i.e. supporters of the original caliphate succession, and revere the Prophet and the four 'Rightly Guided' caliphs; whereas the appellation Shi'a is derived from Shi'at Ali, the partisans of Ali who only follow the Prophet and Ali (the fourth caliph). Within the Shi'a denomination there is a sub-group of 'Twelver' Shi'as that believe that there have been only 12 spiritual descendants of Ali including a Twelfth hidden Imam. See Tony Spybey, *Social Change, Development & Dependency* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 214.

87. There are four Sunni Muslims schools of Jurisprudence (*mazhab*), and one Shi'ite in the Soviet Union: the Hanafi School (Predominant Sunni creed); Shafe'i School; Maliki School; and Hanbali school; Ja'farite rite of Shi'ism

('The Twelvers' – those who recognise the 12 revealed Imams – the same rite as Iran).

88. Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Mystics & Commissars*, op. cit., pp. 32–5.
89. A. Bennigsen and C. Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, op. cit., p. 39.
90. As a result there were 25 Muslim deputies in the first Duma, 35 in the second, 10 in the third and 7 in the fourth Duma. See Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, op. cit., p. 44.
91. Edward Allworth, 'The "Nationality" Idea in Czarist Central Asia', op. cit., p. 239.
92. Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx to Mohammed*, op. cit., introductory chapter.
93. Sergey Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), ch. 10.
94. Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Mohammed: The Changing Face of Central Asia* (London: Harper Collins, 1994), Introductory Chapter.
95. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, pp. 77–80.
96. 'Turkic Federalist Party Program' in H. B. Paksoy (ed.), *Central Asia Reader: The Rediscovery of History* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 122.
97. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, op. cit., pp. 46, 53 and 71; also refer to Edward Allworth, 'The "Nationality" Idea in Czarist Central Asia', op. cit.
98. The All-Russian Muslim movement was led by Muslim liberals of the Duma and it endeavoured to unite the 16 million Muslims in Russia whilst also secularising and democratising Muslim life in Russia.
99. G. Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 65.
100. My emphasis, Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, p. 136.
101. Dilip Hiro, op. cit., p. 3.
102. Äkmäl Ikramov, First Secretary of the CP of Uzbekistan in 1937. In William Fierman, *Langauge Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience* (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), p. 69.
103. Edward Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks*, op. cit., p.191.
104. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, op. cit., p. 24.
105. Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 41.
106. Alexandre Bennigsen, *The Evolution of the Muslim Nationalities of the USSR*, op. cit., p. 13.
107. This account of the Tadzhiks is given in O. Olufsen's *The Emir of Bokhara and his Country*, op. cit., p. 285, for the other ethnic groups refer to the specialist material on each ethnic groups given throughout this chapter.
108. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, op. cit., p. 24.
109. Serge Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 215; Elizabeth Bacon, 'Soviet Policy in Turkestan', *Middle East Journal*, 1 (October 1947), p. 398; and 'The

Revolution and Civil War in the Kazakh Steppe', Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, op. cit.

110. In Soviet anthropology an ethnic group (*etnicheskaya gruppa*) was defined as 'a tribal union possessing certain cultural or ethnic peculiarities and occasionally a distinct dialect'. Alexandre Bennigsen, *The Evolution of the Muslim Nationalities of the USSR*, op. cit., p. 2.

4 THE REDRAWING OF BOUNDARIES: SOVIET 'OFFICIAL NATIONALISM'

1. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 2.
2. Quoted in Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, op. cit., p. 38.
3. Otto Bauer, quoted in Ibid., p. 26.
4. V. I. Lenin, 'The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination', Jan.–Feb. 1916 in *Lenin on the National and Colonial Questions* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1975), pp. 5–6.
5. Quoted in Graham Smith, *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union* (London: Longman, 1990), p. 4.
6. See for example Walker Connor, *Marxism–Leninism and the Nation-State*, op. cit., p. 42.
7. The name 'federal compromise' originating from the compromise between Stalin's plan for 'autonomisation' and the loose political arrangement whereby states would remain sovereign proposed by Rakovsky and the Georgian Bolsheviks, Mdivani and Makhardze.
8. All the constitutions of the Soviet Union (1924, 1936 and 1977) describe the state as a federation comprised of sovereign union republics with the right to secede.
9. For more on this see Valery A. Tishkov. 'The Soviet empire before and after perestroika', *Theory and Society*, 20/5 (October 1991).
10. Edward Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks*, op. cit., p. 181.
11. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan became soviet socialist republics on 27 October 1924.
12. The Kazakh (i.e. Kirghiz) ASSR was created on 26 August 1920 and the Kara-Kirghiz AO on 14 October 1924.
13. R. Vaidyanath. *The Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republics*, op. cit., p. 203.
14. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 2nd edition (London: Verso, 1991). p. 184.
15. Bogoutdinov, *Formirovanie i Razvitie*, Sept. 8, 1954, p. 2. quoted in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia*, p. 77.
16. Äkmäl Ikramov, First Secretary of the CP of Uzbekistan in 1937. In William Fierman, *Langauge Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience* (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), p. 69.
17. The Pamirians were defined as Tadzhiks under the 1959 census. Refer to Alexander Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Union*, op. cit., p. 123.

18. Viktor Kozlov, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* (London: Hutchinson, 1988), p. 170.
19. Shirin Akiner, *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union* (London: KPI, 1986), p. 18.
20. Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, op. cit., p. 133.
21. See F. J. M. Feldbrugge, *The Constitutions of the USSR and the Union Republics: Analysis, Texts, Reports* (Aalphen aan den Rijn – Holland: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1979), for an analysis of the constitutions of the republics of the Soviet Union.
22. Michael Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1982), p. 144.
23. Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 104.
24. Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Union*, op. cit.; Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, op. cit.; S. Akiner, *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union*, op. cit.
25. Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Mohammad*, op. cit., p. 22.
26. Eden Naby, 'The Emerging Central Asia' in Mohiaddin Mesbahi (ed.), *Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union* (Florida: Florida University Press, 1994), p. 34; and Alexandre Bennigsen, *The Evolution of the Muslim Nationalities of the USSR*, op. cit., p. 29.
27. William Fierman, *Language Planning & National Development: The Uzbek Experience*, op. cit., p. 74.
28. Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire*, op. cit., p. 59; and Edward Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), p. 235.
29. Unfortunately, I have not come across any details of Soviet language policy in Kirghizstan but it may be possible to speculate that certain difficulties probably arose because of the separation and differences between the north and south of the country.
30. This objective was actually stated by the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Äkmäl Ikramov. See William Fierman, *Language Planning ...*, op. cit., p. 63.
31. M. Nazif Shahrani, 'Muslim Central Asia: Soviet Development Legacies and Future Challenges' Mohiaddin Mesbahi (ed.), *Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union* (Florida: Florida University Press, 1994), p. 64.
32. William Fierman, *Language Planning ...*, op. cit., p. 63.
33. Ibid., p. 136.
34. Quoted in Viktor Kozlov, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* (London: Hutchinson, 1988) p. 161.
35. Article 45 of the 1977 constitution quoted in Robert Sharlet, *The New Soviet Constitution of 1977: Analysis and Text* (Ohio: King's Court Communications Inc., 1978), p. 91. Similarly, the 1936 constitution ensures the right to education 'by instruction in *schools being conducted in the native language*', *Article 121, quoted in Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* (Moscow: Co-operative Publishing Society of the Workers in the U.S.S.R., 1937), p. 34.
36. For more information on this see S. Akiner, *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union*, op. cit.

37. The literacy rate of greater than 99% after 1970 is given in S. Akiner, *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union*, op. cit.

38. Refer to Michael Ryan, *Contemporary Soviet Society: a statistical handbook* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990).

39. Edward Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks*, op. cit., p. 219.

40. William Fierman, 'Language Law in Uzbekistan', in Yaacov Ro'i (ed.), *Muslim Frontiers*, op. cit., p. 226.

41. Isabelle Kreindler, 'Soviet Language Planning', in Yaacov Ro'i (ed.), *Muslim Frontiers*, op. cit., pp. 191, 194, 195 and 196.

42. Edward Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks*, op. cit., p. 265.

43. Michael Ryan, op. cit.

44. Kazakhstan's high rate is due to its ethnic composition which is only 39.7% Kazakh and 37.8% Russian; for more details see Graham Smith, *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union* (London: Longman, 1990).

45. This division is put forward by Anthony Smith in *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 58–68. Smith's division is into 'communal' and 'dynastic' mythomoteurs, but the term 'state' mythomoteur is more appropriate to this study.

46. Ludmila Chvyr, 'Central Asia's Tajiks', in Vitaly Naumkin, *State, Religion and Society in Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 256.

47. For example, Robert Conquest, *Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice*, op. cit.; Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, op. cit.; Elizabeth Bacon, *Central Asians under Russian Rule* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966).

48. Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 230–5.

49. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in central Asia*, op. cit., p. 237.

50. Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 80, also Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet union*, op. cit., pp. 218–22.

51. See Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, pp. 212–18.

52. Edward Allworth, *Uzbek Literary Politics* (London: Mouton & Co., 1964), p. 100. Variants of Alpamysh are recorded in Kazakh, Karalkalpak, Bashkir, Oirot and Arabic traditions. Version of Kör Oghlu are apparent in Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan.

53. Edward Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks*, op. cit., p. 235.

54. Ibid., p. 239.

55. Gafurov, *Istoriia Tadzhikskogo naroda v kratkom izlozhenii*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1955). Quoted in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia*, p. 235.

56. Graham Fuller, *Central Asia: The New Geopolitics* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992).

57. The height of indelicacy was reached in 1926 when the capital of Kirghizstan was renamed Frunze after the head of the Turkestan Red Army which had enforced Soviet control over the Central Asian region during the Civil War.

58. V. I. Lenin, *Preliminary Draft of Theses on the National & Colonial Questions* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1975). Produced for the Second

Congress of the Communist International in 1920 and was published in June 1920. Lenin recommended that in more 'backward' states and nations it is particularly important to bear in mind 'the need for struggle against the clergy and other influential reactionary and medieval elements in backward countries' and 'the need to combat Pan-Islamism and similar trends which strive to combine the liberation movement against European and American imperialism with an attempt to strengthen the positions of the khans, land-lords, mullahs, etc.'

59. See Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire*, op. cit., p. 11.

60. The other two pillars are *Salat* (private prayer that should be pronounced five times a day) and *Shahada* (testimony to the unity of God and messen-gership of Muhammed).

61. Eden Naby, 'The Emerging Central Asia: Ethnic and Religious Factions' in Mohiaddin Mesbahi (ed.), *Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union* (Florida: Florida University Press, 1994), p. 43.

62. Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Mohammad*, op. cit., p. 28.

63. Alexandre Bennigsen, *et al.*, *Soviet Strategy & Islam*, op. cit., p. 22.

64. Anti-religious propaganda was mainly organised through the Union of Godless Zealots (1925–1941) and the Association for the spread of Political and Scientific Knowledge (founded after the war): for details on these activ-ities see Benningsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, op. cit., p. 174.

65. The Spiritual School of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (Sunni of the Hanafi rite), the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of European Russia and Siberia (Sunni of the Hanafi rite), of the Northern Caucasus and Daghestan (Sunni of the Shafe'i rite), of the Transcaucasian Muslims (Shi'ia of Ha'fari rite).

66. In 1945 Syrian Muslims formed the first Muslim delegation which arrived in the Soviet Union and visited Tashkent. In 1946 several Shi'ia dignitaries from Azerbaijan visited the holy places of Qum and Mashhad in Iran. In 1947 the Soviet government requested permission for Soviet Muslims to study in Egypt at the Islamic university Al-Azhar. Bennigsen and Wimbush *et al.*, *Soviet Strategy and Islam* (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 27.

67. The Muslim presence was initially at Soviet or World peace conferences with the Soviet muftis posturing as defenders of peace (for example in 1949 World Peace Movement and 1951 at Soviet Peace conference). See Bennigsen *et al.*, *Soviet Strategy and Islam*, p. 29.

68. June 1954 Muslim Conference of Ufa, March 1956 Muslim Congress in Baku and in 1958 the first Islamic religious delegation was admitted to the USSR (from Syria). See Bennigsen *et al.*, *Soviet Strategy and Islam*, p. 33. The attack on Islam was resumed in 1953; see A. Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, op. cit., p. 48.

69. G. Kerimaov, 'Islamic anti-communism in its contemporary stage (Religiia v planakh anti-komummnizma)' (Moscow, 1976), p. 170, quoted in Bennigsen *Soviet Strategy and Islam*, p. 36. This analysis followed the for-mula that certain movements were 'objectively progressive' despite their 'subjectively reactionary' nature. These arguments originate from the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920 and the dispute between M. N. Roy and Lenin. See *Lenin on the National and Colonial Questions* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1975).

70. Bennigsen and Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire*, op. cit., p. 16 and also Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, p. 174. All figures given are estimates and vary widely – see the above two books for differing estimates.

71. Diloram Ibrahim, *The Islamization of Central Asia: A Case Study of Uzbekistan* (Leicester: Joeseph Ball Ltd., 1993), p. 24.

72. Eden Naby, 'The Emerging Central Asia: Ethnic and Religious Factions' in Mohiaddin Mesbahi (ed.), *Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union* (Florida: Florida University Press, 1994), p. 50.

73. Alexei Malashenko, 'Islam versus Communism' in Dane Eickelman, op. cit., p. 65.

74. Dilip Hiro, op. cit., p. 162.

75. The Naqshbandi was founded in the 14th century in Bukhara whilst the Qadiri was founded in Baghdad in the 12th century.

76. Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, op. cit., p. 66. – 'Many of the leaders of the 'Basmachi movement' (derived from the Uzbek *basmach* – bandit) were Sufi adepts and several of the more important ones, such as, Khal Hohja, Madamin Beg and Junaid Khan, were Naqshbandi sheikhs.'

77. Interview with Dr. Anara Tabyshalieva of Kirghizstan.

78. Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic Threat* ..., p. 74.

79. For more on the examples of the importance of saints in national and religious life see Maria Eva Subtelny, 'The Cult of Holy Places: Religious Practices Among Soviet Muslims', *The Middle East Journal*, 43/4 (Autumn 1989).

80. Bennigsen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat* ..., op. cit., p. 143.

81. Marat Akchurin, 'Wake in the Cool of Dawn', *The Guardian*, London, 6 August, 1992, p. 32.

82. Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, op. cit., p. 133.

83. For more on the comparisons of developed and developing countries refer to Gerald Breese (ed.), *The City in Newly Developing Countries* (London: Prentice Hall, 1972).

84. Boris Rumer, *Soviet Central Asia: A tragic experiment* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 184.

85. Ibid., refer also to James Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 73–4.

86. Alec Nove and J. Newth, *The Soviet Middle East* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1967), p. 45; refer also to G. Wheeler, 'Soviet Central Asia', *The Muslim World*, 4 (October, 1966), pp. 240–1. Quoted in R. Tuzmuhamedov, *How the National Question was solved in Soviet Central Asia* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), p. 21.

87. Michael Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1982), p. 117.

88. The most recent information on the area has proven unsuccessful in deciding whether the region was economically exploited or not and as with much of Social Science it depends more upon your political stance. For recent debates refer to Richard Kaufman and John Harat, op. cit.

89. The intention to site industry as near as possible to the location of raw materials was set out at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921 – Alec Nove and J. Newth, op. cit.

90. Richard Kaufman and John Hardt, *The Former Soviet Union in Transition* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 1139.

91. By 1987 the proportion of Kazakhs working in industry was extremely low (21%). Refer to B. Pockney, *Soviet Statistics since 1950* (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1991), p. 27.

92. Michael Ryan, *Contemporary Soviet Society*, op. cit., section on population of administrative divisions.

93. Robert Lewis *et al.*, *Nationality and Population Change in Russia and the USSR*, op. cit., p. 147.

94. These explanations are given respectively by Ajay Patnaik, 'Ethnicity, culture and migration in Central Asia', *Labyrinth*, 1/3; Robert Lewis, *Nationality and Population Change in Russia and the USSR*, op. cit.; Nancy Lubin, *Labour and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia* (London: Macmillan, 1984).

95. Refer to Robert Lewis *et al.*, *Nationality and Population Change ...*, op. cit., p. 151. Unfortunately the detailed ethnic composition of the regions has not been available since 1970 but an examination of the 1979 and 1989 rates of urbanisation reveal that there has been no substantial change in the ratio of urban/rural population percentages (Table A.2).

96. Neil Melvin, *Ethnic Separatism and the Disintegration of the Kazakhstani State: the Role of the Russian Community* (London: RIIA Chatham House, 1994), p. 35.

97. Interviews with Zulfia Murat and Dr. Anara Tabyshalieva.

98. Barnett Rubin, 'The Fragmentation of Tajikistan', *Survival*, 35/4 (Winter 1993–4), p. 76.

99. Valentin Bushkov, 'The population of Northern Tajikistan between 1870 and 1990', in Vitaly Naumkin, *State, Religion and Society in Central Asia*, op. cit.; and Donald Carlisle, 'Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks', *Problems of Communism*, 40 (Sept.–Oct. 1991).

100. Bennigsen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat ...*, p. 136.

101. See later references in the next chapter.

102. Boris Rumer, op. cit., p. 148.

103. Refer to Helene Carrere d'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire* (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979); Michael Rywkin, 'Power and Ethnicity: Regional and District Party Staffing in Uzbekistan' and 'Power and ethnicity: Party Staffing in Uzbekistan', *Central Asian Survey*, 4/1 (1985).

104. Donald Carlisle, 'Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks', *Problems of Communism*, 40 (Sept.–Oct. 1991).

105. For example refer to Aziz Niyazi, 'Tajikistan' in Mohiaddin Mesbahi (ed.), *Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union* (Florida: Florida University Press, 1994) who puts the date of these élite formations after the Stalinist period; also Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?* (London: Zed Books, 1994).

106. For example my interviews with Yevgeny Zhovtis, Zulfia Murat, Dr. Anara Tabyshalieva and Murat Lamaulin, which are referred to later. There were others that declined to comment on this aspect of Central Asian society.

107. Ronald Suny, 'The Soviet South: Nationalism and the outside world' in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), *The Rise of Nations in the Soviet Union* (New York: Council on Foreign Relation, 1991).

108. Edward Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks*, op. cit., p. 208.

109. Sororate is the custom of a widower marrying the sister of his deceased wife. Levirate is the custom of a widow marrying the brother of her deceased husband. Kaytarma is the groom being obliged to spend time in the bride's household to pay the price for her hand. Refer to Alexander Bennigsen, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire*, op. cit.; and Azade-Ayse Rorlich, 'Islam and Atheism: Dynamic Tension in Soviet Central Asia' in William Fierman, *Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991).

110. Martha Brill Olcott's introduction to Sergei Poliakov, *Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), p. xvi.

111. Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, *Islam in Central Asia* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1994), p. 101.

5   CONTEMPORARY CENTRAL ASIA

1. Martha Brill Olcott, 'The Myth of "Tsentral'naia Aziia"', *Orbis*, 38/4 (Fall 1994).

2. Bess Brown, 'Investigation of "Blank spots" in Kazakh History Moves Forward', *Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR*, 1/33 (August 18, 1989); James Critchlow, 'Uzbek Language Bill Sets Tongues Loose', *Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR*, 1/38 (22 Sept. 1989).

3. Jiger Janabel, 'When National Ambition Conflicts With Reality: studies on Kazakhstan's ethnic relations', *Central Asian Survey*, 15/1 (1996), p. 7.

4. Refer to Dr. Rustem Kadyrzhanov, 'Evolution of the Ruling Elite of Kazakhstan', *Labyrinth*, 4/2 (1997), p. 34: 'Museum of the Timurids in Tashkent', *Labyrinth*, 3/2 (1996), p. 45.

5. Martin Klatt, 'Russians in the "Near Abroad"', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3/32 (19 August 1994), p. 41. Refer also to 'Few Russians left in Tadzhikistan', *Labyrinth*, 1/3 (Summer 1994), p. 11; Emil Shukurov and Anara Tabyshalieva, 'Ways to Ethnic Peace', *Kirghizstan Chronicle*, 41 (October 11, 1994), p. 3.

6. Annette Bohr, 'Violence Erupts in Uzbekistan', *Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR*, 1 (16 June 1989), 'New Information on May Riots in Ashkhabad and Nebit-Dag', *Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR*, 1/29 (July 1989).

7. Ann Sheehy, 'Social and Economic Background to Recent Events in Ferghana Valley', *Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR*, 1/27 (7 July 1989).

8. From a general review of the Central Asian press it appears that the funding and labour have been supplied by local populations.

9. For instance, Akaev visited certain holy sites but did not actually make the pilgrimage. Refer to Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's New States* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 32.

10. 'Introduction' in Yaacov Ro'i (ed.), *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies* (London, Frank Cass, 1995), p. 2.

11. Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Issues in Contemporary South and Central Asian Politics', *Asian Survey*, 32/10 (October 1992), p. 901.

12. The most overt embracement of the Turkish model was by President Akaev of Kirghizstan who stated that his country 'chooses the Turkish path of

development', Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, *Islam in Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 145.

13.   The cooptation of the clergy and their refusal to recognise Islamic parties is demonstrated most clearly in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. ibid., chapter on 'Islam and Politics'.

14.   Ibid., p. 137.

15.   Annette Bohr, 'Soviet Muslims Demonstrate in Tashkent', *Report on the USSR*, 8 (24 February 1989).

16.   Conversation with students outside the Mir-i-Arab medresseh in Bukhara which stayed open during the Soviet period, numbers were said to have increased threefold from a maximum of one hundred. Similar interest was apparent at the Tashkent Islamic Institute.

17.   Martha Brill Olcott, 'Central Asia's Political Crisis' in Dane Eickelman, *Russia's Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press), p. 58.

18.   Survey taken in June 1993, Nancy Lubin, 'Islam and Ethnic Identity in Central Asia: A View from Below', Yaacov Ro'i (ed.), *Muslim Eurasia ...*, op. cit.

19.   Yaacov Ro'i, 'The Islamic Influence on Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia', *Problems of Communism*, 39/4 (Jul./Aug. 1990), p. 53.

20.   Maria Subtelny, 'The Cult of Holy Places', op. cit.

21.   Interview with Dr. Anara Tabyshalieva, Chairperson of the Kirghiz Peace Centre. Refer also to her article 'From Undisputed Society to ... Preventing disputes', *Kirghizstan Chronicle*, 30 (26 June 1994).

22.   Interview with Murat Lamaulin of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies. Refer also to Ian Bremmer, 'Nazarbaev and the north: state building and ethnic relations in Kazakhstan', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 17/4 (October 1994), p. 626.

23.   Donald Carlisle, 'Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks', op. cit., p. 43.

24.   Martha Brill Olcott, 'The Myth of "Tsentralnaia Aziia"', op. cit., *passim*.

25.   Eden Naby, 'Tajiks Reemphasise Iranian Heritage as Ethnic Pressures Mount in Central Asia', *Report on the USSR* (16 Feb. 1990).

26.   Muriel Atkin, 'Religious, National, and Other Identities in Central Asia', Jo-Ann Gross (ed.), *Muslims in Central Asia: Expression of Identity and Change* (London: Duke University Press, 1992), p. 51.

27.   Aziz Niyazi, 'The year of tumult', Vitaly Naumkin (ed.), *State, Religion and Society in Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 278.

28.   Dilip Hiro, op. cit., p. 120.

29.   Lumila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, op. cit., p. 137.

30.   'Topchubek Turgunaliev in Jail Again', *Central Asia Monitor*, 2 (1997).

31.   Interview with Omurbek Tekebayev, First Deputy Chairperson of *Ata Meken*, Kirghizstan.

32.   Bess Brown and John Tedstrom, 'Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan: Central Asia's Leaders', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 1/17 (24 April 1992).

33.   Abidin Bozdag, 'Crisis and Democracy in Kirghizia', *Aussenpolitik*, 43/3 (1992).

34.   That is, these parties have been set up to create the illusion of a democratic state. The term 'potemkin' refers to the name given to model villages which were on display to foreign visitors to the Soviet Union. Cassandra Cavanagh, 'Crackdown on the Opposition in Uzbekistan', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 1/31 (31 July 1992).

35. Martha Brill Olcott, 'Central Asia's Post-Empire Politics', *Orbis* (Spring 1992).
36. Yalcin Tokgozoglu, 'Uzbek Government Continues to Stifle Dissent' *RFE/RL Research Report*, 2/29 (1 Oct. 1993).
37. Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, op. cit., p. 134.
38. Dilip Hiro, op. cit., p. 170.
39. Aziz Niyazi, 'Tadzhikistan', in Mohiaddin Mesbahi, op. cit., p. 180.
40. Barnett Rubin, 'The Fragmentation of Tajikistan', *Survival*, 35/4 (Winter 1993–4).
41. Bess Brown, 'Central Asia Emerges on the World Stage', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3 January 1992.
42. Christopher Panico, 'Turkmenistan Unaffected by Winds of Change', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 2/4 (22 January 1993).
43. Due to the current emigration of Russians from Kazakhstan it is difficult to give exact figures. Recent research has indicated that the Russian population has been reduced to 37%. See 'Slavs are Asked not to Leave Kazakhstan', *Central Asian Forum*, 15 (1994), p. 8.
44. According to the 1989 census, Kazakhs are a minority in the oblasts of Kustanay, Pavlodar, East Kazakhstan, Karaganda, Dzhezkazgan, Tselinograd, Kokchetav, Alma Ata and its oblast and North Kazakhstan. Martha Brill Olcott, 'Perestroika in Kazakhstan', *Problems of Communism*, 39/4 (Jul./Aug. 1990).
45. Bess Brown, 'Central Asia: The First Year of Unexpected Statehood', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 20/1 (1 Jan. 1993).
46. Martha Brill Olcott, 'Perestroika in Kazakhstan', *Problems of Communism*, op. cit.
47. 'Draft Constitution of Kazakhstan', *Summary of World Broadcasts: Former USSR*, SU/2360, 20 July 1995.
48. Michael Ustugov, 'Will Kazakhstan be a Federated State?', *Central Asian Forum*, 15 (1994).
49. Yaacov Ro'i, 'Central Asian Riots and Disturbances, 1989–1990: Causes and context', *Central Asian Survey*, 10/3 (1991).
50. Ian Bremmer, 'Nazarbaev and the north ...', op. cit.
51. Interview with Dr. Meruert Abuseyitova, Deputy Director of the National Academy of Sciences Centre of Oriental Studies, Kazakhstan.
52. Dr. Rustem Kadyrzhanov, 'Evolution of the Ruling Elite of Kazakhstan', *Labyrinth*, 4/2 p. 36.
53. Interview with Evgeny Zhovtis, Executive Director of the Kazakhstan-American Bureau on Human Rights and Rule of Law.
54. Nursultan Nazarbayev, 'Ideological Consolidation of the Society as an Essential Prerequisite to Kazakhstan's Progress', *Kazakhstan Weekly*, 50 (15 Dec. 1993), p. 6.
55. Ibid., p. 6.
56. Teulegen Askarov, 'Kazakh Groups Might Pose Opposition to Unitary Kazakhstan', *Central Asian Forum*, 19 (1994), pp. 10–12.
57. Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's New States*, op. cit., p. 80.
58. 'Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev's solution to the zhuz question: A new capital', *Labyrinth: Central Asia Quarterly*, 1/4 (Autumn 1994), p. 3.
59. Refer to Ian Bremmer and Cory Welt, 'The trouble with democracy in Kazakhstan', *Central Asian Survey*, 15/2 (1996), p. 182.

60. Ian Bremmer, 'Nazarbaev and the North', op. cit., p. 621.
61. Anatoly Khazanov, 'The Ethnic Problems of Contemporary Kazakhstan', *Central Asian Survey*, 14/2 (1995), p. 256. Refer also to Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's New States*, op. cit., p. 63.
62. Article 5 of the constitution, quoted in Ian Bremmer and Cory Welt, op. cit., p. 181.
63. 'Nazarbayev Protects Rights of Linguistic Minorities', *Labyrinth*, 4/2 (Summer 1997), p. 4.
64. Interview with Evgeny Zhovtis, Executive Director of the Kazakhstan-American Bureau on Human Rights and Rule of Law. The systematic rooting out of Russians in sought after jobs in the south of the republic was very much evident in general conversations I had with people in Almaty.
65. Yuri Kobishanov, 'Region of Earthquakes at the Centre of the World: Ethnic Problems of the New Independent States of Central Asia', *Nezavismaya Gazeta*, 30 August 1994, p. 5.
66. Interview with Zulfia Marat, Kirghiz-American Bureau on Human Rights and Rule of Law. These facts were backed up in several other general conversations.
67. Interview with Zulfia Marat from the Kirghiz-American Bureau on Human Rights, also see Dilip Hiro, 'Beyond the fringe', *New Statesman & Society*, 6/234 (8 January 1993), p. 19. The Bugu tribe, based in the Issyk-Kul region (as is the Sarybagysh), has also played a significant political role. The Salto were mainly represented by B. Mambetov Chairman of the Council of Ministers (161–68) and D. Asankulov KGB chief (1967–91). In 1981 Usubaliyev succeeded in Making T. Koshoyev and A. Duishayev president and prime minister (both Sarybagysh from the village of Kishi-Kemin) respectively. See Alexander Filonyk, 'Kyrgyzstan' in *Central Asia and the Caucasus ...*, Mohiaddin Mesbahi (ed.), p. 157.
68. For examples of earlier campaigns along this line see Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 116.
69. Boris Mainaev, *Central Asian Forum*, 2 (7 December 1993).
70. 'Tribalism through Officer's Eyes', *Kirghizstan Chronicle*, 22 (31 May 1994), p. 3.
71. 'Tribalism – is it what we need?', *Kirghiz Chronicle*, 3 (18 January 1994), p. 2.
72. Interview with Omurbek Tekebayev, chairperson of the *Ata-Meken* party, whose support comes from the south of the country.
73. So described by the Russian newspaper *'Moskovskiye Novosti'*, quoted in 'Notorious' Osh leader loses current job, *Summary of World Broadcasts: Former USSR*, SU/2221 G/6, 7 Feb. 1995.
74. Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's New States*, op. cit., p. 106.
75. Interview with Zulfia Murat, op. cit.
76. ' "Notorious" Osh leader loses current job', op. cit.
77. Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's New States*, op. cit., p. 106.
78. Boris Mainayev, 'Are We Able to Build the Trans-Kirghiz Railway', *Kirghizstan Chronicle*, 2 (11 January 1994), p. 2.
79. According to a UN appraisal wages are 4 times higher in Russia than in Kirghizstan: 'Tribalism – is it what we need', *Kirghizstan Chronicle*, 3 (18 January 1994), p. 2.
80. John Anderson, 'Constitutional development in Central Asia', *Central Asian Survey*, 16/3 (1997).

81. Graham E. Fuller, *Central Asia: The New Geopolitics* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992), p. 28.
82. Martha Bill Olcott, 'Central Asia On Its Own', *Journal of Democracy*, 4/1 (January 1993).
83. For more on this see N. G. Borozna, 'Some Features of the Traditional Wedding Ceremony of the Uzbek-Durmen of the Southern Raions of Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan' in Tamara Dragadze (ed.), *Kinship and Marriage in the Soviet Union: Field Studies* (London: RKP, 1984).
84. Edward Allworth provided a list of some of these village names in his book *The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present* (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), p. 260. Also refer to Geoffrey Wheeler who states that 'The Uzbeks of northern Khorezm still call themselves Mangyts, Kungrats and Kypchaks, and some Uzbek groups in South Tadzhikistan have preserved such tribal names as Turk, Karluk, Barlas, and Lokay' – Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 11.
85. Demian Vaisman, 'Regionalism in Uzbekistan', Yaacov Ro'i, *Muslim Eurasia*, op. cit.
86. Deimian Vaisman, 'Regionalism in Uzbekistan', op. cit., p. 113.
87. James Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991), chapter on the 'Post-Brezhnev Crackdown'.
88. Demian Vaisman, 'Regionalism in Uzbekistan', op. cit.
89. Peter Clement, 'Prospects for Political Pluralism in Central Asia', in Carol Saivetz, Anthony Jones, *In Search of Pluralism: Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), p. 104.
90. Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's New States*, op. cit., p. 86.
91. Cassandra Cavanagh provides this useful insight in 'Uzbekistan Re-examines the Cotton Affair', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 1/37 (18 Sep. 1992). Corruption was generally blamed on the persistence of 'localism', which was seen as unfair given the high level involvement of certain Muscovite élites. For a record of Soviet denunciations refer to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party in *Current Soviet Policies IX: The Documentary Record of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party* (Columbus: The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1986).
92. Martha Brill Olcott, 'Islam and Fundamentalism in Central Asia' in Yaacov Ro'i (ed.), *Muslim Eurasia*, op. cit., pp. 25 and 36.
93. Alexei Malashenko, 'Islam & Politics in the Southern Zone of the Former USSR' in *Contributions in Political Science*, 339, Vitaly Naumkin, op. cit., p. 121.
94. Cassandra Cavanagh, 'Crackdown on the Opposition in Uzbekistan', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 1/31 (31 July 1992).
95. James Critchlow, 'Uzbekistan: Underlying Instabilities', *RFE/RL Research Report* (7 Feb. 1992).
96. Islam Karimov, *Address by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan at the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly* (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1993), p. 16.
97. Demian Vaisman, 'Regionalism in Uzbekistan', op. cit.
98. 'Museum of the Timurids', *Labyrinth*, 3/2 (1996).
99. *RFE/RL News Briefs*, 10–21 January 1994. The vote established that 99.95% of voters were in favour of this move.

100. 'Turkmenistan: Communist? Us?', *The Economist* (17 December 1994), p. 66.

101. John Anderson, 'Authoritarian political Development in Central Asia: the case of Turkmenistan', *Central Asian Survey*, 14/4 (1995), p. 513.

102. Maria Subtelny, 'The Cult of Holy Places', op. cit.

103. John Anderson, 'Authoritarian Political Development', op. cit., p. 516.

104. For a full list of Turkmen tribes and a precise breakdown of the size and location of these groups refer to Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1985). For historical accounts of the antagonisms between the Turkmen refer to Mehmet Saray's *The Turkmens in the Age of Imperialism* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 1989) and Nikolay Murav'ev's *Journey to Khiva through the Turkoman Country* (London: Oguz Press, 1977), p. 102. First published in Russia in 1822.

105. Shirin Akiner, 'Central Asia: conflict or stability and development', op. cit., p. 11.

106. 'Turkmenistan: Observers see cracks in Niyazov's edifice', *Labyrinth*, 1/3 (Summer 1994), p. 6.

107. I. Zhukov, 'Saparmurad Niyazov will remain president till 2002', *Central Asia Today*, 2 (1994), p. 60.

108. Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's New States*, op. cit., p. 147.

109. Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, *Address to the Peoples of Turkmenistan* (Ankara: Nurol Printing Co., 1993), p. 17.

110. Quoted in John Anderson, 'Political development in Turkmenistan', op. cit., p. 513.

111. Christopher Panico, 'Turkmenistan Unaffected by Winds of Change', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 2/4 (22 Jan. 1993).

112. 'A Hotbed of Hostilities in Central Asia: The Spectre of Afghan War Looming Large', *Central Asian Forum*, 8 (August 1993), pp. 25–8, and 'Few Russians left in Tadzhikistan', *Labyrinth*, 1/3 (Summer 1994), p. 11.

113. Barnett R. Rubin, 'The Fragmentation of Tajikistan', *Survival: The IISS Quarterly*, 35/4 (Winter 1993–4).

114. Originally the whole region spoke in east Iranian dialects until the Arabian and Persian conquests after which Farsi a west Iranian language, predominated. See Victor Porkhomovsky, 'Historical Origins of Inter-ethnic Conflicts in Central Asia and Transcaucasia' in 'Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict', Vitaly Naumkin (ed.), op. cit.

115. Anthony Richter, 'Springtime in Tajikistan', *World Policy Journal*, 2 (1994), p. 84.

116. Refer to Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, 'National reconciliation: the imperfect whim', *Central Asian Survey*, 15/3/4 (1996), pp. 331–2.

117. *Background Brief: Conflict in Tajikistan*, (London, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, January 1997), p. 3.

118. The two political parties, *Rastakhiz* (Revival, set up at the end of 1989) and the Islamic Renaissance Party (its leader is Muhammedsharif Khimmatzoda is from Gharm) and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (again its leader. Shodmon Yusupov was from Garm), joined forces and became known as the 'Islamic-democratic opposition' whereas the national guard (pro Nabiev) were called the 'Popular Front'. The government was supported by the

Republican Party of Tajikistan which was created by a faction within the DPT that represented the Leninabad region. For more on this refer to Aziz Niyazi, 'Tajikistan', in *Central Asia & the Caucasus after the Soviet Union*, op. cit. p. 180.

119. Bess Brown, 'Whither Tajikistan?', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 1/24 (12 June 1992); Bess Brown, 'Tajikistan: The Fall of Nabiev', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 1/38 (25 Sept. 1992); and also Barnett Rubin, 'The Fragmentation of Tajikistan', *Survival*, 35/4 (Fall 1994).

120. Roland Danreuther, 'Russia, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf', *Survival*, 35/4 (Winter 1993), p. 99.

121. The percentage of Uzbeks in each of the regions is as follows: 45% Uzbeks in Hissar, 31.9% in Kurghan Tyube, 31.3% in Khojand and 12.7% in Kulyab. See Barnett Rubin, 'The Fragmentation of Tajikistan', op. cit.

122. Keith Martin, 'Tajikistan: Civil War without End?', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 2/33 (20 August 1993), p. 25.

123. Bess Brown, 'Whither Tajikistan?', op. cit.

124. *Background Brief: Conflict in Tajikistan*, op. cit., p. 2.

125. 'Tajikistan: Votes and plov', *The Economist* (12 November 1994), p. 94.

126. 'A Hotbed of Hostilities in Central Asia: The Spectre of Afghan War Looming Large', *Central Asian Forum* (published in Kazakhstan), 8 (August 1993), pp. 25–8; Bruce Pannier 'A Year of Violence in Tajikistan', *Transition*, 3/2 (February 1997).

127. *Summary of World Broadcasts: Former USSR*, SU 2645 G/1 (22 June 1996); Roland Danreuther, 'Russia, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf', *Survival*, 35/4 (Winter 1993), p. 101; also Anthony Richter, 'Springtime in Tajikistan', *World Policy Journal*, 2 (1994).

128. 'Military Crisis forces compromise', *Labyrinth*, 1/4 (Autumn 1994), p. 10.

129. Joint statement broadcast on 25 December 1996 by President Imomali Rakhmonov and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition. Sayed Abdullo Nuri. Quoted in Background Brief (London: Foreign & Commonwealth Office, January 1997), p. 1.

130. 'Opposition leader urges government to recognize secular movement'. *Summary of World Broadcasts*, SU/2828 G/1 (28 January 1997).

131. Shahrbanou Tadjbaksh, op. cit., p. 333.

132. For example, the recent kidnapping of U.N. personnel by Bahrom Sadirov in order to ensure his bother's safe return from Afghanistan. *Summary of World Broadcasts: Former USSR*, SU/2837 G/1.

133. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, 'Islam and Nationalism', *Central Asian Survey*, 1/3 (1983).

134. Iftikhar H. Malik, 'Issues in Contemporary South and Central Asian Politics', *Asian Survey*, 32/10 (October 1992), p. 901.

135. Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, (London: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 139.

6   IRON FIST OR VELVET REVOLUTION?

*   The title alludes to the two possible outcomes at the opposite ends of the political spectrum, authoritarian rule or democratic consolidation. Martha

Brill Olcott refers to the former as the rule of the 'iron fist' and the latter as the 'silk revolution'. Refer to Olcott, *Central Asia's New States*, op. cit.

1. For more on this see Annika Savill, 'Tehran Summit a focus for Asia power struggle', *The Independent* (18 February 1992), p. 10.
2. *RFE/RL News Briefs*, 10–21 Jan. 1994.
3. Ibid., 24–28 Jan. 1994.
4. 'Liter-ally', *The Financial Times* (16 March 1993), p. 21.
5. Boris Rumer, 'Central Asia's Gathering Storm', *Orbis*, 37/1 (Winter 1993).
6. Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's New States*, op. cit., p. 42.
7. Rajan Menon, 'In the Shadow of the Bear', *International Security*, 20/1 (Summer 1995), p. 161.
8. *Central Asia Newsfile*, No. 4, Feb. 1993.
9. The most thorough investigation of these explanations continues to be Nancy Lubin's, *Labour and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1984).
10. Sergei Poliakov, *Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), p. xvi.
11. Anthony Richter, 'Springtime in Tajikistan', *World Policy Journal*, 2 (1994).
12. Cassandra Cavanaugh, 'Uzbekistan's Long Road to the Market', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 1/29 (17 July 1992).
13. Gregory Gleason, 'Central Asia: Land Reform and the Ethnic Factor', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 2/3 (15 January 1993).
14. According to 1993 data the Gross National Product compared to 1989 was 65% in Kazakhstan, 68.4% in Kirghizstan, 50% Tajikistan 50% in Turkmenistan and 85.6% in Uzbekistan. Refer to Raushan Yelemesov, 'Kazakhstan Turns into a Third World Country', *Kazakhstan Weekly*, 39 (28 September 1994), p. 5.
15. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, 'Return of the Citizen' in Ronald Beiner, *Theorizing Citizenship* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 304.
16. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 'Democratization and War', *Foreign Affairs*, 74/3 (1995), and 'Democratization and the Danger of War', *International Security*, 20/1 (Summer 1995).
17. Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's New States*, op. cit., p. 155.
18. Yuriy Kulchik, Andrey Fadin and Victor Sergeev, *Central Asia After The Empire* (London: Pluto Press, 1996), p. 42; see also *Labyrinth*, 2/2 (Spring 1995), p. 2.
19. John Anderson, *The International Politics of Central Asia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 192.
20. Ian Bremmer and Cory Welt, op. cit., p. 258.
21. 10 Ukrainians, 3 Germans, 3 Jews 1 Uzbek and 1 Tatar. See *RFE/RL News Briefs*, 14–18 March 1994.
22. Refer to 'CSCE gives thumbs down for Kazakh election', *Labyrinth*, 1/2 (Spring 1994), p. 1.
23. 'Kazakh Parliamentary election Results', *Labyrinth*, 3/1 (Spring 1996), p. 1.
24. Refer to John Anderson, *The International Politics of Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 98.
25. 'Constitutional Crisis in Osh', *Labyrinth*, 3/3 (Autumn 1996), p. 5.
26. Refer to 'Kyrgyz election aftermath', *Labyrinth*, 2/2 (Summer 1995), p. 8.

27. For example, Omurbek Tekebayev's registration was disallowed along with several others, 'Akayev romps home in Kyrgyz elections', *Labyrinth*, 3/1 (Spring 1996), p. 5.
28. John Anderson, *The International Politics of Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 95.
29. 'Karimov seeks extended term', *Labyrinth*, 2/2 (Summer 1995), p. 12.
30. 'Uzbek and Turkmen Parliamentary Elections', *Labyrinth*, 2/1 (Spring 1995), p. 9.
31. John Anderson, 'Constitutional development in Central Asia', *Central Asian Survey*, 16/3 (1997).
32. Out of the 181 seats in the new Parliament a hundred went to the Communist Party. Refer to Yuriy Kulchik *et al.*, *Central Asia After the Empire*, op. cit., p. 79; and John Anderson, *The International Politics of Central Asia*, op. cit., p. 182.
33. 'Kazakhstan moves towards Presidential rule', *Labyrinth*, 4/2 (Summer 1997), p. 3.
34. 'Referendum on Constitution in Kyrgyzstan', *Labyrinth*, 3/2 (Summer 1996), p. 5.
35. Refer to Robert Dahl's *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) for what he considers the requirements for the establishment of democracy.
36. Refer to Shirin Akiner, *Central Asia: Conflict or Stability and Development?* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1997), pp. 29 and 34.
37. John Anderson, 'Constitutional development in Central Asia', *Central Asian Survey*, 16/3 (1997), p. 303.
38. Refer to Chapter 7 in Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
39. The first meeting was held in December 1994. Refer to John Anderson, 'Constitutional development in Central Asia', op. cit., p. 314.
40. Martha Brill Olcott refers to Islam Karimov's use of his executive powers as the rule of the 'iron fist'; she also refers to the possibility of a 'silk revolution' whereby a similar train of events occur in Central Asia as occurred in Eastern Europe. Refer to Olcott, *Central Asia's New States*, op. cit., p. 55.

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